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investments. I show that the standard "backward linkage'' measure used to estimate technology spillovers
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Benjamin G. Hyman
Gilles Duranton
Ann Harrison
This dissertation consists of three chapters studying the effects of diverse public policy
instruments on firm productivity and local labor markets.
The first chapter analyzes how the US’s largest policy for retraining trade-displaced
workers—–Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA)–—affects earnings and employment
outcomes. Prior research has been limited by two challenges precluding credible estimates:
a lack of quality data to track worker movements across employers, and selection into
training programs. Leveraging an institutional feature of TAA that assigns two otherwise
equal TAA applicants to investigators of varying approval leniencies, I estimate the causal
returns to retraining for roughly 300,000 displaced workers by merging Census Bureau
microdata with TAA winning and losing petitions.
I find large initial returns to TAA. Ten years out, TAA-trained workers have $50,000
higher cumulative earnings. Yet annual returns fully depreciate after ten years. Returns
are concentrated in the most disrupted regions, where workers are more likely to
switch industries and move to labor markets with better opportunities in response to
training—consistent with adjustment frictions. Despite some inefficiencies, the results
highlight that TAA may serve as an important tag for redistributing the growth from trade
to adversely affected workers.
The second chapter, joint with Ann Harrison, Shanthi Nataraj, and Leslie Martin, compares
the impact of command-and-control (CAC) regulations and coal price variation on firm
iv
pollution abatement, coal consumption, and productivity growth in India. Both CAC
regulations and higher coal prices resulted in improved air quality. CAC regulations
increased the share of large establishments investing in pollution control equipment. In
contrast, higher coal prices reduced the intensive margin of coal use more broadly, with
price elasticities similar to those found in the US. In terms of productivity, CAC regulations
imposed a higher cost on large firms.
The third chapter reconsiders host country productivity spillovers from multinational
corporation (MNC) investments. I show that the standard “backward linkage” measure
used to estimate technology spillovers implicitly assumes domestic and foreign firms share
the same input structure. Mean backward linkages reduce in half when the share of locally
sourced inputs is adjusted to reflect MNC’s observably higher propensity to import inputs.
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CHAPTER 1 : Can Displaced Labor Be Retrained? Evidence from Quasi-Random
Assignment to Trade Adjustment Assistance
1.1. Introduction
Between 2000 and 2016 the US shed approximately 6 million manufacturing jobs, resulting
in the lowest level of manufacturing employment since the onset of World War II
(BLS, 2017).1 Strikingly, this decline contrasted with record revenue growth in both
manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries over the same period (see Figure 1.1). In
light of increasing pressure from trade and automation, are today’s workers able to adjust
to labor market disruptions as they have in the past?
While economists have generally considered worker adjustment to shocks such as trade
to be relatively frictionless, the unusual speed of these recent structural changes has
prompted a fresh look at whether growing industries can absorb and offset declining
earnings among displaced workers. Standard Ricardian trade theories predict that
relatively higher- and lower-skilled economies stand to “gain from trade” if skill-intensive
labor markets specialize in high value-added activities (like computer software) and
trade for lower value-added goods and services (such as textiles). However, these
models also conventionally assume that workers facing short-run job displacement from
trade either adjust instantaneously to newly expanding sectors (i.e. labor is perfectly
mobile), or are compensated by redistributive government transfers that preserve trade’s
Pareto-improving qualities.2
Though many studies have shown that removing trade barriers can increase growth and
1Pierce and Schott (2016) highlight that the recent manufacturing decline contrasts with a stable
employment trend which had varied around 18 million jobs from 1965 until the accession of China to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.
2Economists have relied on the notion of “Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency” (Kaldor, 1939; Hicks, 1939) to relax
strong Pareto assumptions which preclude “losers” from trade. Instead, an allocation is Kaldor-Hicks efficient
if losing factors of production can hypothetically be compensated by winning factors. Building on the work
of Dixit and Norman (1986), Feenstra and Lewis (1994) show that redistributive compensation from levying
taxes on winning factors are more likely to result in a Pareto-improving allocation if combined with mobility
subsidies to overcome adjustment frictions.
1
consumer welfare through specialization, lower goods prices, and higher variety,3 less
attention has been given to adverse labor outcomes because imports from low-wage
countries had been relatively inconsequential until the 1990s (Autor et al., 2016).
More recently however, influential papers in empirical trade and labor economics
have documented that displaced workers may remain persistently underemployed and
underpaid (with respect to prior earnings) years beyond their initial job separation (Bartik
A., 2017; Lachowksa et al., 2017; Pierce and Schott, 2016; Flaaen et al., 2016; Autor et al.,
2014, 2013; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Harrison and McMillan, 2011).4 As jobs and tasks
become increasingly outsourceable and automated, there is also growing concern about
how future generations of US workers will sustain wage growth in a rapidly transforming
innovation economy. For example, 1.3 million truck drivers will likely compete with
the emergence of self-driving vehicle technology by 2026 (CEA, 2016). Such issues were
especially salient during the 2016 US Presidential election, which featured protectionist
backlash against trade on both sides of the political aisle.5
Yet in spite of widespread concern and a growing literature on adjustment frictions,
surprisingly little is known about whether the US’s largest and longest standing incentive
program for retraining displaced workers—the Department of Labor’s 1974 Trade
Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program—is a necessary, effective, or efficient means to
accelerate adjustment. The main contribution of this paper is to provide large-sample
empirical estimates of the causal effects of retraining trade-impacted workers on labor
market outcomes. Credible parameter estimates of these effects have historically been
complicated by two factors: (1) A lack of detailed worker-level data to track TAA
participants before and after displacement events across employers; (2) Confounding
3Recent work by Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016) further suggests low-income workers have the most
to gain from trade, as they bear a disproportionate incidence of lower consumer prices due to a higher
propensity to consume tradable goods.
4Feenstra et al. (2017) and Feenstra and Sasahara (2017) find that manufacturing job losses are offset
by service job growth, however these papers do not address distributional consequences which can persist
despite aggregate gains.
5Autor et al. (2016) study the effects of rising trade exposure on political polarization, and find that
exposure to trade with China decreased the number of moderate congressional representatives in office.
2
factors correlated with qualifying for TAA, particularly pre-determined skills and
trends associated with tradable-good production and training take-up—selection biases
which preclude reliable estimates of the program’s effects. In this paper, I employ a
quasi-experimental research design that builds on the rapidly maturing examiner (judge
randomization) methodological literature to circumvent these endogeneity concerns.
Applying this strategy in a “big data” setting, I estimate the causal effects of TAA benefits
on displaced worker earnings, employment, education, and mobility outcomes from 1990
to 2011.6
I first assemble a new dataset combining restricted-use administrative data from the US
Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) dataset with the
universe of TAA winning and losing petitions (applications) attained through Freedom
of Information Act requests at the US Department of Labor (DOL). This unique merger
allows me to track a sample of approximately 300,000 displaced workers as they move in
and out of unemployment status and across employers of diverse industries and regions,
both before and after their initial job separation. Critically, DOL petition data contain the
unique names of investigators responsible for determining whether workers qualify for
TAA. These investigators are tasked with subjectively determining whether applicants
were laid off by companies whose decline in production (sales) was due to increased
imports or offshoring—an adjudication of the firm’s trade exposure or “tradability” status.
I show that this institutional feature of TAA effectively assigns two otherwise identical
worker cohorts (displaced from the same industry), different TAA approval probabilities
based on whether their case is directed to a more lenient versus strict investigator.
If assigned quasi-randomly to more lenient investigators, displaced workers have a
higher likelihood of receiving TAA benefits. These include up to $10,000/year for two
6Recent examples of such examiner designs include Dobbie and Song (2015), who use the random
assignment of bankruptcy judges to establish the causal effects of consumer bankruptcy insurance on
debtor outcomes; Autor et al. (2015), who study the welfare impact of disability benefits in Norway;
and Mueller-Smith (2015), who studies the impacts of incarceration. The original idea to exploit judge
randomization as a causal design can be attributed to Kling (2006).
3
years of training and on average $15,000/year of extended unemployment insurance
(UI) while training. I leverage this assignment as an exogenous source of variation in
training take-up to identify the causal effects of TAA in a two stage least squares (2SLS)
setting—mapping out differential and dynamic earnings responses using investigator
leniency as an instrumental variable.7
I find evidence of large initial returns to TAA. Workers inferred to take up benefits forego
roughly $10,000 in income while training, yet ten years later have approximately $50,000
higher cumulative earnings relative to all-else-equal workers that do not retrain. I estimate
that 40% of these returns are driven by higher wages—a sizable share which suggests that
TAA-trained workers are not only compensated through greater labor force participation
or higher priority in job queues. Rather, TAA workers also appear to be paid a premium
for their newly acquired human capital. But these large relative gains also decay over time.
In fact, annual incomes among TAA and non-TAA workers fully converge after ten years.
In conjunction with two additional pieces of evidence—that TAA has no effect on formal
education, and diminishing returns are restricted to states with low training durations—I
attribute this depreciation to short-run demanded skills becoming obsolete (consistent
with rapid skill-biased technological change or an overall declining labor share).8 Indeed,
62% of TAA training programs confer vocational degrees with shorter program lengths
than typical community college or 4-year college degrees which have been shown to have
durable earnings returns (Card (2001); Kane and Rouse (1995)).
While these results provide strong evidence that overall earnings returns to TAA are
largely positive, government intervention in the adjustment process is only warranted
economically in the presence of market failures or if redistribution is socially desirable.9
7While this design is well-equipped to estimate an important adjustment parameter with respect to
training, the TAA treatment effect (estimated here using an intent-to-treat framework) should be thought
of as just one input into a richer trade model characterizing the full efficiency and distributional consequences
of trade liberalization.
8For a discussion of the potential determinants of the declining labor share in the United States, see Autor
et al. (2017).
9There are arguably other less distortive ways to achieve the latter redistributive goal. See for example
recent work by Lyon and Waugh (2017), who consider optimal progressive taxation schemes to redistribute
4
While human capital theory suggests that wage differentials across occupations should
provide ample incentives for workers and firms to privately undertake skill upgrading
(Becker, 1964), laid off machine operators in Detroit’s automobile sector may face a variety
of frictions that prevent them from acquiring productive employment in expanding sectors
such as robotics occupations in Pittsburgh’s burgeoning 3D-printing industry. Among
several possible barriers to adjustment, these frictions may be spatial or industrial—high
mobility costs across labor markets and industries stagnate worker wages in trade-afflicted
labor markets (Bartik A., 2017; Yagan, 2014; Kline and Moretti, 2013; Blanchard and Katz,
1992); informational—search costs result in job mismatch after displacement (Moretensen
and Pissarides, 1994); financial—liquidity constraints preclude the necessary investments
in retraining and education required for work in the modern economy (Lochner
and Monge-Naranjo, 2011); or behavioral—workers may be “present-biased” or make
forecasting errors about the future viability of their local industries (Augenblick et al.,
2015).
To unpack which frictions underlie the main effects (if any), I conduct a variety of
empirical tests exploiting the rich heterogeneity of the administrative data to identify
potential mechanisms. I find strongest support for spatial and industrial adjustment
frictions. Merging county-level Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) unemployment rate
data to the LEHD panel, I define “high” and “low” shock severity regions based on
whether the county in which a TAA-qualified worker was displaced was above or below
median unemployment in their quarter of separation. I find that workers in highly
disrupted regions are more likely to switch both industries and commuting zones (a
now widely used geographic measure of local labor markets) in response to training.
Workers are approximately 30 percentage points more likely to move commuting zones
and 50 percentage points more likely to switch industries (at the 2-digit North American
Industrial Classification System (NAICS) level), with respect to the location and industry
of their pre-layoff employer. While not as well identified due to potential selection
the gains from trade.
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concerns (but nonetheless supported by common pre-trends), I also present suggestive
evidence that positive earnings returns among “movers” drive the overall effects relative
to “stayers”.10 Lastly, I find no evidence that TAA subsidies lead to deferred job search,
which suggests that effects are more likely due to the training itself rather than relieving
liquidity or search constraints.
While the paper’s identification strategy provides robust evidence of positive earnings
returns and higher mobility associated with TAA, this does not inform us about the
cost-effectiveness of the program. Toward this second end, I compare the ten year stream
of estimated TAA differential earnings returns as benefits, with average TAA expenditures
on training, extended UI, and foregone earnings while training, as costs. I estimate an
internal rate of return (IRR) to TAA of between 0.0% and 9.1%, which I interpret as a
lower bound for two reasons. First, earnings returns are calculated from an intent-to-treat
(ITT) estimator which likely understates benefits due to imperfect compliance with the
treatment (i.e. partial take-up of TAA attenuates earnings estimates toward zero and
understate the treatment-on-treated (TOT) effect of interest). Second, TAA may induce
worker substitution away from other costly social insurance programs such as disability
insurance (DI), which would further understate program costs.11
One important caveat however, is that positive earnings returns are estimated from a
local average treatment effect (LATE) that does not capture the fact that firms may be
incentivized to lay off additional workers after learning of their TAA eligibility status.
Nevertheless, back-of-the-envelope calculations show that these are unlikely to outweigh
potentially much larger downward pressures.
Overall, this paper provides new quasi-experimental evidence that earnings returns from
trade-adjustment targeting via retraining may be larger and more effective than previously
10As is discussed further below, whether a worker switches or stays in their initial commuting zone or
industry is defined by their ex-post mobility decisions, which may reflect a self-selected sample that differs
along a number of unobservables.
11Autor et al. (2014) find that DI is in fact the predominant margin through which workers adjust to trade
shocks.
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thought. More work is needed however, to fully understand the extent to which such
targeting alleviates aggregate worker adjustment barriers. Despite some noteworthy
inefficiencies, TAA may serve as an important tag for redistributing the growth from
trade. However, whether these results can be extrapolated to future types of trade and
automation pressures remains an open question.
1.1.1. Related Literature
While this paper is one of the first to empirically estimate the effects of TAA on worker
outcomes, the study builds on a long history of scholarship in labor economics, trade,
and public economics. Particularly, this analysis is positioned at the intersection of three
distinct literatures:
(1) The impact of worker displacement and trade on inequality.
(2) The effects of job training on earnings and human capital accumulation.
(3) The role of local labor market and occupational mobility frictions in earnings growth.
Starting with displacement and inequality, this paper most directly follows the work of
Autor et al. (2016), who study long run earnings adjustment patterns of workers exposed
to Chinese import competition using administrative Social Security Administration (SSA)
data. The authors find long-run negative effects from trade, and show that trade-affected
workers take up disability insurance (DI) rather than trade adjustment assistance to insure
themselves against these shocks.12 Recently, other scholars have also studied displacement
and inequality through the lenses of trade (Pierce and Schott, 2016; Ebenstein et al., 2014;
Autor et al., 2013; Amiti and Davis, 2011; Harrison and McMillan, 2011; Kletzer, 2004),
technology and automation (Autor et al., 2013; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Goldin and
Katz, 2009), business cycle fluctuations (Lachowksa et al. (2017), Von Wachter et al. (2009)),
and reasons for separation (Flaaen et al., 2016). One additional catalyst for renewed interest
12One can compare these persistent adverse effects form import competition to the relative returns to
retraining through TAA. Importantly however, Autor et al. (2016) consider the joint effect on workers who
may see reduced earnings or hours on the intensive margin, as well as workers who are displaced (the unit of
analysis in this paper). These sample differences thus present important caveats when making direct estimate
comparisons.
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in this topic has been greater availability of administrative datasets which facilitate more
precise estimates of heterogeneous responses to different types of separation events.
Work on displacement has also been linked to a longer tradition of scholarship on
job training, which has been the source of several methodological advancements in
labor economics and debate surrounding the econometrics of program evaluation.
Early literature focused on either model-based econometric selection correction methods
(Heckman, 1976) or difference-in-differences estimators (Ashenfelter (1978)) to address a
number of endogeneity concerns, and found little to no effects of job training on worker
outcomes. Ashenfelter and Card (1985) however, showed that difference-in-differences
estimates were sensitive to the control groups used, while LaLonde (1986) demonstrated
that experimental results did not match non-randomized econometric studies. This
was followed by rapid advancement in the development of matching estimators and
propensity score methods (Heckman et al., 1996, 1997), and continued debate over how
to resolve the critique of nonexperimental approaches to estimation.13
In their 1999 handbook chapter, Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) bridge the debate
by calling for better data and experimental evidence when possible. Subsequently, in
a meta-analysis of 97 job training program evaluations from 1995 to 2007 that more
frequently employ experimental variation and higher quality data, Card et al. (2010)
follow up on prior estimates with a similarly titled handbook chapter, and conclude that
”...training programmes are associated with positive medium-term impacts, although in
the short term they often appear ineffective.” When converted to standardized effect sizes,
this paper’s main employment results fall near the middle of those effect sizes classified as
“significantly positive” in the Card et al. (2010) study.
While TAA is a sizable training program, there is a surprising dearth of evidence on its
empirical effects on workers.14 One notable exception is a recent study by Mathematica
13Dehejia and Wahba (1999) first indicated that LaLonde’s critique could be addressed using propensity
score methods, but later work by Smith and Todd (2001) showed the limitations of this approach.
14Notable exceptions include Feenstra and Lewis (1994), who provide a strong theoretical foundation for
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Policy Research authors Schochet et al. (2012), who evaluate the effects of TAA by
comparing program enrollees with a propensity-score matched sample of UI claimants
that do not take up TAA. The authors find a mostly negative result, concluding that
“...impacts of TAA on engagement in any productive activity were small.” However, they
are also very careful to note two important caveats in interpreting their effects. First,
the sample frame used in their study included manufacturing workers who were laid
off just before a large economic downturn—sampled between 2005 to 2006. Since TAA
trainees enroll for up to 2 to 3 years and the study only tracked workers for 4 years after
enrollment, TAA workers would have entered a more dismal labor market relative to
matched UI claimants who may have been reemployed during a more robust economy
after exhausting short-run UI benefits.15 Second, and consistent with conclusions from
the propensity score literature which calls for a large number of observables for internal
validity (Todd (2010)), the authors recognize that unobserved heterogeneity may result
in differently selected samples across the two groups. By contrast, this study leverages
a quasi-experimental design and tracks workers over 20 years using a wide range of
administrative and demographic variables.
The third literature this paper builds on relates to imperfect spatial and industrial mobility.
Pioneering work by Blanchard and Katz (1992) highlighted the empirical importance of
worker mobility as an equilibrating factor across differently shocked labor markets, and
has been followed more recently by studies illuminating the need for careful estimates of
how mobility constraints affect worker outcomes. These questions have been studied in
the context of migratory insurance during recessions (Yagan (2014)), responses to trade
shocks ((Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2017; Bartik A., 2017; Kovak et al., 2017)), and more
broadly in the context of place-based policies and taxation (Serrato-Suárez and Zidar
(2016), Kline and Moretti (2014, 2013)). In these and other papers, relaxing the benchmark
considering the role of adjustment assistance in the context of imperfect mobility. Monarch et al. (2017)
and Kondo (2013) also use TAA-approved plants as a lever to study the effects of offshoring on firms and
displacement multipliers respectively.
15Standard UI benefits typically last for 26 weeks, however during the Great Recession both generosity and
duration were greatly expanded.
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of a perfectly elastic labor supply across regions, sectors, and occupations, generate all
types of frictions which are only now beginning to be tested empirically. In this paper, I
contribute direct causal estimates of how training programs affect worker mobility across
local labor markets and industries.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides institutional background
on Trade Adjustment Assistance, worker eligibility for benefits, and the composition of
training programs taken up. In Section 1.3, I discuss the main administrative data sources
used, matching procedures and sample restrictions. Section 1.4 outlines the investigator
leniency identification strategy and estimating equations. Section 1.5 presents the main
results on worker-level outcomes, and heterogeneous mobility and training intensity
effects. I contextualize these results in a cost-benefit analysis in Section 1.6, presenting
the internal rate of return of TAA and sensitivity to assumptions. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2. Trade Adjustment Assistance
When considerations of national policy make it desirable to avoid higher tariffs, those
injured by that competition should not be required to bear the full brunt of the impact.
Rather, the burden of economic adjustment should be borne in part by the Federal
Government... But the accent is on “adjustment” more than “assistance”. Through
trade adjustment prompt and effective help can be given to those suffering genuine
hardship in adjusting to import competition, moving men and resources of uneconomic
production into efficient production and competitive positions...
—John F. Kennedy, Congressional address on the 1962 Trade Expansion Act (originally cited by
Kondo (2013))16
16Institutional details in this section build on those presented in Monarch et al. (2017) and Kondo (2013),
and are amended based on secondary sources and interviews with Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance
officials.
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1.2.1. Institutional Background
US Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) is a federal transfer program established under
the 1962 Trade Expansion Act which provides assistance to workers “who lose their jobs
or whose hours of work and wages are reduced as a result of increased imports or shifts in
production out of the United States.”17 The program was established during the Kennedy
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and sought to couple
unprecedented trade liberalization (part of a more widespread post-war trade integration
effort) with adjustment insurance for adversely affected US workers.
The current program is governed by the 1974 Trade Act, and was amended several times
throughout the 1980s altering the generosity of its benefits. In 1993, TAA was expanded
to add additional coverage for workers directly affected by the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA-TAA), however this provision was subsequently repealed in
the Trade Act of 2002. Since 2002 however, TAA benefits have remained relatively stable
in expenditure terms. In fiscal year 2010, nearly $1 billion in annual cash transfers were
appropriated to subsidize an estimated 230,000 qualified workers to enroll in retraining
programs after trade-related layoffs.18 While TAA contains several program components,
its primary benefit is coverage of up to $10,000/recipient for every year a qualified worker
is retraining, up to a statutory maximum of three years. Coverage includes up to two
years for “basic” retraining, and an additional year for “remedial” training (if deemed
necessary) or “completion” training for workers who are close to completing a credentialed
curriculum but have exhausted basic benefits.
Recipients are also entitled to expanded unemployment insurance (UI) benefits while
training (called “Trade Readjustment Allowances” (TRA)), conditional on providing
regular proof of training enrollment. This conditional incentive design is distinct from
17Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration. https://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/
taa_wdp.cfm
18Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration. https://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/
factsheet.cf.
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standard UI, in that it intends to overcome moral hazard concerns associated with search
disincentives, imposing at least minimal “search effort” through job training.19 Workers
are eligible for extended UI for up to three years, including the standard initial 26-week
UI duration which is most common across US states. Median receipts on extended
UI roughly equaled $15,000/recipient-year from 2001 to 2016, slightly more than the
$10,000/recipient-year offered for training.20 Lastly, TAA covers minimal job search and
relocation costs, yet these comprise less than 0.1% of total spending, and are hence given
little attention throughout the analysis.21
TAA funds are allocated via state transfers to Cooperating State Agencies (CSAs) from
the Federal Unemployment Benefits and Allowances (FUBA) account. Once workers
are approved for TAA, state career centers (e.g. American Job Centers, One-Stop
Career Centers) guide workers to potential training program matches based on prior
experience. However, workers ultimately have choice over where to train. Once they have
demonstrated proof of enrollment, both training subsidies and regular TRA payments are
administered through local state career centers, where workers recoup paychecks.
1.2.2. Worker Eligibility
To receive TAA benefits, workers (or their surrogates) must file petitions at the Department
of Labor within one year of their trade-related separation from a given employer. Filers
may include groups of three or more workers (38% of total filers), companies filing on
behalf of laid off workers (36%), labor unions (13%), or state career centers (13%).22 From
1974 to 2016, the Department of Labor received petitions covering an estimated 8.2 million
workers, of which approximately 63% were approved for TAA (see Figure 1.2). Petitions
19Workers near retirement age however, may not find time and effort costs of training to be a high trade-off
for extended UI.
20The extent of this support varies formulaicly by each state’s initial UI generosity. Data used for this
calculation comes from the Trade Act Participant Report (TAPR) from 2001 to 2016. See Appendix 1.B.4 for
more details.
21TAA has also been experimenting with wage insurance to bridge the income gap for older workers,
however this program (know as Alternative or Reemployment TAA) is beyond the scope of the current project.
22Percentages from author calculations based on DOL petition data, 1974 - 2016.
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were filed on behalf of workers from more than 40,000 unique plants, and the number of
approved applicants began to outstrip denied applicants after the passage of NAFTA.23
Once a petition is filed at the Department of Labor (DOL), Office of Trade Adjustment
Assistance supervisors (“certifying officers”) assign petitions to case investigators working
from the Washington D.C. headquarters.24 (This assignment process is described in greater
detail in the identification strategy in Section 1.4.) These investigators are tasked with
subjectively determining whether applicants were laid off by companies whose decline
in production (sales) was due to increased imports or outsourcing, and have subpoena
power to request confidential information from any given firm or plant to assess whether
its separated workers qualify for TAA.25 To qualify, investigators look for one of three
criteria:
(1) Direct reduction in sales from import competition
(2) Shifts in production outside the US
(3) Upstream supplier or downstream client of firms affected by (1) or (2)
Importantly, once investigators certify a petition associated with a given plant, all workers
displaced from that plant within a specified 3-year eligibility window automatically
qualify for TAA, despite who files. The timeline below illustrates this point, and shows
which displaced workers are eligible for TAA based on a statutory window around the
petition determination date (event time τ = 0). When a petition is filed, investigators
record the “impact date” as the date a worker-cohort was laid off due to a trade event,
which may not exceed one year prior to when the petition is filed. The “expiry date”
marks the last day a worker can be laid off and still receive benefits—statutorily two years
after the petition decision.
23Figure 1.2 also demonstrates a countercyclical filing pattern. However this may be unsurprising, as firms
have been shown to make structural adjustments precisely during recessions (Aghion et al., 2005).
24The short TAA petition form can be found here: https://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/docs/
RevisedPetition.pdf
25Investigators do this by issuing Confidential Data Requests: https://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/pdf/
CDR_Service.pdf, and typically arrive at a determination decision within 60 days.
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In corresponding Census microdata, I thus identify my sample as all “displaced” workers
that move from positive to non-positive earnings at a petition-associated plant, within the
TAA eligibility window.26 One unintended consequence of this eligibility design is that
the plant itself may become aware of its workers’ TAA approval status after the decision
is made public at τ = 0. If so, firms with union-represented workforces or those located
in “company-towns” may have an incentive to fire additional workers who were originally
retained after the first wave of layoffs, with the knowledge that these workers will be
compensated.27 Because retained workers are presumably selected for higher productivity
and would only be laid off if approved for TAA, this could contaminate the treatment
group and bias earnings estimates upwards. I thus only include workers laid off in the
one year prior to the petition decision. Despite this relatively conservative condition, I am
still able to identify a final sample of roughly 300,000 displaced workers after sampling
restrictions.
While the treatment is effectively at the plant-level, this does not guarantee that
information about TAA eligibility disseminates to all qualified workers. However, it
does allow for the estimation of an intent-to-treat (ITT) estimator which reflects the
effects of qualifying for TAA despite potential program shortcomings such as information
26The main results are robust to a number of sensitivity samples that use alternative definitions of
displacement that more closely follow the “mass layoff” literature. These are discussed further in the sample
restrictions outlined in Section 1.3.
27Whether the motive is profit or non-profit rooted, as noted above, most petitions are filed by companies
instituting layoffs rather than workers or unions.
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asymmetries. Indeed, Schochet et al. (2012) estimate that 25-45% of workers offered TAA
benefits actually take up the program. In combination with the additional restriction above
to preclude perverse incentive problems, these are important limitations when interpreting
local average treatment effects and weighing program benefits against costs.
1.2.3. TAA Training Programs
The Department of Labor classifies training by three main categories: occupational
(vocational, trade schools, community college, associates degree, etc.), remedial
(elementary proficiency), and on-the-job (training at the firm from which the worker
separated with the expectation of rehiring after training).28 According to TAA performance
data from 2000 to 2016, 62% of TAA workers enrolled in occupational training programs,
18% in community college and credentialed programs, 15% in remedial programs, and less
than 1% in on-the-job or apprentice training programs (Trade Act Participant Report).
For a subset of this data (2001 to 2007), I am able to observe the most targeted post-training
occupations and most frequent occupational transitions using DOL-ascribed occupational
codes (O*Net 4.0 8-digit codes). Consistent with expanding industries during this time
period, the most targeted occupations from TAA training were computer operators, office
clerks, transcribing-machine operators, medical assistants, and nursing aids. In terms of
occupation switching, some workers choose training programs to deepen industry-specific
human capital, while others appear to enroll in training to expand more general human
capital. For example, two of the most commonly displaced occupations during this time
period were commercial aircraft workers and men’s clothing workers. Many commercial aircraft
workers retrained in areas that seem like natural transitions—becoming tractor operators
and air conditioning or refrigeration mechanics. However, another popularly targeted
occupation among this same group was medical assistants. Men’s clothing workers on
the other hand, frequently retrained to become sewing machine operators—choosing
almost exclusively to deepen knowledge in their own industries. While these reflect some
prominent examples of targeted switches, this does not inform us as to whether such
28While firms can be reimbursed directly for providing on-the-job training to laid-off workers, this
comprises a very small share of overall TAA training activities.
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transitions were actually successful.
1.3. Data Sources and Matching
This project uses two main administrative datasets, merging the history of TAA petitions
to U.S. Census Bureau administrative data.
1.3.1. TAA Historical Petition Database
I have first acquired the universe of approved and denied TAA petitions (1974-2016)
through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests at the DOL. This dataset contains an
observation for each petition (roughly 84,000 in total),29 and provides three critical pieces
of information.
1. First, each petition contains the plant (establishment) name and address, which I
leverage for matching to Census Bureau establishments and the workers employed
at those establishments.
2. Each petition contains a series of dates, including the petition filing date,
determination (TAA approval decision) date, impact date, and eligibility expiry date
(see Section 1.2 for definitions). These are used for identifying and pulling the set of
workers laid off in the eligibility window.
3. Crucially for the paper’s main identification strategy, each petition also contains the
last name of the investigator assigned to each case. These names were intensively
cleaned in close consult with DOL officials and validated with historical employee
records.30
The petition database additionally includes information on petitioner filer types (company,
union, worker-group, or state career center), DOL-assigned 4-digit Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) codes, the company’s main product or service (recorded as a
qualitative value), and an indicator for whether the petition was designated as part of
29This includes about 8,400 petitions for the NAFTA-TAA program described in Section 1.2.
30This was needed to calculate precise investigator leniency values. For example, this included tasks such
as identifying whether “Green” and “Greene” were the same or separate investigators.
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the NAFTA-TAA program, TAA, or both. Finally, each petition contains an estimate of
the number of workers covered—a 3-year estimate spanning the entire eligibility window
discussed above, that assumes that every laid off worker would take up the program.
Filers come from a variety of industries, from well-known automobile manufacturing
plants in Michigan, to displaced port workers in Seattle. Table 1.1 shows the location of the
top TAA filing zip codes and the industries associated with those zip codes in each decade
of the program’s existence. Moving from 1975 to 2016, filing has gradually moved from
manufacturing industries in “Rust Belt” states to a more disperse set, both geographically
and in terms value-added activities.
1.3.2. Construction of LEHD Worker-Level Panel
I merge TAA petition data to the US Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household
Dynamics (LEHD) administrative files. The LEHD files allow for the construction of a
detailed person-level panel dataset which tracks quarterly worker earnings, labor force
participation (employment), and educational status across employers, geographies, and
time. The core data are compiled from employer-reported Unemployment Insurance (UI)
filings at the state-level for every paid employee. While the LEHD data partnership spans
all 50 US states and covers over 90% of US workers,31 states approve researcher requested
data on a state-by-state basis. For this project, 24 states and the District of Columbia
approved data access.32 I use the 2011 LEHD snapshot which provides a relatively
balanced panel from 1990 to 2011 (see Appendix 1.A.1 for further details). Leveraging each
worker’s (de-identified) social security number, I merge in worker age, gender, and race,
from the Social Security Administration Numident file (available in the LEHD Individual
Characteristics File). Educational attainment variables are also available for Decennial
Census and American Community Survey (ACS) respondents (roughly 1 in 6 workers),
while education imputes based on Census Bureau multiple-imputation and probabilistic
31As part of the non-included 10%, the LEHD excludes workers who are self-employed, agricultural
workers, and some government employees. See Abowd et al. (2009) and Vilhuber and McKinney (2014) for
further details.
32These include AR, AZ, CA, CO, DC, DE, FL, IA, ID, IL, IN, KS, MD, ME, MO, MT, NM, NV, OK, OR, PA,
SC, TN, WA, WV.
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record linking methods are used for non-respondent workers.33 Education can take four
ordinal values: 1=Some High School; 2=High School Degree; 3=Some College; 4=College
Degree.
There are some important caveats imposed by the data limitations discussed above. Figure
1.3 compares the number of estimated TAA workers covered by filed petitions in all 50
states (cumulated over the entire TAA history from 1974 to 2016), against the number
of filers in the 24-state LEHD sub-sample from 1990 to 2011. These are mapped to
1990 Commuting Zone (CZs) geographies, which are the central unit of analysis when
measuring the effects of TAA on spatial mobility.34 The figure reveals that while filers
are generally concentrated in “Rust Belt” and southern manufacturing states, the LEHD
sub-sample is missing some notable political swing states such as Michigan, Wisconsin,
and Ohio (however contain others such as Pennsylvania).
Secondly, as is the case in most labor settings however, the LEHD cannot distinguish
between a number of cases that may be the cause of a missing earnings value. Following
standard practice, I designate a worker as unemployed if she has a missing earnings
value between two positive earnings observations. However I cannot discern between
unemployed workers versus those who are retired, deceased, reliant on extended take-up
of social insurance programs such as disability insurance, self-employed, or discouraged
from the labor force. Importantly, I also cannot know whether a worker with a missing
earnings value is in fact employed in a state outside of the set of 24 approved for this
project. This limitation would be most problematic for mobility estimates. In robustness
tests, I thus show that the main effects are stable when using the more contiguous West
Coast states shown in Figure 1.3 which are less likely to feature mobility outside of the
region.
33All effects of TAA on formal education are robust to using both imputed and non-imputed measures. It
also bears noting that while worker occupations are available for ACS respondents, these data were not made
available for the current draft however will be explored in future work.
34Using the definition from Dorn (2009), “Commuting Zones (CZs) provide a local labor market geography
that covers the entire land area of the United States. CZs are clusters of U.S. counties that are characterized by
strong within-cluster and weak between-cluster commuting ties.“
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1.3.3. Matching TAA Petitions to Displaced Workers at LEHD Employers
To be able to detect a potentially small effect size of TAA in noisy earnings data, I desire as
conservative a matching strategy as possible. To identify TAA filers at the worker-level, I
first have to identify both the correct TAA petitioner plants and the timing of the separation
event in the LEHD.
Beginning with identifying TAA plants, the 2011 LEHD snapshot contains each
establishment’s State Employer Identification Number (SEIN) and federal Employer
Identification Number (EIN), however does not directly report business name and
address.35 Using commingled IRS and Census data from the Business Register—the
Census Bureau’s most comprehensive database of U.S. business establishments (formerly
Standard Statistical Establishment List)—I am able to assign a company name and address
to each EIN in the LEHD, and subsequently match LEHD plants to TAA petitioners on
cleaned company names and addresses.
I keep only the first TAA petition associated with any given plant so that no worker is
assigned to both the treatment and control group due to multiple filings. I then match TAA
plant addresses to Business Register addresses in both the calendar year of the petition and
the year prior to the petition (to account for any potential filing lags or measurement error
in filing dates).36 Finally, I keep matched LEHD establishments if the plant address is
unique to a given state-year cell. By focusing on one-to-one matches, this circumvents
problems arising from matching one TAA establishment address to a Census location
containing many establishments at the same address (such as an office building). The
sample should thus be interpreted as representative of rural, stand-alone, manufacturing
plants. I then repeat this exact same procedure for company names, extensively cleaned in
both datasets.
Drawing three random samples of 100 TAA petitions, I manually cross-check company
names and addresses and verify a match rate of 98%, with the residual likely owing
35Each EIN and SEIN may have multiple and distinct units. For details on how this is dealt with, see
Appendix 1.A.1.
36I build a comprehensive address cleaning file based on other papers, including code generously provided
by Monarch et al. (2017) who also match TAA plants to Business Register addresses.
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to discrepancies between parent and subsidiary names which could not be reconciled
between the two datasets. This results in a final matched sample of 4,700 unique TAA
establishments—comprising roughly 13% of plants associated with TAA claimants from
1990 to 2011. Finally, each matched plant’s SEIN number can then be used to pull all
workers employed at those plants during the eligibility window described in Section
1.2.2. The final step is to pull the full job history for each of these workers, and identify
which workers separated or were “displaced”—defined here as moving from positive
non-positive earnings during the TAA eligibility window.37 For further details on this
procedure, please see Appendix 1.A.1.
1.3.4. Sample Restrictions and Summary Statistics
Having identified TAA-eligible displaced workers associated with both approved and
denied petitions, I implement a number of sample restrictions to focus on those who are
most likely to take up training were they randomly assigned TAA approval. As noted in
Section 1.2.2, I keep workers only if they were displaced in the year prior to the petition
decision, which eliminates one third of the original sample. I further restrict attention to
working-age individuals (22-65) who make less than $50,000/year (∼85th percentile) in all
years prior to the petition filing. This value is a commonly used threshold for Department
of Labor programs, and eliminates the spurious inclusion of CEOs, managers, and other
workers who are both unlikely to take up training and not the population of interest in this
study.
Quarterly earnings are deflated to 2010 real dollars using a seasonally adjusted consumer
price index. For computational tractability, I further collapse worker earnings to the
year relative to the petition decision (event time τ). While workers can furnish returns
from multiple employers, earnings are aggregated such that each worker only has one
earnings observation per relative year (the unit of analysis). I include observations 10 years
before and after the petition decision such that τ ∈ [−10, 10].38 These restrictions reduce
the overall dataset from ∼25 million to ∼4.2 million observations and 287,000 workers
37Workers can furnish returns from multiple employers, but earnings are aggregated (collapsed) such that
each worker only has one earnings observation per quarter.
38This window takes maximal advantage of the 21 years of data spanned by the LEHD.
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(rounded as per Census Bureau disclosure requirements). Earnings and employment
values are left- and right-censored within each worker panel, however the main paper
results are robust to both censoring and replacing edge values with zeros.
Lastly, for comparability with the labor literature, I define a “High Labor Force
Attachment” sub-group as the preferred analysis sample of the paper. This includes
workers with at least 8 quarters of positive earnings in the pre-period at or above
the full-time minimum wage equivalent ($7.25 * 2,082 average working hours in 2010
≈ $15,000 annually).39 This results in a final sample of 177,000 displaced workers.
However, all main results are robust to using both the high attachment sub-sample and
the unrestricted sample.
Table 1.2 shows summary statistics for both groups, pooled across all periods (pre-period
balance statistics are presented in the next table). Starting with panel A, workers in both
samples are largely middle-aged, predominantly white, and slightly skewed toward being
female. Worker high school and college graduation rates are almost exactly in line with
national averages for the time period.40 Because they are included based on a separation
event, worker earnings and quarters employed per year are expectedly below national
averages, with the average worker making $22,830 and $18,814 in each sample respectively
(see panel B). Workers have on average about 1 job, however there is large dispersion
in the worker’s total number of employers in a given year. As indicated by the county
unemployment rate at the time of filing, these workers are in highly distressed local labor
markets with unemployment rates near 6.5% (BLS Local Area Unemployment Statistics).
I also report overall mobility rates expressed as the likelihood a worker remains at the
firm, industry, or commuting zone of the employer from which they initially separated.
Regarding petitioner characteristics (panel C), companies and worker-groups are the most
common filers, followed by unions. It bears noting that approval rates are much higher
39Further restrictions on the petitioner side include keeping only those petitions assigned to investigators
with more than 10 cases, to eliminate potential noise associated with investigator leniency rates calculated
from small cells.
40Ryan and Siebens (2012) show that post-1990 high school graduation rates were roughly 80%—consistent
with adding the three education values in the summary statistics—whereas college graduation rates were
roughly 25%.
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when companies file with respect to non-company filers, which can be seen by comparing
“TAA Approved” versus “TAA Denied” groups in either sample.
Both samples contain roughly 250 case investigators during this time period, who remain
on average for about 10 years with the Department of Labor and handle roughly 23 TAA
cases over that tenure. To see the extent to which approval rates map to standard measures
of industry tradability and occupational offshorability associated with those industries
(presumably known to investigators), I merge in three known indices from Mian and Sufi
(2014), Autor and Dorn (2013), and Blinder (2007), which show that higher tradability
values are generally associated with the approved TAA groups. For details on their
construction at the industry-level, see Appendix 1.A.2.
1.4. Empirical Framework
1.4.1. Limitations to Difference-in-Differences
The top panel of Figure 4 plots raw means for TAA approved and denied workers across
their separation events, relative to the year of the petition decision (τ = 0). At first glance,
one might look at this figure and conclude that workers who are approved for TAA are no
different than those that are denied in the pre-period. The difference-in-differences (DID)
common trends assumption appears to hold visually, and thus we are tempted to interpret
the post-period (lack of) differential earnings response as a causal effect. However this is
highly misleading for at least two reasons.
First, these means mask incredible heterogeneity in both levels and pre-trends. In some
industries like textiles, TAA approved workers have both differentially declining earnings
and a lower level of overall earnings relative to non-TAA approved workers, which might
bias TAA effects downwards. Whereas in other support industries such as aluminum
manufacturing products and auto parts, TAA-approved pre-treatment earnings are much
higher than non-TAA earnings, which might bias TAA effects upwards.41 The point here is
that there is no good reason that approved workers should look like denied workers absent
41In additional results, I show distributions of differential levels and pre-trends across industries to
highlight violations of the DID identifying assumption.
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TAA. Secular trends for workers at “tradable” industries confound post estimates.
Second, even if the common pretrends assumption held, TAA workers may respond
differentially to a lay-off event relative to non-TAA workers. Those working at non-tradable
industries may for example, reflect certain localized high value added jobs with skills
more easily transferable to other sectors. In this case, one would need an even stronger
identifying assumption such as parallel post-trends absent the treatment. Workers may be
different for a number of reasons correlated with tradability, geography, demographics, or
heterogeneity in access to types of training, yielding DID estimates that are not credible.
1.4.2. Investigator Assignment and Leniency IV
TAA cases are assigned [to investigators] primarily based on investigator caseload, as
well as previous experience with a company or industry. Staff leave or other scheduling
issues can be a factor as well.
—Correspondence with Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance,
a (obtained via Department of Labor FOIA request, 12/15/2016)
To overcome the challenging selection problems involved in identifying the causal effects
of TAA, I take advantage of how petitions are assigned to case investigators. I define
an investigator’s leniency as the share of total cases approved over their entire tenure,
less the current case (excluding those with less than 10 cases over their tenure).42
This “leave-one-out” leniency measure thus varies by investigator and case, but is
time-invariant.43 According to the assignment mechanism described in the quote above,
TAA assigns two otherwise identical worker cohorts displaced from the same industry,
different TAA approval probabilities based on whether their case is directed to a more
lenient versus strict investigator.
42In some cases, the petition also lists the last name of the certifying officer who assigned the case. For
those cases, I calculate leniency across investigator-certifier cells, however all results are robust to using just
investigator leniency as well as investigator-certifying officer measures.
43Additional results show that investigator leniency is relatively stable within investigators over time.
DOL investigators do work on a number of cases beyond those associated with TAA, including for example
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) cases. However these are not observed in the data
and thus not included in the leniency measure.
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I thus use this leave-one-out measure of investigator leniency as an instrumental variable
(IV) for assignment to TAA.44 Yet as leniency may still be correlated with petitioner
characteristics through industry specialization and experience, I must also include a
number of flexible controls for each investigator’s industrial concentration and experience.
Conditional on the successful inclusion of these controls, assignment based on caseload
should effectively be as if randomly assigned.
The intuition for how this instrument alters earnings results with respect to the naive DID
estimator, is shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1.4. Raw earnings are plotted against top
and bottom leniency quartiles, making this an unconditional version of the “reduced form
equation” of a corresponding 2SLS procedure (see figure for quartile cut-offs). Already
using just raw means for workers assigned to lenient (top quartile) versus strict (bottom
quartile) investigators, we begin to see earnings patterns separate in the post-period.
This is, in fact, the variation underlying the main results of the paper. While the figure
still exhibits some pre-trend differences, these are eliminated when including the flexible
controls mentioned above.
1.4.3. Estimation Strategy
I employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation strategy that tracks workers as they
move across employers using repeated (pooled) cross-sectional regressions over event
time:
TAAijkt = θLeniency
−p
j(i) + αCjkt + δNjkt + λk + X
′
ijktγ + νijkt (1.1)
Yijktτ = βτTAAijkt + αCjkt + δNjkt + λk︸ ︷︷ ︸
restoring randomness
+X
′
ijktγ + εijktτ (1.2)
In the first stage, worker i’s petition is assigned to investigator j in calendar year t. TAAijkt
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if that worker is associated with an approved TAA
44While investigator leniency is the most, Belloni et al. (2012) propose a lasso method for selecting the most
strongly binding among a number of plausibly exogenous instruments. However in this paper, the only other
investigator-level variable available is an imputed investigator race variable based on last name, and I thus do
not employ this method.
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petition. Leniency−pj(i) measures the total share of cases approved by investigator j less the
worker’s own petition p.45 k indexes the 4-digit SIC industry from which the worker was
displaced, and τ ∈ [−10, 10] is the year relative to the petition approval decision at τ = 0.
Outcomes Yijktτ include worker earnings, quarters employed, formal education, and the
probability workers move 2-digit NAICS industries and commuting zones.
I include three assignment variables to control flexibly for differential approval
propensities among highly specialized or experienced investigators. Njkt is the raw
number of cases that an investigator j has adjudicated in industry k by calendar year t.
Cjkt =
Njkt
∑j Njkt
is the concentration of industry k cases assigned to investigator j by time
t. While these may be correlated, they are not perfectly collinear due to the fact that
investigators are not balanced across the entire panel. In both stages, Xijkt are precision
controls that are mostly time-invariant and measured in the baseline (pre-application)
period. The exception to this is a polynomial in age and variables interacted with that
polynomial, however these vary mechanically over time and cannot be endogenously
manipulated in response to the TAA treatment.46
The coefficients of interest are each βτ, which are estimated in separate regressions for each
τ. When overlaid on an event-study style plot, these point estimates dynamically map out
the effects of TAA over time. Thee include placebo estimates for all τ < 0, which test for
the effects of TAA prior to the worker’s separation and petition for benefits (i.e. periods in
which we would not expect to find any statistical significant differential effects of TAA).
1.4.4. Randomization Tests and IV Assumptions
Like all instrumental variables, the leniency IV must satisfy two main conditions:
excludability and relevance (including monotonicity).47
45I use the subscript j(i) to clarify that worker i is assigned to investigator j (j for “judge”).
46Not shown in equations (1) and (2) but indicated clearly in regression tables, calendar-year and
filer-quarter fixed effects are included in most specifications.
47Technically there are three separate assumptions including monotonicity, which is difficult to test
explicitly. In additional results, heterogeneous subgroups of the analysis all contain a positive first stage
such that higher leniency scores weakly increase TAA probability, facilitating a local average treatment effect
interpretation for compliers.
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Excludability
While excludability cannot be tested directly, I present two strong pieces of evidence
supporting the claim that investigator leniency is orthogonal to pre-determined
characteristics of petitioners (conditional on concentration controls), and that the
instrument only affects worker outcomes through assignment to TAA.
In Table 1.3, I test for random assignment of TAA petitions to DOL investigators
by regressing the instrument on pre-determined characteristics. If investigators were
assigned to cases with particular economic or demographic characteristics, we would
expect to observe statistically significant predictors of higher leniency values. However,
as we move through the columns from left to right, consistent with randomization, very
few covariates are predictive of the instrument. (When they are statistically significant, the
coefficients are economically so close to zero that they can be ignored.)
Starting with column (1), I report the baseline mean of all pre-determined characteristics
prior to the eligibility window (5 to 40 quarters before the petition decision inclusively).
The dependent variable in column (2) is the endogenous TAA approval indicator variable.
Consequently, it is not surprising that many of the coefficients in this column are
statistically significant. Notably, in panel C, company filers have approval rates that are
on average 22 percentage points higher than the omitted filer group (state career centers),
and TAA approved workers are more likely to be considered “tradable” according to the
Mian and Sufi (2014) definition.
The dependent variable in columns (3) to (5) is the investigator leniency IV. Columns (4)
and (5) add the three “randomness restoring” controls shown in the main specification,
where investigator concentration controls include both Cjkt and Njkt measures (defined
above). Adding these controls only alter randomization results in minor ways—consistent
with most variation being driven by caseload rather than industry-based assignment.
Since the regressions presented here each include many covariates however, one may
be concerned that the oversaturation of the model with controls is what drives the
zeros, rather than random assignment. Column (6) thus shows p-values from separate
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regressions of the leniency IV on each covariate independently. Here, as in all regressions,
standard errors are clustered at the investigator level (the level of randomization). Finally,
all regressions contain quarter-of-filing and calendar-year fixed effects.
The second piece of evidence that assignment based on caseload is as if random, is
that investigators with low caseloads do not systematically differ in their leniencies
from investigators with higher caseloads. Figure 1.5 demonstrates non-parametrically,
how neither investigator caseload nor tenure at the Department of Labor are correlated
with leniency. This rules out confounding stories such as cases being assigned to more
experienced investigators who regularly approve certain types of workers, or the idea
that lower caseload workers have different competencies which could be correlated
with pre-determined characteristics of the types of workers they approve—violating the
exclusion restriction.
Relevance and First Stage
Figure 1.6 displays variation in the investigator leniency measure pooled across the
program’s history. The figure plots the number of petitions filed across 50 bins of leniency,
and exhibits a surprising degree of variation. The plot is then overlaid with two kernel
densities to express the distribution of leniency’s stability over the business cycle.
Table 1.4 reports companion first stage estimates corresponding to equation (1) of the paper
for the “High Labor Force Attachment” sample. Column (1) includes the minimal set
of controls needed for identification, while moving left to right adds precision controls
and investigator characteristics (which have already been shown to be uncorrelated with
approval rates in Figure 1.5.) Baseline Controls include means over 5 to 40 quarters
prior to the TAA petition decision for the following variables: worker earnings, quarters
employed, worker tenure, and initial employer and state earnings. Full Regression Controls
reflect covariates estimated in the preferred specification in subsequent tables, and include:
race and gender fixed effects, a cubic in age fully interacted with baseline earnings
and gender indicators, filer-state fixed effects, filer-type fixed effects (company, union,
worker-group), and a dummy variable for whether a petition applied as part of the
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NAFTA-TAA program.
Interpreting the magnitude of the first stage, a coefficient of 0.60 can be interpreted as a
10 percentage point increase in leniency (the share of cases approved) being associated
with a 6 percentage point higher approval rate. I report the F-statistic from an F-test on
the excluded instrument, which is consistently strong and robust despite conservative
clustering. Finally, the data shown here use the main analysis sample at the worker-level.
When regressions corresponding to models (1) and (2) are estimated at the petition-level
using just petition data however, the first stage coefficient is closer to 1 (which is consistent
with the examiner literature).48 Overall, these results suggest that the instrument indeed
has a large amount of predictive power over worker approval for TAA.
LATE Compliers
Before proceeding to the main results of the paper, it is worth highlighting which types of
petitioners and workers are expected to comply with the treatment. Each TAA approval
decision can be thought of as a latent variable sum of an observable “tradability” signal
σ and subjective adjudication noise ξ j for each investigator j (see Dobbie and Song (2015)
for a similar set-up). This is expressed in Appendix 1.B.1. The left panel orders mean
industry approval rates from lowest to highest by 3-digit NAICS codes, calculated over
all TAA cases from 1974 to 2016. These are highly correlated with known measures of
tradability. The right panel shows within-industry investigator variation around the same
mean approval rates, where the median is indicated with a black dot and range plot
whiskers reflect the 35th to 65th leniency percentiles within each industry.
The high-variance industries along the middle bracket of the support reflect the
“marginal” cases that are hard to adjudicate, and for whom the randomly assigned
investigator is most likely to be influential. Roughly 80% of workers are assigned to
investigators with leniency rates between 0.2 and 0.8, which suggests that indeed most
TAA applicants are not part of industries that are easily assessable as having been
impacted by offshoring or import competition. This raises an important concern about the
48There is also a large increase in the excluded IV first stage F-statistics at the petitioner-level.
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extent to which the results remain relevant to trade-shocked workers. If indeed industry
tradability is hard to adjudicate, the local average treatment effect may in fact represent the
effects of training on a different population rather than workers most adversely affected
by trade. For example, if trade shocks are correlated with technological upgrading or
automation, the LATE will reflect some combination of these. In additional results, I parse
estimates by different regions of this support and find no significant differences across low
and high values of tradability.
Lastly, it is important to note that the LATE estimated here is in fact an intent-to-treat
estimator which mechanically understates the treatment-on-treated or “true” LATE.
Without detailed take-up data at the individual or plant-level however, one cannot conduct
the desired bounding or decomposition exercises that would help place these effects in
a more general context, nor use intent to instrument for take-up as is common with
one-sided attrition models.
1.5. Main Results
1.5.1. Impact of TAA on Worker Earnings, Employment, and Formal Education
Table 1.5 reports the main effects of TAA on worker earnings using the regression specified
in equation (2), where event time τ is pooled across two periods (such that each row
represents a separate regression): Pre-Training: τ ∈ [−10,−1]; and Post-Training: τ ∈
[2, 10].49 Starting with the post period, column (1) shows baseline OLS estimates that are
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that TAA workers receive on average $964
lower annual earnings after training. However, this estimate is not credible for the myriad
of reasons discussed above. When applying the leniency instrument in a 2SLS approach in
columns (2) through (6), the effect sign and magnitude dramatically change. Column (6)
shows the preferred TAA earnings estimate of the paper. Accordingly, TAA takers have on
average $10,256 higher annual earnings, relative to all-else-equal non-takers.50
49As the vast majority of program participants enroll in two-year programs or less, I conservatively use
this window (rather than a 3-year training window) as the treatment period. For effects on earnings during
training, see Figure 1.8 which shows more granular annual effects over event time.
50Variable definitions are analogous to those shown in Section 1.4.4. Baseline Controls include means over
5 to 40 quarters prior to the TAA petition decision for the following variables: worker earnings, quarters
employed, worker tenure, and initial employer earnings. Full Regression Controls reflect covariates estimated
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Successively adding precision controls from columns (2) to (6) only minorly alter effect
sizes. Particularly influential in reducing standard errors are controls added from columns
(4) to (6). These are potential signs that TAA effects may have important dimensions
of heterogeneity by filer type, local labor market (including states), and demographics.
Lastly, consistent with prior randomization results, the pre-training period placebo
estimates consistently show a precise zero. That is, there are assuringly no differential
earnings effects of TAA when we not expect there to be (prior to the worker’s separation).
Considering average baseline earnings prior to layoffs were $26,880 (Table 1.3), an effect
size of $10,256 implies a relatively large elasticity. To further understand these results,
I reestimate equation (2) separately for each period 10 years before and after the year
of the TAA approval decision. The results for these 21 regressions (using the preferred
specification from column (6) of Table 1.5) are plotted in the top panel of Figure 1.7, where
vertical lines partition the support into pre-TAA, during-TAA, and post-TAA periods.
The figure shows a clear and surprisingly pattern. Expectedly, workers inferred to take
up benefits forego roughly $10,000 in income while training for two years. Perhaps
unexpectedly however, large initial returns decay over time. Annual incomes among TAA
and non-TAA workers in fact, fully converge after ten years. Further tests reveal that this
pattern is not driven by differential attrition.
Importantly, the dependent variable here includes earnings values equal to zero when
a worker is unemployed, and is thus reflective of the joint earnings and labor force
participation effect. To begin to decompose these two mechanisms and rationalize the
pattern of depreciation, the bottom panel of Figure 1.7 implements the same estimation but
calculating the dependent variable as within-worker cumulative earnings from τ = −10
to the event year on the x-axis. The results from these cumulative earnings regressions
suggest that indeed, effects are being driven by both earnings as well as labor force
participation. The advantage to expressing earnings this way instead of logging, is that
in the preferred specification in subsequent tables, and include: race and gender fixed effects, a cubic in
age fully interacted with baseline earnings and gender indicators, filer-state fixed effects, filer-type fixed
effects (company, union, worker-group), and a dummy variable for whether a petition applied as part
of the NAFTA-TAA program. All specifications include the identification controls needed for restoring
randomness according to equation (2), and standard errors are clustered at the investigator level (the level
of randomization).
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one does not need to be concerned with logging earnings values of zero. Appendix 1.B.3
shows however, that logging produces very similar results. Furthermore, cumulative
earnings have an appealing interpretation. Ten years out, workers have approximately
$50,000 higher cumulative earnings relative to all-else equal workers that do not retrain.
This pattern is fully stable to using the larger “full” sample which does not only restrict
attention to workers that were more highly attached to the labor force (see Appendix 1.B.2
for the corresponding figure, and Appendix 1.C.1 for more detailed event-year coefficient
estimates.)
Table 1.6 reports the main effects of TAA on number of quarters employed using the
same specification and controls as before. Focusing on the preferred estimate in column
(6), TAA-trained workers are employed on average 0.64 more quarters each year in the
post period. The top panel of Figure 1.8 shows the corresponding dynamic pattern of
employment, which closely mirrors earnings effects. Trained workers appear immediately
more employable than non-trained workers, which further suggests that there are no
economically meaningful extra search costs after TAA workers exhaust extended UI
benefits (a mechanism that we can thus tentatively rule out but return to when discussing
mobility effects). Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that roughly 60% of the prior
earnings pattern can be explained by this higher employment rate.51 While the LEHD
does not contain variables for hours worked, I am able to test whether TAA affects the
number of jobs a worker has in a given year. If displaced workers that do not receive TAA
benefits face reduced hours in the labor market, this may materialize as workers taking
multiple part-time jobs. However, the bottom panel of Figure 1.8 confirms that there is no
discernible effect on the number of jobs held.
If indeed training contributes a sizable benefit that is capitalized into earnings, we may
expect to see differential take-up along formal education measures. Table 1.7 reports the
main effects on two such measures—the probability a worker has educational attainment
greater than or equal to a high school degree and “some college” respectively. As discussed
51Using denied worker annual earnings as a baseline ($23,468 from Table 1.2), I divide this by 4 to get
quarterly earnings, and multiply by 0.64 to attain the relative earnings return for each year in the post period.
I then calculate this as a fraction of the cumulative $50,000 earnings return just established.
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before, a concerning caveat about this data is that the measurement is both ordinal and
sparsely populated. I show however in the table, that across all specifications, there is
no statistically significant effect on the probability that a worker moves up the formal
education scale. This is robust to using the constrained sample for which education values
are not imputed, and the full sample included education imputes. Figure 1.9 demonstrates
this clearly.
1.5.2. Heterogeneity and Mechanisms
The fact that TAA appears to increase earnings, that those earnings depreciate, and that
there are no effects on formal education (such as community college take-up), together
suggest that TAA may only augment short-run demanded human capital rather than the
types of permanent capital that are known to have more durable returns (Card (2001); Kane
and Rouse (1995)). While there is suggestive evidence that most effects are coming through
training and not extended unemployment components of TAA, there is also concern that
trained workers are just getting bumped to the top of local labor market job queues at the
expense of other workers.52 One way this might manifest itself is if trained workers stay in
the same industries and labor markets relative to untrained workers. Conversely, if TAA
workers switch industries and labor markets, this is more consistent with an adjustment
friction story rather than labor market crowd-out.
To begin to test these mechanisms, I expand the main regression specification of the
paper to account for simple heterogeneity in pre-TAA characteristics such that regression
coefficients reflect within-group causal effects. In the specification below, I interact the
main effects of TAA (mediated by investigator leniency) with “High” and “Low” values of
52See Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) for a nuanced view of how schooling and job signaling may
play out in such scenarios.
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pre-treatment covariates in both stages.
TAAijkt ∗ 1(High)t = θH1 Leniency
−p
j(i) ∗ 1(High)t + θ
H
2 Leniency
−p
j(i) ∗ 1(Low)t + ... + ν
H
ijkt
(1.3)
TAAijkt ∗ 1(Low)t = θL1 Leniency
−p
j(i) ∗ 1(High)t + θ
L
2 Leniency
−p
j(i) ∗ 1(Low)t + ... + ν
L
ijkt
(1.4)
Yijktτ = β1τTAAijkt ∗ 1(High)t + β2τTAAijkt ∗ 1(Low)t + ... + εijktτ (1.5)
The above specification is analogous to equations (1) and (2), where equations (3) and
(4) correspond to the new first stage. Ellipses (...) are shown to parsimoniously capture
exogenous controls αCjkt + δNjkt + λk + X
′
ijktγ in all three equations. Unlike before
however, I include 1(High)t and 1(Low)t as indicator variables for whether a worker is
above or below the median of a certain pre-treatment covariate. In this way, one can plot
the main coefficients of interest across two simple heterogeneity groups (β1τ and β2τ) to
test for heterogeneous treatment effects.
Training Quality and Duration
I begin by examining heterogeneity in training quality. While quality is unobservable, the
Department of Labor Trade Act Participant Report (TAPR) records average weeks trained
for TAA participants on a quarter-by-state basis, which varies based on fiscal resources
committed to vocational training and state education programs. Using duration data from
2001 to 2016, I define “High” and “Low” training states with respect to the median weeks
trained per person in each calendar quarter. Figure 1.10 shows the overlaid results of
the two coefficients of interest, suppressing standard errors for clarity (however statistical
significance is reported in Table 1.8).
Remarkably, workers that are located in high-duration states prior to their layoff (the series
marked with an “x”) do not exhibit the depreciating pattern that is common to those in
lower training duration states. While one might be concerned that in fact, lower training
duration reflects drop-out rates or other selected worker qualities, it is unlikely that an
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entire state features large enough selection effects to explain this difference. In conjunction
with previous evidence, I thus attribute the depreciation to short-run demanded skills
becoming obsolete (consistent with rapid skill-biased technological change or an overall
declining labor share).53 Indeed, 62% of TAA training programs confer vocational degrees
with shorter program lengths than typical community college or 4-year college degrees.
Whether these vocational programs are responsive enough to more rapidly adapt to
changing demand, or if instead more human capital investment is needed to catch up to
the frontier, requires more research. However the results here provide some strong leads
for future work in this area.
Effects on Spatial and Industrial Mobility
To analyze effects on worker mobility across commuting zones and industries, I first
rank counties by the severity of their shock based on Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
unemployment rate data (Local Area Unemployment Statistics), which I merge to the
LEHD panel. I define high and low shock severity regions based on whether the county in
which a TAA-qualified worker was displaced was above or below median unemployment
in their quarter of separation.54
Figure 1.11 reveals that workers displaced in slacker labor markets (higher unemployment
counties) have returns that are almost double those of low unemployment rate counties.
Foregone earnings are higher for workers in high-shock regions, which suggests they train
for longer. However, the vast majority of workers are located in high-shock counties,
which is also evidenced by the summary statistics. I thus interpret the main effects as being
driven by high-shock regions, and subsequently examine high and low shocks separately
when analyzing mobility effects.
Figure 1.12 shows the main mobility results of the paper, where corresponding standard
errors are suppressed but shown in Table 1.8. I find that workers in highly disrupted
regions are more likely to switch both industries and commuting zones in response to
53For a discussion of the potential determinants of the declining labor share in the United States, see Autor
et al. (2017).
54All results here are robust to using a level measure of local labor market distress, or a change over time.
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training. Workers are approximately 30 percentage points more likely to move commuting
zones and 50 percentage points more likely to switch industries (at the 2-digit North
American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) level), with respect to the location
and industry of their pre-layoff employer. These are large effects, when compared with
baseline mobility rates of 0.26 and 0.23 for commuting zones and 2-digit industries
respectively (subtracting baseline estimates in Table 1.3 from 1.)
While not as well identified due to potential selection concerns (but nonetheless supported
by common pre-trends), I also present suggestive evidence that positive earnings returns
among “movers” drive the overall effects relative to “stayers”. I define movers and stayers
by their ex-post mobility decisions, which may reflect a self-selected sample that differs
along a number of unobservables. Figure 1.13 shows that the main earnings results of the
paper map very closely to effects for movers.55
Overall, while there is suggestive evidence that TAA-trained workers previously were
bound by adjustment frictions, the analyses above are not explicit tests for externalities.
Whether TAA is effectively expanding a feasible match radius or alleviating an
informational friction remains prime ground for future study.56 If in fact these workers
are facing trade shocks which are spatially correlated (and industrially concentrated if
sufficiently agglomerated in those regions), this might also explain why earnings returns
are especially strong among movers. These workers would need to have much larger
search radii to find productive employment.57 Whether these strong mobility responses
reflect matching or information frictions, liquidity constraints (Chetty, 2008), or both, also
remains to be tested.
1.6. Cost Effectiveness
While the paper’s identification strategy provides robust evidence of positive earnings
returns and higher mobility associated with TAA, this does not inform us about the
55By contrast, Figure 1.B.5 shows the effects for stayers, which I interpret as those who by chance happen
to get the remaining jobs open in their local economies.
56See Shimer (2007) for a framework analyzing the roles of search and skill mismatch frictions in
unemployment.
57In ongoing work, I am investigating this further by taking advantage of distances moved between
employers.
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social cost-effectiveness of the program. Toward this second end, I compare the ten year
stream of estimated TAA earnings returns as benefits, with average TAA expenditures on
training, extended UI, and foregone earnings while training, as costs. I incorporate two
important potential sources of deadweight loss (DWL): the excess burden from taxation
(“leakage”from redistribution), and moral hazard search costs associated with extended
unemployment insurance transfers. These are incorporated as follows:
Benefits =
Earnings Returns from TAA︷ ︸︸ ︷
τ=10
∑
τ=2
β̂τ
(1 + r)τ+1
(1.6)
Costs =
τ=1
∑
τ=0
Foregone Earnings + Training Costs (& DWL)︷ ︸︸ ︷
−β̂τ + (1 + ε)Training +
UI Transfer Costs (Moral Hazard & DWL)︷ ︸︸ ︷
(ε + Ω) ∗UI
(1 + r)τ+1
(1.7)
Here, Benefits are the discounted stream of relative TAA earnings returns for post-training
years (τ = 2...10), with β̂τ parameter estimates taken from Appendix Table 1.C.1.58 Costs
contain two main terms. The first term is the discounted sum of foregone earnings while
training (β̂τ < 0 for τ ∈ [0, 1]) and average expenditures on training, where Training =
$6, 181.96 is calculated from the data shown in Appendix Figure 1.B.4. ε represents the
excess burden required by taxation to finance each dollar spent on training (Okun’s “leaky
bucket”).59 The second term is simpler because UI transfers from one agent to another only
implicate social costs through excess burden (ε ∈ [0, 1]) and search disincentives induced
by the transfer scheme (Ω ∈ [0, 1]).60
To simplify the analysis, I set Ω = 0.345 (=0.6/1.6 following Schmieder and Von Wachter
(2016)). Setting UI = $13, 181.96, again taken from Appendix Figure 1.B.4, we then solve
the internal rate of return r that equates net present benefits to costs for different values
58Note that τ + 1 is in the exponent of the discount term to be consistent with prior notation. τ = 0 should
be thought of as year one, such that the social planner is positioned at τ = −1 when calculating the IRR.
59This first term reflects the opportunity cost of training resources which could otherwise be allocated to
other activities.
60That is, instead of including as costs (1 + ε + Ω) multiplied by each annual UI value, UI could easily
be incorporated into benefits which cancels out the ”1”. We thus only need to concern ourselves with
dead-weight loss and distortion parameters.
36
of ε. Following Heckman et al. (2010), I show both private and societal internal rates of
return to TAA for a range of excess burden values (where private returns to workers only
include foregone earnings costs associated with training.)
Internal Rate of Return to TAA
Leakage Parameter (ε) Private Return Social Return
0% 49.5% 17.0%
25% 49.5% 9.1%
50% 49.5% 4.0%
75% 49.5% 0%
100% 49.5% -3.0%
Note: Private returns assume workers do not bear any of the incidence of any Ricardian effects induced by the
excess burden of taxation, hence their stability across different deadweight loss parameter values.
I estimate an internal rate of return (IRR) on TAA of between 0.0% and 9.1% for deadweight
loss values ranging between 0.25 and 0.75. I interpret this as a lower bound for at least two
reasons. First, earnings returns are calculated from an intent-to-treat (ITT) estimator which
likely understates benefits due to imperfect compliance with the treatment (i.e. partial
take-up of TAA attenuates earnings estimates toward zero). Second, TAA may induce
worker substitution away from other costly social insurance programs such as disability
insurance (DI), which would further decrease program costs.61
One important caveat however, is that positive earnings returns are estimated from a
local average treatment effect (LATE) that does not capture the fact that firms may be
incentivized to lay off additional workers after learning of their TAA eligibility status.
Nevertheless, back-of-the-envelope calculations show that these are unlikely to outweigh
potentially much larger downward pressures. Finally, it bears noting that like other public
programs, the additional public revenue from taxation of increased earnings returns for
TAA takers is not sufficient to cover program costs.
61Autor et al. (2014) find that DI is in fact the predominant margin through which workers adjust to trade
shocks.
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1.7. Concluding Remarks
One of the most prominent challenges facing low-income workers in a modern, global
labor market, is how labor will adjust to a rapidly changing and increasingly automated
economy. Trade-impacted workers have received a large share of this attention, which
became particularly visible as a policy issue during the 2016 Presidential Election. While
low-income households have benefited tremendously from trade in terms of lower costs
of goods, higher variety, and quality of life improvements associated with technological
advancement, recent evidence suggests that they have also been persistently negatively
affected in terms of earnings and employment outcomes. Despite growing evidence that
trade’s disperse benefits also come with concentrated costs, little is known about policy
efforts that deliberately target the adjustment process for those most affected by regionally
and industrially shocked labor markets. Credible empirical estimates are made difficult
by both a lack of detailed worker-level data and confounding factors correlated with
qualifying for adjustment programs—selection biases which generally preclude reliable
estimates.
This paper estimates the causal effects of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA)—the
United States’ largest and longest standing public incentive program for retraining—on
worker outcomes, by leveraging quasi-random assignment of TAA cases to investigators
of varying approval leniencies. Using employer-employee matched Census data on
300,000 displaced workers, the paper provides evidence of large initial returns to TAA.
Workers inferred to take up benefits forego roughly $10,000 in income while training,
yet ten years later have approximately $50,000 higher cumulative earnings relative to
all-else-equal workers that do not retrain. I estimate that 40% of these returns are driven
by higher wages—a sizable share which suggests that TAA-trained workers are not only
compensated through greater labor force participation or higher priority in job queues.
Rather, TAA workers also appear to be paid a premium for their newly acquired human
capital.
But these large relative gains also decay over time. In fact, annual incomes among TAA and
non-TAA workers fully converge after ten years. In conjunction with two additional pieces
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of evidence—that TAA has no effect on formal education, and diminishing returns are
restricted to states with low training durations—I attribute this depreciation to short-run
demanded skills becoming obsolete (consistent with rapid skill-biased technological
change or an overall declining labor share). Indeed, 62% of TAA training programs confer
vocational degrees with shorter program lengths than typical community college or 4-year
college degrees which have been shown to have durable earnings returns.
I provide suggestive evidence that TAA-trained workers were previously bound by
adjustment frictions. However, one limitation to the study is that I do not identify whether
TAA is effectively expanding a feasible job match radius for its participants, or instead
alleviating other frictions, which may include worker present-bias, household liquidity
constraints, and other hypotheses. If in fact these workers are facing trade shocks which
are spatially correlated (and industrially concentrated if sufficiently agglomerated in those
regions), this might also explain why earnings returns are especially strong among movers.
Lastly, a cost-benefit analysis produces a conservative internal rate of return (IRR) on TAA
between 0.0% and 9.1%. Despite this being a relatively low IRR, policymakers may still
consider the efficiency costs associated with TAA investments a worthwhile trade-off as
a redistributive policy toward this sub-population. This would be especially true if there
were either other externalities associated with TAA training, or current social insurance
programs were shown to be insufficient for these workers.
One outstanding and related puzzle is if labor markets signal high private returns to
human capital investments such as TAA training, and this study confirms those high
returns, then why are take-up rates so persistently low? Future work will need to explain
this puzzle, and further examine whether the results from this paper are relevant to other
types of labor market pressures such as automation.
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Figure 1.1: Manufacturing Employment and Real Output
NOTES—This figure shows seasonally adjusted data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),
retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The solid line plots monthly US workers
employed in manufacturing industries (BLS Current Employment Statistics, CES3000000001).
The dashed line shows a quarterly index of nonfarm business sector real output (BLS Labor
productivity and Costs) where 2009q1=100. In a similar figure, Pierce and Schott (2016) show the
upward pattern in output persists for manufacturing sector value added, which suggests falling
labor intensity drives the decline rather than secular stagnation. Source: BLS (2017)
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Figure 1.2: TAA Filer Time Series (DOL Estimates)
NOTES—This figure shows the estimated number of workers eligible for TAA benefits as covered
by petitions at the Department of Labor. Worker estimates are generated by case investigators
processing plant-level information (at times acquired using subpoena power), and cover the entire
3-year eligibility window shown in the timeline in Section 1.2. Recession quarters are indicated in
gray, and taken from NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee data. The final matched analysis
sample studies petitions filed between 1990 and 2011 for a subset of 23 approved states (see text for
further details). Source: DOL (OTAA) petition database attained via FOIA request; NBER Business
Cycle Dating Committee
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Figure 1.3: Workers Filing for TAA: All (Top) versus LEHD Sample (Bottom)
NOTES—These maps show the cumulative number of TAA filers by 1990 commuting zone
(geographies taken from Dorn (2009)). The top sample reflects the universe of TAA filers from
1974 to 2016. The bottom sample displays all filers in 24 LEHD-approved states from 1990 to 2011,
forming the basis of the matched analysis sample. Both maps display cumulative numbers by
quintile. See Appendix 1.B.6 for a population-weighted version of the same maps. Source: DOL
(OTAA) petition database attained via FOIA request
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Figure 1.4: Displaced Worker Earnings, naive Difference-in- Differences (Top) versus
Leniency IV “Reduced Form” (Bottom)
NOTES—These plots show locally smoothed polynomial regressions of annual earnings before
and after worker separation (with 10% confidence intervals for exposition). Unconditional means
are estimated for the main analysis sample: working-age individuals (22-65) with 2 years of
positive earnings above the annual minimum wage equivalent prior to filing ($7.25 * 2,082 average
working hours in 2010 ≈ $15,000), earning less than $50,000 annually in the pre-period. Monetary
variables are deflated to 2010 US dollars, seasonally adjusted, and winsorized at 1% to limit outliers.
Leniency quartiles (bottom panel) are calculated across 250 investigators. 25th and 75th percentiles
correspond to approval rates of 0.56 and 0.79 respectively. Source: LEHD; DOL
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Figure 1.5: Leniency IV versus Investigator Caseload and Tenure
NOTES—These plots show the relationship between the main leave-one-out investigator leniency
measure and: (1) investigator caseload measured by number of petitions (top); (2) investigator
tenure in total years (bottom). Leniency is first regressed on year-of-filing fixed effects. Residuals
from these regressions are then averaged across 100 quantile bins and plotted across the support
of the x-axis variable. Residualized values are added to the overall mean leniency rate for ease of
interpretation. Source: DOL historical employee records acquired via FOIA request
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Figure 1.6: Variation in TAA Investigator Leniency
NOTES—This figure plots the number of petitions filed across 50 bins of investigator leniency
(leave-one-out), pooled over the history of the TAA program (1974 to 2016). These are then overlaid
with two kernel densities to express how the distribution of leniency varies across the business
cycle. An analogous figure using the subset of 250 investigators associated with the final analysis
sample is shown in the online appendix. Source: DOL historical employee records acquired via
FOIA request
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Figure 1.7: Dynamic Effects of TAA on Worker Earnings
NOTES—These plots show the main 2SLS coefficient estimates of the effects of TAA on annual
earnings (top) and within-worker cumulative earnings (bottom), dynamically across event years
relative to the TAA petition decision (τ = 0). Each point estimate is from a separate cross-sectional
regression by event year. Cumulative earnings are summed from τ = −10 to the event year on
the x-axis. Vertical lines partition the support into pre-TAA, during-TAA, and post-TAA periods.
Sample restrictions and variable definitions are identical to those described in Table 1.5, column 6
(the paper’s preferred earnings specification). Dotted lines represent 90% confidence intervals with
standard errors clustered at the investigator level. Source: LEHD; DOL
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Figure 1.8: Dynamic Effects of TAA on Labor Force Participation
NOTES—These plots show the main 2SLS coefficient estimates of the effects of TAA on quarters
employed (top) and number of jobs held (bottom), dynamically across event years relative to the
TAA petition decision (τ = 0). Each point estimate is from a separate cross-sectional regression
by event year. Baseline quarters employed and number of jobs held are 3.56 and 1.11 respectively
(Table 1.3, column 1). Vertical lines partition the support into pre-TAA, during-TAA, and post-TAA
periods. Sample restrictions and variable definitions are identical to those described in Table 1.6,
column 6 (the paper’s preferred employment specification). Dotted lines represent 90% confidence
intervals with standard errors clustered at the investigator level. Source: LEHD; DOL
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Figure 1.9: Dynamic Effects of TAA on Formal Education
Prob(Education ≥ High School Degree)
Prob(Education ≥ Some College)
NOTES—These plots show the main 2SLS coefficient estimates of the effects of TAA on formal
education take-up using both imputed and non-imputed decennial census measures which are
merged to the Census LEHD (see text for details), dynamically across all event years relative to the
TAA petition decision (τ = 0). Each point estimate is from a separate cross-sectional regression
by event year. Education can take four ordinal values: 1=Some High School; 2=High School
Degree; 3=Some College; 4=College Degree. Vertical lines partition the pre-TAA, during-TAA,
and post-TAA periods. Sample restrictions and variable definitions are identical to those described
in Table 1.7, column 5 (the paper’s preferred education specification). Dotted lines represent 90%
confidence intervals with standard errors clustered at the investigator level. Source: LEHD; DOL
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Figure 1.10: Heterogeneous Earnings Effects of TAA by State Training Duration
NOTES—This figure overlays two series of 2SLS estimates, corresponding to each β1τ and β2τ
of equation (5) of the draft where coefficients reflect high and low training duration lengths.
Each point estimate is from a separate regression by event year, showing the effects of TAA on
worker earnings interacted with high and low training duration in the state and quarter in which
the worker was laid off (pre-period). “High” and “Low” are defined relative to median training
duration, which is calculated for each quarter across states using TAA performance data from 2001
to 2016 (training duration data are not available prior to 2001). Vertical lines partition the pre-TAA,
during-TAA, and post-TAA periods. Besides the sub-sample from data limitations, remaining
sample restrictions and variable definitions are identical to those described in Table 1.6, column
5. Standard errors are suppressed for exposition (see online appendix for underlying data and
standard errors). Source: LEHD; DOL Trade Act Participant Report (TAPR), 2001 to 2016
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Figure 1.11: Heterogeneous Earnings Effects of TAA by Labor Market Strength
NOTES—This figure shows two series of 2SLS estimates, corresponding to each β1τ and β2τ of
equation (5) of the draft. Coefficients reflect workers displaced in high (top) and low (bottom)
initial unemployment rate regions. Each point estimate is from a separate regression by event year,
showing the effects of TAA on worker earnings by high and low training duration in the state and
year in which the worker was laid off. “High” and “Low” are defined relative to median training
duration, which is calculated for each quarter across states using TAA performance data from 2001
to 2016 (training duration data are not available prior to 2001). Vertical lines partition the pre-TAA,
during-TAA, and post-TAA periods. Besides the data constraint from limited performance data,
sample restrictions and variable definitions are identical to those described in Table 1.5, column 6.
Dotted lines represent 90% confidence intervals with standard errors clustered at the investigator
level. Source: LEHD; BLS Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS)
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Figure 1.12: Effects of TAA on Worker Mobility by Initial Labor Market Strength
NOTES—This figure shows two series of 2SLS estimates, corresponding to each β1τ and β2τ
of equation (5) of the draft where the dependent variables are the probability that a worker is
employed in the same commuting zone (top) and 2-digit NAICS industry (bottom) as the region
and industry from which they initially separated. Estimates are broken out by high and low
shock unemployment regions, where each point estimate is from a separate regression by event
year. Commuting zones are defined by 1990 boundaries originally geocoded by Dorn (2009).
Baseline mobility rates can be found in Table 1.3, column 1. Vertical lines partition the pre-TAA,
during-TAA, and post-TAA periods. Sample restrictions and variable definitions are identical to
those described in Table 1.6, column 6. Standard errors are suppressed for exposition. See online
appendix for underlying data, and Figure 1.13 for corresponding earnings responses by mobility
groups. Source: LEHD; BLS Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS)
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Figure 1.13: Earnings Effects of TAA for Labor Market and Industry “Movers”
NOTES—This figure shows 2SLS estimates of the effects of TAA for workers who move commuting
zones (top) or switch 2-digit NAICS industries (bottom) in the post-period, relative to the region
and industry in which they were initially employed. This ex-post definition of mobility is used
as a subgroup in a specification similar to equation (5) of the draft, where only coefficients on
movers are plotted here (see Appendix 1.B.5 for analogous results for “stayers”). Movers comprise
approximately 47% and 56% of the sample for commuting zones and industries respectively. Each
point estimate is from a separate regression by event year. Vertical lines partition the pre-TAA,
during-TAA, and post-TAA periods. Sample restrictions and variable definitions are identical
to those described in Table 1.5, column 6. Dotted lines represent 90% confidence intervals with
standard errors clustered at the investigator level. Source: LEHD; DOL
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Table 1.1: Location of Top 10 “Trade Displaced” TAA Zip Codes
Rank 1975-1985 1985-1995 1995-2005 2005-2016
1. Flint, MI Seattle, WA Los Angeles, CA Fremont, CA
2. Detroit, MI (a) Fort Worth, TX Seattle, WA Detroit, MI
3. Detroit, MI (b) Houston, TX East Chicago, IN Nashville, TN
4. Detroit, MI (c) Linden, NJ Long Beach, CA St. Louis, MI
5. Detroit, MI (d) Flint, MI San Jose, CA Wichita, KS
6. Detroit, MI (e) Los Angeles, CA Scranton, PA Dayton, OH
7. Saginaw, MI Houston, TX Washington, NC Warren, OH
8. Dayton, OH Milwaukee, WI New York, NY Wilmington, OH
9. Kokomo, IN Toledo, OH Dallas, TX Los Angeles, CA
10. Ann Arbor, MI Framingham, MA Seattle, WA Detroit, MI
Affected
Industries
(Mode)
Motor Vehicles,
Parts, Accessories
Oil & Gas Extract.,
Exploration,
Services
Electronics,
Aircraft, Textiles
Auto Parts, Plastics
Aircraft, Computers
Pharmaceuticals
NOTES—This table reports the locations of the top ten “trade-displaced” zip codes as calculated
from Department of Labor estimates of the total number of workers eligible for TAA, as associated
with filed TAA petitions at the plant level. The reported industry reflects the qualitative description
associated with the top three to five modal industries in the same decade using standard industrial
classification (SIC) codes ascribed to petitions by case investigators. Source: DOL (OTAA) petition
database attained via FOIA request
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics for TAA Approved and Denied Workers
High Labor Force Attachment High & Low Labor Force Attachment
TAA Approved TAA Denied All TAA Approved TAA Denied All
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
A. Worker Demographics (LEHD)
Age (time of filing) 43.91 (10.93) 43.08 (11.09) 43.65 (10.99) 42.7 (11.13) 41.76 (11.16) 42.41 (11.15)
Female 0.54 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50) 0.56 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50) 0.55 (0.50)
Black 0.11 (0.32) 0.13 (0.33) 0.12 (0.32) 0.13 (0.33) 0.15 (0.35) 0.13 (0.34)
White 0.80 (0.40) 0.79 (0.40) 0.80 (0.40) 0.79 (0.41) 0.78 (0.42) 0.78 (0.41)
High School Degree 0.39 (0.49) 0.37 (0.48) 0.39 (0.49) 0.38 (0.49) 0.37 (0.48) 0.37 (0.48)
Some College 0.29 (0.45) 0.31 (0.46) 0.30 (0.46) 0.29 (0.45) 0.31 (0.46) 0.29 (0.45)
College Degree and Above 0.11 (0.31) 0.14 (0.35) 0.12 (0.33) 0.12 (0.32) 0.14 (0.35) 0.13 (0.33)
B. Worker Economic Variables (LEHD)
Annual Earnings ($1,000) 22.554 (13.511) 23.468 (14.793) 22.83 (13.916) 18.628 (13.904) 19.232 (15.136) 18.814 (14.294)
Quarters Employed 3.21 (1.28) 3.14 (1.33) 3.19 (1.30) 2.93 (1.42) 2.87 (1.47) 2.92 (1.44)
Quarters Employed (full-time equivalence) 2.77 (1.54) 2.71 (1.57) 2.75 (1.55) 2.28 (1.67) 2.22 (1.70) 2.26 (1.68)
Employed 0.79 (0.40) 0.76 (0.43) 0.78 (0.41) 0.74 (0.44) 0.7 (0.46) 0.73 (0.45)
# of Jobs / Year 0.95 (0.75) 0.92 (0.78) 0.94 (0.76) 0.94 (0.08) 0.91 (0.85) 0.93 (0.84)
Tenure (years at separation) 4.90 (3.71) 3.87 (3.24) 4.58 (3.60) 14.76 (14.52) 11.5 (12.29) 13.74 (13.94)
Init. Employer Mean Earnings ($1,000) 23.197 (5.628) 23.216 (5.596) 23.204 (5.617) 20.822 (6.59) 21.100 (6.338) 20.910 (6.513)
County Unemployment Rate (time of filing) 6.51 (2.28) 6.4 (1.85) 6.48 (2.16) 6.43 (2.20) 6.40 (1.78) 6.42 (2.08)
Prob(Employed at Petitioner Firm) 0.66 (0.47) 0.66 (0.47) 0.66 (0.47) 0.63 (0.48) 0.64 (0.48) 0.63 (0.48)
Prob(Employed at Petitioner 2-Digit NAICS) 0.7 (0.46) 0.71 (0.45) 0.70 (0.46) 0.68 (0.47) 0.69 (0.46) 0.68 (0.47)
Prob(Employed in Petitioner Commuting Zone) 0.69 (0.46) 0.72 (0.45) 0.70 (0.46) 0.67 (0.47) 0.72 (0.45) 0.69 (0.46)
C. Petitioner Characteristics (DOL)
Company Filer 0.40 (0.49) 0.10 (0.3) 0.31 (0.46) 0.40 (0.49) 0.11 (0.31) 0.31 (0.46)
Union Filer 0.14 (0.34) 0.19 (0.39) 0.15 (0.36) 0.13 (0.34) 0.17 (0.38) 0.14 (0.35)
Worker-Group Filer 0.37 (0.48) 0.63 (0.48) 0.45 (0.50) 0.37 (0.48) 0.65 (0.48) 0.46 (0.50)
Investigator Caseload (no. of petitions) 22.83 (18.25) 22.27 (16.21) 22.66 (17.64) 23.05 (18.68) 22.44 (16.35) 22.86 (17.99)
Investigator Tenure (decades) 0.979 (0.942) 1.02 (0.879) 0.991 (0.925) 1.02 (0.950) 0.995 (0.872) 1.01 (0.928)
Prob(Tradable) (Mian & Sufi, 2011) 0.64 (0.48) 0.51 (0.50) 0.60 (0.49) 0.58 (0.49) 0.43 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50)
Offshorability Z-Score (Blinder, 2007) 0.29 (0.84) 0.09 (1.23) 0.22 (0.98) 0.25 (0.87) 0.02 (1.28) 0.18 (1.02)
Offshorability Z-Score (Autor & Dorn, 2013) 0.23 (0.86) 0.27 (0.79) 0.24 (0.84) 0.16 (0.84) 0.22 (0.78) 0.17 (0.82)
Number of Petitioners ∼3,100 ∼1,300 ∼4,300 ∼3,300 ∼1,400 ∼4,700
Number of Displaced Workers ∼123,000 ∼54,000 ∼177,000 ∼198,000 ∼89,000 ∼287,000
Number of Observations ∼1,811,000 ∼810,000 ∼2,623,000 ∼2,883,000 ∼1,307,000 ∼4,192,000
NOTES—This table reports means and standard deviations for approved and denied TAA petitioners, pooled across all periods (pre, during,
and post-TAA). Both samples are restricted to working-age individuals (22-65) making less than $50,000 annually in the pre-period, and
restricted to first-time filers. The “High Attachment” sample requires 2 years of positive earnings above the annual minimum wage equivalent
prior to filing ($7.25 * 2,082 average working hours in 2010 ≈ $15,000). Monetary variables are deflated to 2010 US dollars, seasonally
adjusted, and winsorized at the 1% level to limit the influence of outliers. Both samples contain 250 unique case investigators (rounded for
confidentiality). See text for variable descriptions. Source: LEHD, DOL
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Table 1.3: Testing for Random Assignment of TAA Petitions to Investigators
Baseline TAA Approved Investigator Leniency F-Test [p-value]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Pre-Determined Demographics (LEHD)
Age (time of filing) 40.771 0.0007* (0.0004) -0.00007 (0.0001) -0.00002 (0.00004) -0.00002 (0.00004) [0.4437]
Female 0.5248 0.0281** (0.0118) 0.0015 (0.0019) -0.0005 (0.0009) -0.0006 (0.0009) [0.5166]
Black 0.1147 -0.0415* (0.0229) -0.0081** (0.0033) -0.0035 (0.0026) -0.0034 (0.0025) [0.3025]
White 0.7957 -0.0192 (0.0151) -0.0018 (0.0025) -0.0001 -0.0020 -0.0001 (0.0020) [0.2819]
High School Degree 0.3865 -0.0057 (0.0069) -0.0020 (0.0015) -0.0011 (0.0012) -0.0010 (0.0011) [0.8490]
Some College 0.2936 -0.0110 (0.0068) -0.00189 (0.0015) -0.0007 (0.0011) -0.0006 (0.0010) [0.3707]
College Degree 0.1173 -0.0224** (0.0089) -0.0014 (0.0021) -0.0013 (0.0011) -0.0012 (0.0011) [0.3110]
B. Pre-Determined Economic Variables (LEHD)
Annual Earnings ($1,000) 26.880 -0.0021*** (0.0006) -0.0002 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.00007) -0.00007 (0.00007) [0.0917]
Quarters Employed 3.5566 -0.0060 (0.0048) 0.0011 (0.0012) 0.0007 (0.0008) 0.0006 (0.0008) [0.0627]
Quarters Employed (full-time equivalence) 3.2330 0.0154*** (0.0041) 0.0011 (0.0009) 0.0002 (0.0004) 0.0002 (0.0005) [0.0586]
Employed 0.9236 0.0420** (0.0189) -0.0040 (0.0027) -0.0025 (0.0025) -0.0021 (0.0025) [0.2100]
# of Jobs / Year 1.1120 -0.0007 (0.0008) 0.0002 (0.0002) 0.0002* (0.0001) 0.0002** (0.0001) [0.2325]
Tenure (years at separation) 5.0390 0.0012*** (0.0004) 0.0002** (0.0001) 0.0001** (0.0001) 0.0001** (0.0006) [0.0291]
Init. Employer Mean Earnings ($1,000) 23.159 0.0008 (0.0024) 0.0006 (0.0004) 0.0005 (0.0004) 0.0005 (0.0004) [0.1070]
County Unemployment Rate (time of filing) 6.6054 0.0070 (0.0059) -0.0001 (0.0012) 0.0005 (0.0009) 0.0008 (0.0009) [0.0952]
Prob(Employed at Petitioner Firm) 0.7409 -0.0114 (0.0171) 0.0005 (0.0022) -0.0012 (0.0019) -0.0012 (0.0019) [0.0423]
Prob(Employed at Petitioner 2-Digit NAICS) 0.7760 0.0177 (0.0211) -0.0004 (0.0029) -0.0007 (0.002) -0.0008 (0.0020) [0.7783]
Prob(Employed in Petitioner Commuting Zone) 0.6853 -0.0245 (0.0253) 0.0026 (0.0046) 0.0067** (0.0031) 0.0066** (0.0031) [0.4896]
C. Pre-Determined Petitioner Characteristics (DOL)
Company Filer 0.3267 0.2190*** (0.0436) 0.0024 (0.0072) 0.0012 (0.0079) 0.0016 (0.0079) [0.5251]
Union Filer 0.1415 -0.0068 (0.0491) -0.0043 (0.0086) -0.0038 (0.0085) -0.0038 (0.0086) [0.8211]
Worker-Group Filer 0.4354 -0.0643 (0.0469) 0.0001 (0.0070) -0.0024 (0.0075) -0.00152 (0.0074) [0.8612]
Investigator Caseload (no. of petitions) 23.2509 0.00001 (0.0009) -0.0003* (0.0002) -0.00008 (0.0002) -0.00005 (0.0002) [0.3175]
Investigator Tenure (decades) 0.9419 0.00002 (0.00003) -0.00004** (0.00002) -0.00004** (0.00002) -0.00004** (0.00002) [0.0177]
Prob(Tradable) (Mian & Sufi, 2011) 0.6008 0.0687** (0.0270) 0.0009 (0.0048) – – – – [0.0952]
Offshorability Z-Score (Blinder, 2007) 0.3076 0.0032 (0.0176) -0.0058** (0.0025) – – – – [0.0967]
Offshorability Z-Score (Autor & Dorn, 2013) 0.2533 -0.0121 (0.0103) -0.0021 (0.0018) – – – – [0.1812]
Filer Industry FEs (4-digit SIC) – yes yes yes
Investigator Concentration Controls – yes yes
Joint F-Test [p-value] – [0.0000] [0.0409] [0.2033] [0.1801] [0.1801]
Number of Petitioners – ∼4,300 ∼4,300 ∼4,300 ∼4,300 ∼4,300
Number of Employers – ∼86,000 ∼86,000 ∼86,000 ∼86,000 ∼86,000
Number of Displaced Workers – ∼177,000 ∼177,000 ∼177,000 ∼177,000 ∼177,000
Number of Observations – ∼1,381,000 ∼1,381,000 ∼1,381,000 ∼1,381,000 ∼1,381,000
NOTES—This table tests for random assignment of TAA petitions to DOL investigators. Observations are pooled from eligible separating
workers in the “High Attachment” sample 40 to 5 quarters before their petition decision, and restricted to first-time filers. The sample includes
working-age individuals (22-65) making under $50,000 annually in the pre-period, with 2 years above the annual minimum wage equivalent
prior to filing ($7.25 * 2,082 average working hours in 2010 ≈ $15,000). Column (1) reports the baseline mean. The dependent variable
in column (2) is an indicator for TAA approval. The dependent variable in columns (3) to (5) is the investigator leniency IV. Column (6)
shows p-values from separate regressions of the leniency IV on each covariate. Monetary variables are deflated to 2010 US dollars, seasonally
adjusted, and winsorized at 1% to limit outlier influence. All regressions contain quarter-of-filing and calendar-year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the investigator level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Source: LEHD, DOL
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Table 1.4: TAA Approval and Investigator Leniency (First Stage)
1(TAA) 1(TAA) 1(TAA) 1(TAA) 1(TAA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Leniency (Leave-One-Out) 0.646*** 0.613*** 0.639*** 0.615*** 0.592***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
Investigator # of Cases in Industry (Njkt) 0.00274*** 0.00278*** 0.00270*** 0.00268*** 0.00296***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Investigator Concentration in Industry (Cjkt) -0.524*** -0.499*** -0.508*** -0.481*** -0.411***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
Investigator Caseload (No. of Petitions) -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Investigator Tenure (Decades) 0.000003 0.000003 0.000004*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Filer Industry FEs (4-Digit SIC) yes yes yes yes yes
Calendar-Year & Filer-Quarter FEs yes yes yes yes
Baseline Controls yes yes
Full Regression Controls yes
Number of Petitioners ∼4,300 ∼4,300 ∼4,300 ∼4,300 ∼4,300
Number of Displaced Workers ∼177,000 ∼177,000 ∼177,000 ∼177,000 ∼177,000
Number of Observations ∼2,623,000 ∼2,623,000 ∼2,623,000 2,623,000 ∼2,623,000
F-Statistic on Excluded IV 32.76 29.07 31.04 27.63 27.21
NOTES—This table reports first stage estimates corresponding to equation (1) of the paper for the
“High Attachment” sample, which includes working-age individuals (22-65) making under $50,000
annually in the pre-period, with 2 years above the annual minimum wage equivalent prior to filing
($7.25 * 2,082 average working hours in 2010≈ $15,000). Baseline Controls include means over 5 to 40
quarters prior to the TAA petition decision for the following variables: worker earnings, quarters
employed, worker tenure, and initial employer and state earnings. Full Regression Controls reflect
covariates estimated in the paper’s preferred specification, and include: race and gender fixed
effects, a cubic in age fully interacted with baseline earnings and gender indicators, filer-state fixed
effects, filer-type fixed effects (company, union, worker-group), and a dummy variable for whether
a petition applied as part of the NAFTA-TAA program (see text). Monetary variables are deflated
to 2010 US dollars, seasonally adjusted, and winsorized at the 1% level to limit the influence
of outliers. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the investigator level. ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.10. Source: LEHD, DOL.
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Table 1.5: Pooled Effects of TAA on Annual Earnings ($)
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Post-Training
1(TAA Approved) -963.8*** 14,474.4* 14,335.4* 14,812.3* 13,112.8** 10,255.9**
(250.2) (8211.1) (8449.8) (8383) (6432.3) (5086.7)
B. Pre-Training [Placebo]
1(TAA Approved) -150.9 405.4 313.1 169.2 266.9 333.8
(246.7) (480.1) (499.8) (514.2) (677.8) (660.1)
Identification Controls:
Filer Industry FEs (4-digit SIC) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Investigator Concentration Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Precision Controls:
Calendar Year & Filer Quarter FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
Baseline Controls yes yes yes yes
Filer Type & NAFTA-TAA FEs yes yes yes
Filer State FEs yes yes
Demographic Controls yes
Number of Petitioners ∼4,300 ∼4,300 ∼4,300 ∼4,300 ∼4,300 ∼4,300
Number of Workers ∼177,000 ∼177,000 ∼177,000 ∼177,000 ∼177,0000 ∼177,000
Number of Observations (All Periods) ∼2,623,000 ∼2,623,000 ∼2,623,000 ∼2,623,000 ∼2,623,000 ∼2,623,000
NOTES—This table reports the main effects of TAA on annual earnings, pooled in the “post”
and “pre” periods separately such that each column presents two regression coefficients. Each
specification corresponds to equation (2) of the paper for the “High Attachment” sample, which
includes working-age individuals (22-65) making under $50,000 annually in the pre-period, with
2 years above the annual minimum wage equivalent prior to filing ($7.25 * 2,082 average working
hours in 2010 ≈ $15,000). Baseline Controls include means over 5 to 40 quarters prior to the TAA
petition decision for the following variables: worker earnings, quarters employed, worker tenure,
and initial employer and state earnings. Demographic Controls include: race and gender fixed
effects, a cubic in age fully interacted with baseline earnings and gender indicators. Filer-type
fixed effects indicate whether a petition was filed by a company, union, worker-group, or career
center (omitted). NAFTA-TAA is a dummy variable for whether a petition applied as part of the
NAFTA-TAA program (see text). Monetary variables are deflated to 2010 US dollars, seasonally
adjusted, and winsorized at the 1% level to limit the influence of outliers. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the investigator level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Source: LEHD,
DOL
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Table 1.6: Pooled Effects of TAA on Quarters Employed
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Post-Training
1(TAA Approved) -0.0127 1.368* 1.209* 1.175* 0.795** 0.642**
(0.72) (0.72) (0.62) (0.61) (0.38) (0.32)
B. Pre-Training [Placebo]
1(TAA Approved) -0.00116 0.43 0.0193 0.0157 0.0466 0.0587
(0.01) (0.30) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08)
Identification Controls:
Filer Industry FEs (4-digit SIC) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Investigator Concentration Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Precision Controls:
Calendar Year & Filer Quarter FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
Baseline Controls yes yes yes yes
Filer Type & NAFTA-TAA FEs yes yes yes
Filer State FEs yes yes
Demographic Controls yes
Number of Petitioners ∼4,300 ∼4,300 ∼4,300 ∼4,300 ∼4,300 ∼4,300
Number of Workers ∼177,000 ∼177,000 ∼177,000 ∼177,000 ∼177,0000 ∼177,000
Number of Observations (All Periods) ∼2,623,000 ∼2,623,000 ∼2,623,000 ∼2,623,000 ∼2,623,000 ∼2,623,000
NOTES—This table reports the main effects of TAA on quarters employed, pooled in the “post”
and “pre” periods separately such that each column presents two regression coefficients. Each
specification corresponds to equation (2) of the paper for the “High Attachment” sample, which
includes working-age individuals (22-65) making under $50,000 annually in the pre-period, with
2 years above the annual minimum wage equivalent prior to filing ($7.25 * 2,082 average working
hours in 2010 ≈ $15,000). Baseline Controls include means over 5 to 40 quarters prior to the TAA
petition decision for the following variables: worker earnings, quarters employed, worker tenure,
and initial employer and state earnings. Demographic Controls include: race and gender fixed
effects, a cubic in age fully interacted with baseline earnings and gender indicators. Filer-type
fixed effects indicate whether a petition was filed by a company, union, worker-group, or career
center (omitted). NAFTA-TAA is a dummy variable for whether a petition applied as part of the
NAFTA-TAA program (see text). Monetary variables are deflated to 2010 US dollars, seasonally
adjusted, and winsorized at the 1% level to limit the influence of outliers. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the investigator level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Source: LEHD,
DOL
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Table 1.7: Pooled Effects of TAA on Formal Education
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Post-Training
1(TAA Approved) -0.0183 -0.233 -0.133 -0.081 -0.15
(0.01) (0.22) (0.2) (0.18) (0.16)
B. Pre-Training [Placebo]
1(TAA Approved) -0.0106 -0.0605 -0.0159 -0.00948 -0.188
(0.01) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
Identification Controls:
Filer Industry FEs (4-digit SIC) yes yes yes yes yes
Investigator Concentration Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Precision Controls:
Calendar Year & Filer Quarter FEs yes yes yes yes yes
Baseline Controls yes yes yes
Filer Type & NAFTA-TAA FEs yes yes
Demographic Controls & State FEs yes
Number of Petitioners ∼4,300 ∼4,300 ∼4,300 ∼4,300 ∼4,300
Number of Workers ∼177,000 ∼177,000 ∼177,000 ∼177,000 ∼177,000
Number of Observations (All Periods) ∼2,623,000 ∼2,623,000 ∼2,623,000 ∼2,623,000 ∼2,623,000
Baseline Education Value 2 2 2 2 2
NOTES—This table reports the main effects of TAA on formal education, pooled in the “post”
and “pre” periods separately such that each column presents two regression coefficients. Ordinal
education values reflect combined imputed and non-imputed decennial census estimates which
are merged to the Census LEHD based on a scrambled social security identifier. 1=Some High
School; 2=High School Degree; 3=Some College; 4=College Degree. Each specification corresponds
to equation (2) of the paper for the “High Attachment” sample, which includes working-age
individuals (22-65) making under $50,000 annually in the pre-period, with 2 years above the annual
minimum wage equivalent prior to filing ($7.25 * 2,082 average working hours in 2010 ≈ $15,000).
Baseline Controls include means over 5 to 40 quarters prior to the TAA petition decision for the
following variables: worker earnings, quarters employed, worker tenure, and initial employer and
state earnings. Demographic Controls include: race and gender fixed effects, a cubic in age fully
interacted with baseline earnings and gender indicators. Filer-type fixed effects indicate whether
a petition was filed by a company, union, worker-group, or career center (omitted). NAFTA-TAA
is a dummy variable for whether a petition applied as part of the NAFTA-TAA program (see text).
Monetary variables are deflated to 2010 US dollars, seasonally adjusted, and winsorized at the
1% level to limit the influence of outliers. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
investigator level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Source: LEHD, DOL
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Table 1.8: Event Year Coefficient Estimates by Heterogeneity Groupings
Earnings ($) Pr(Stays in Initial CZ) Pr(Stays in Initial NAICS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Event Year (τ) High Training Low Training High Low High Low
Duration Duration Shock Shock Shock Shock
0 -9,357.12** -5,432.05 -0.3231 -0.1044 0.0052 -0.2405*
1 -4,015.65 459.38 -0.3810* -0.4943** -0.2287 -0.5293*
2 4,324.40 10,001.72 -0.3083* -0.3178 -0.3461* -0.4958
3 7,629.67 12,370.85 -0.3819* 0.0704 -0.5085** 0.1071
4 6,972.06 11,692.10* -0.3288** 0.2292 -0.5104*** 0.3335
5 6,766.97* 7,730.66* -0.3211* 0.1521 -0.4310** 0.2651
6 9,626.92** 6,971.34* -0.2970* 0.2007 -0.3746** 0.6994*
7 9,608.34** 6,317.66 -0.3172* 0.2482 -0.3941** 0.6446
8 5,931.00* 4,201.82 -0.2486* 0.2721 -0.2688* 0.5458
9 5,776.88* 4,278.90 -0.2023* -0.0301 -0.2833* 0.4003
Identification Controls:
Filer Industry FEs (4-digit SIC) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Investigator Concentration Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Precision Controls:
Calendar Year & Filer Quarter FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
Baseline Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Filer Type & NAFTA-TAA FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic Controls & State FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. of Workers ∼177,000 ∼177,000 ∼177,000
NOTES—This table shows 2SLS coefficient estimates of the effect of TAA on the dependent
variable and sub-group indicated for the main analysis sample—“High Labor Force
Attachment”. Columns (1) and (2) correspond to Figure 10. Columns (3) through (6)
correspond to Figure 12. Number of displaced workers are rounded as per Census
Bureau confidentiality requirements. Each point estimate is from a separate cross-sectional
regression for the event year relative to the TAA petition decision (τ = 0). Standard errors
clustered at the investigator level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Source: LEHD; DOL
60
Appendices
Appendix A. Data Appendix
A.1 LEHD Sample Construction and TAA Matching
This appendix provides additional detail on how the matched LEHD sample of workers
is constructed. The main sample consists of worker histories for separating workers
associated with both approved and denied TAA petitions, flagged as “separated” if
observed moving from positive to zero earnings in the TAA eligibility window.62 Workers
in each state are observed if they were employed between the following quarter and
2011q4:
– 1985q2: MD
– 1990q1: CO, IL, IN, KS, WA, MO
– 1991q1: OR, PA
– 1991q3: CA
– 1992q1: AZ
– 1992q4: FL
– 1993q1: MT
– 1995q3: NM
– 1996q1: ME
– 1997q1: WV
– 1998q1: NV, SC, TN
– 1998q3: DE
– 1998q4: IA
– 2000q1: OK
– 2002q2: DC
– 2002q3: AR
To identify TAA filers at the worker-level, I first have to identify both the correct TAA
petitioner plant, and the timing of the separation event in the LEHD. I restrict attention to
all petitions filed between 1990 and 2011. Matching is done in several steps:
Step 1. Match TAA petitioner list of establishments (DOL list of first-time TAA claims
against establishments) separately on cleaned address and company name strings within
each state, to the Standard Statistical Establishment List (SSEL) single- and multi-unit files
for the calendar year of the petition and the year prior to the petition (to account for any
potential filing lags or measurement error in filing dates).
Step 2. Keep SSEL establishments if the matched address or company name is unique
in a given state-year cell. By focusing on one-to-one matches, this circumvents problems
arising from matching one TAA establishment address to a Census location containing
many establishments at the same address (such as an office building). This is especially
important when there is a small expected effect size but large variation in the outcome
variable, or compliance is imperfect, as is known to be the case with TAA (Schochet et
al., 2012). The sample thus reflects a very conservative match, but also one with external
validity representative of rural, stand-alone, manufacturing plants.
62This definition of separation allows for a greater sample size, however all results are robust to using
“mass layoff” definitions in which greater than 30% of employees are laid off, “displacement” definitions in
which workers make less than 70% of their prior earnings in the post-period, and restrictions that only keep
workers who are unemployed for more than 2 quarters (eliminating potential measurement error).
61
Step 3. Draw three random samples of 100 matches (without replacement) and manually
verify rate at which SSEL establishment names match TAA establishment names.63
Step 4. Using the LEHD Employer Characteristics FIle (ECF), assign all units at each SEIN
(State Employer Identification Number) a matched SSEL establishment (if a match exists)
by merging the two datasets on federal EIN (Employer Identification Number using the
LEHD-provided es ein variable). Then, using the SEIN, pull the full worker history for
any worker that separated in the TAA eligibility window (shown in Section 1.2.2) from
the Employee History File (EHF). Workers can furnish returns from multiple employers,
but earnings are aggregated (collapsed) such that each worker only has one earnings
observation per quarter.
Importantly, a worker is marked unemployed if she is observed subsequently reemployed
after having a missing earnings observation. However, I cannot distinguish between the
following cases if the worker is not observed as reemployed (censored):
– Worker is discouraged / out of labor force
– Worker moved to state outside approved sample (otherwise workers can be tracked
across states)
– Worker is on long-term disability / has retired / is deceased
– Worker is self-employed
A.2 Tradability and Offshorability Indices
In some sense, the mean approval rate across different TAA industries forms an implicit
index of industry tradability or offshorability as perceived by TAA case investigators. To
show how well investigator approval rates map to known indices in the literature, I use
three industry-level measures.
I first take the offshorability score assigned by Blinder (2007) to each occupation code
(O*Net OCC 10.0, last revised in 1991), which also contains Department of Labor
6-digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) codes. Using the BLS Occupational
Employment Statistics (OES) national industry estimates that show the most common
SOC occupations for each 6-digit NAICS industry, I compute a weighted sum of the
offshorability index within each industry, multiplying the share of employees in a given
occupation times the offshorability score. I then divide this by its standard deviation to
have a comparable standardized measure across industries.
I repeat this exact same procedure for 1990 occupational codes provided by Autor and
Dorn (2013), who base their offshorability measures on face-to-face and on-site interaction
requirements used in Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2011). Finally, Mian and Sufi (2014)
63Match rates for all three samples are greater than 98%, with the residual owing to likely discrepancies
between parent and subsidiary names which could not be reconciled between the two datasets.
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provide their own measure of tradability based on geographic concentration. Normalizing
all three measures, I can compare them and how well they correlate with mean TAA
approval rates across 3-digit NAICS codes.
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Appendix B. Additional Figures
Figure 1.B.1: Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) Compliers
NOTES—This figure highlights the types of workers and firms that are likely to comply with
the TAA investigator leniency instrument—i.e. LATE compliers—those indicated by the middle
bracket in each panel. The left panel orders mean industry approval rates from lowest to
highest by 3-digit NAICS codes, calculated over all TAA cases from 1974 to 2016. Overlaid is
a standard measure of tradability calculated from Blinder (2007) for the same industries. (See
Appendix 1.A.2 for details on the construction of this index at the industry level, as well as other
tradablility measures from Mian and Sufi (2014) and Autor and Dorn (2013).) The right panel
shows within-industry investigator variation around the same mean approval rates, where the
median is indicated with a black dot and whiskers reflect the 35th to 65th leniency percentiles
within each industry. Each 1(TAA) approval decision can be thought of as a latent variable sum
of an observable tradability signal (left) and subjective adjudication noise (right). 85% of workers
are associated with leniency rates between 20% and 80% (i.e. marginal cases), rather than with
industries that are generally always denied or approved benefits. Source: DOL (OTAA) petition
database attained via FOIA request
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Figure 1.B.2: Dynamic Effects of TAA on Annual Earnings, Full Sample
NOTES—This plots shows 2SLS coefficient estimates of the effects of TAA on annual earnings for
the unrestricted “High and Low Labor Force Attachment” sample (287,000 displaced workers), as
robustness to the preferred sample estimates in Figure 7. Coefficients are estimated for each event
year relative to the TAA petition decision (τ = 0), such that each point estimate is from a separate
cross-sectional regression. Vertical lines partition the support into pre-TAA, during-TAA, and
post-TAA periods. Sample restrictions and variable definitions are identical to those described in
Table 1.5, column 6 (the paper’s preferred earnings specification), except workers are not required
to have 2 years above the annual minimum wage equivalent prior to filing. Dotted lines represent
90% confidence intervals with standard errors clustered at the investigator level. Source: LEHD;
DOL
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Figure 1.B.3: Dynamic Effects of TAA on Log Earnings
NOTES—This plot shows 2SLS coefficient estimates for the effects of TAA on log earnings as
an alternative specification to (Figure 1.8 (effects on quarters employed). Estimates are shown
dynamically across event years relative to the TAA petition decision (τ = 0). Each point estimate
is from a separate cross-sectional regression by event year. Vertical lines partition the support
into pre-TAA, during-TAA, and post-TAA periods. Sample restrictions and variable definitions are
identical to those described in Table 1.5, column 6, except non-zero earnings quarters are eliminated
by logging. Dotted lines represent 90% confidence intervals with standard errors clustered at the
investigator level. Source: LEHD; DOL
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Figure 1.B.4: Composition of TAA Spending Across States & Time
NOTES—This figure displays median TAA expenditures on training and extended UI (Trade
Readjustment Allowances (TRA)), along with their inter-quartile range across states within each
year. Data reflects spending on recipients known to have participated for at least one day in
training or TRA. The large variation in extended UI rates depend partly on different initial UI
generosities and formulae across states (see Department of Labor Unemployment Insurance Data
Summary), and partly on legislative changes and automatic stabilizers implemented during the
Great Recession. Source: DOL Trade Act Participant Report (TAPR), 2001 to 2016
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Figure 1.B.5: Effects of TAA on Earnings for CZ and Industry “Stayers”
NOTES—This figure shows 2SLS estimates of the effects of TAA for workers who stay in their initial
commuting zones (top) and 2-digit NAICS industries (bottom) in the post-period. This ex-post
definition of mobility is used as a subgroup in a specification similar to equation (5) of the draft,
where only coefficients on stayers are plotted here. Stayers comprise approximately 53% and 44% of
the sample for commuting zones and industries respectively. Each point estimate is from a separate
regression by event year. Vertical lines partition the pre-TAA, during-TAA, and post-TAA periods.
Sample restrictions and variable definitions are identical to those described in Table 5, column 6.
Dotted lines represent 90% confidence intervals with standard errors clustered at the investigator
level. Source: LEHD; DOL
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Figure 1.B.6: Workers Filing for TAA: All (Top) versus LEHD Sample (Bottom),
Weighted by 2010 Zip Code Population (1,000 people)
NOTES—These maps show the cumulative number of TAA filers by 1990 commuting zone
(geographies taken from Dorn (2009)). The top sample reflects the universe of TAA filers from
1974 to 2016. The bottom sample displays all filers in 24 LEHD-approved states from 1990 to 2011,
forming the basis of the matched analysis sample. Both maps display cumulative numbers by
quintile. Source: DOL (OTAA) petition database attained via FOIA request; US Census Bureau
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Appendix C. Additional Tables
Figure 1.C.1: Dynamic Earnings Coefficient Estimates by Event Year
High Attachment High & Low Attachment
Event Year (τ) βτ Std. Error βτ Std. Error
0 -8,117.04* (4376.39) -5,632.83* (3,333.45)
1 -2,658.47 (4297.99) -1,160.72 (3590.28)
2 6,350.23 (4789.55) 4,748.69 (3832.99)
3 9,259.34 (5885.42) 7,810.82* (4464.60)
4 8714.95* (4781.49) 8,374.10** (3834.50)
5 7186.63* (3692.48) 7,212.00** (3,318.52)
6 8374.69** (3790.21) 7,413.26** (3,378.17)
7 7948.48** (3871.13) 7,757.00** (3,552.50)
8 4845.18* (2808.49) 4,235.00* (2,221.53)
9 5012.91* (2734.88) 5,511.12*** (2,093.29)
10 978.67 (1421.35) 1,294.62 (1,041.89)
Identification Controls:
Filer Industry FEs (4-digit SIC) yes yes
Investigator Concentration Controls yes yes
Precision Controls:
Calendar Year & Filer Quarter FEs yes yes
Baseline Controls yes yes
Filer Type & NAFTA-TAA FEs yes yes
Demographic Controls & State FEs yes yes
No. of Workers ∼177,000 ∼287,000
No. of Observations (Total) ∼2,623,000 ∼4,192,000
NOTES—This table shows 2SLS coefficient estimates of the effect of TAA on annual
earnings by event year. “High Attachment” estimates correspond to the main analysis
sample of workers that are highly attached to the labor force (see Figure 1.7 for
corresponding graph and sample restrictions). “High and Low Attachment” estimates
correspond to the unrestricted sample (see Figure 1.B.1 for corresponding graph and
sample restrictions). Number of displaced workers are rounded as per Census Bureau
confidentiality requirements. Each point estimate is from a separate cross-sectional
regression for the event year relative to the TAA petition decision (τ = 0). Standard errors
clustered at the investigator level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Source: LEHD; DOL
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CHAPTER 2 : When do Firms Go Green? Comparing Price Incentives with
Command and Control Regulations in India
2.1. Introduction
New Delhi is the most polluted city on earth, with levels of harmful particulate matter that
are far higher than those found in Beijing. In 2014, the WHO estimated that 13 of the 20
cities in the world with the highest levels of air pollution were in India.1 These high levels
of air pollution have been ascribed to a number of factors, including vehicular emissions,
burning of fossil fuels, and economic expansion. The 2014 World Energy Outlook projects
that India will overtake the US as the world’s second largest coal consumer before 2020,
and will also surpass China as the world’s biggest coal importer (IEA, 2014).
Indian lawmakers have passed hundreds of pieces of environmental legislation at the state,
national, and municipal level to address rising pollution. Most of this environmental
legislation has taken the form of command-and-control (CAC) directives which impose
technology standards, uniform pollution reduction mandates, or location restrictions on
automobiles, factories, or power plants. A long-standing view among economists is
that market-based instruments are more cost-effective at addressing pollution than CAC
regulations (for example, Bohm and Russell (1985), Ellerman (2003), Harrington and
Morgenstern (2007), Fowlie et al. (2012)). CAC regulation can involve unnecessarily
high costs. In contrast, market-based instruments like pollution taxes, tradeable permits,
or higher prices for polluting inputs give firms flexibility as to how much, where, and
how to reduce pollution. In addition, most market-based instruments provide continued
incentives to innovate beyond the requirements imposed by regulation.
In this paper, we compare India’s recent experience with CAC regulation and the
incentives provided to firms via input prices. On the one hand, market-based instruments,
such as higher prices for polluting inputs like fossil fuels, may be particularly effective
1World Health Organization, Ambient (Outdoor) Air Pollution Database, v4, July 18, 2014.
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when institutions are weak or enforcement is imperfect (Laffont (2005), Estache and
Wren-Lewis (2009)) On the other hand, there are other cases in which CAC mechanisms
can play an important role. In cases with highly-localized pollution impacts or where there
is a thin market with few trading partners, CAC regulation can be preferred.
India has introduced a wide range of environmental regulations but has relatively weak
institutions (Bertrand et al. (2007), Duflo et al. (2013), Duflo et al. (2014), Greenstone
and Hanna (2014)). In 1991 the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) identified
17 highly-polluting industries (HPI) as particularly worthy of regulation. Since then, the
Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) and the State Pollution Control Boards (SPCBs)
have together targeted these HPI industries through a variety of CAC directives. In 1996,
India’s Supreme Court further attempted to reduce pollution by requiring 17 cities to
enact Action Plans aimed at reducing air pollution through a variety of additional CAC
regulations. HPI industries featured prominently as regulatory targets in these Action
Plans.
We compare the success of the Indian Supreme Court’s Action Plans (SCAP) with price
instruments in changing firm behavior. The staggered timing and selection of cities at
the national rather than local level, helps us identify plausibly causal effects. Although the
Indian government did not use an explicit pollution tax like a carbon tax during our sample
period, we are able to take advantage of very large temporal and geographic variations in
coal prices to compare price instruments with CAC policies.2 Using panel data on formal
manufacturing plants from 1998 through 2009, we show that both CAC policies and price
instruments induced firms to “go green”, but through different channels. We also compare
the efficiency costs of these two approaches by measuring their impacts on establishment
productivity, entry, and exit.
We observe that the SCAP were most effective in targeting, and may have focused
2In an effort to generate a National Clean Energy Fund, the Indian government did begin to tax coal in
2010 – at roughly $0.83 (50 Rs.) per metric ton of coal, doubling the tax to $1.67 (100 Rs.) per metric ton of coal
in 2014.
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regulatory efforts on, the largest, most polluting establishments. The magnitude of this
impact is substantial: we estimate that the SCAP led to a 9 percent higher probability of
large HPI establishments investing in pollution control equipment.
We do not observe that SCAP leads to a reduction in coal use. In contrast, higher coal prices
were associated with significantly lower coal consumption across all establishments. We
use geographic and temporal variation in coal prices to compare the effects of higher prices
with the CAC regulations of the SCAP. We find that higher district-level coal prices are
associated with lower coal use; the price elasticity of demand for coal use, which suggests
that a 10 percent increase in coal price yields a 5 to 10 percent reduction in coal use, is in
line with estimates from the United States.
The benefits of SCAP and higher coal prices can be seen in reduced district-level air
pollution emissions. Using comprehensive emissions data collected by Greenstone and
Hanna (2014) and supplemented with additional reports from India’s The Energy and
Resources Institute (TERI), we compare and contrast the impact of CAC regulations and
coal prices on nitrogen dioxide (NO2), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and particulate matter (PM).
Manufacturing activity is most closely associated with SO2 emissions. We find that the
SCAPs were effective in reducing SO2 emissions in rural districts, while the higher coal
prices reduced emissions in both urban and rural districts.
But neither policy was costless. We examine the impact of CAC and coal prices on total
factor productivity (TFP), as well as establishment entry and exit. Between 2000 and
2009, Indian manufacturing establishments steadily increased their TFP. However, the
introduction of SCAP legislation reversed that trend, offsetting the TFP increases in SCAP
districts. Large HPI establishments show declines in TFP of about 3 percent associated
with the SCAP policy, which translates into a loss of output of 1.27 thousand crore Rupees
or 220 million USD/year (in 1998 currency). Supporters of environmental legislation often
point to a double “dividend” from abatement investment in terms of innovation and
productivity growth in addition to pollution abatement benefits. We find no evidence
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of such a productivity boost.3
In addition to lowering TFP, the Action Plans discouraged entry. The point estimates
indicate that these CAC regulations reduced establishment entry in HPI sectors by 4.5
percent. Higher coal prices also reduced productivity and discouraged entry to some
extent. A 10 percent increase in coal prices is associated with a decrease in TFP of 0.17-0.18
percent. If the large, HPI establishments that were affected by the SCAP policies had
instead been subjected to a higher coal price, the price would have had to rise by nearly
200 percent in order to result in the same TFP decline caused by the Action Plans.
Our study builds on recent work by Greenstone and Hanna (2014), who collected detailed
information on the timing and location of the Action Plans and merged them with
district-level emissions data. They also compared the impact of Action Plans with other
measures to address water pollution and explicit policies that encouraged the use of
catalytic converters for vehicles. Greenstone and Hanna (2014) find that the most effective
of these CAC plans was the legislation for reducing air pollution through the mandated
adoption of catalytic converters by vehicles. But while the focus of their study is on
vehicular emissions, much of the legislation has sought to directly change the activities
of polluting firms and industrial sectors.
In this paper, we directly evaluate the effectiveness of the Action Plans on firm behavior. To
our knowledge this paper is the first attempt to analyze the effectiveness of environmental
legislation on a comprehensive dataset of Indian establishments.4 Taken together, our
findings suggest that CAC regulations are an effective but costly approach for targeting
the largest polluters, whereas market-based incentives may be more effective at widening
the reach of environmental regulations.
3We also find that small, non-HPI establishments experienced an increase in TFP after the Action Plans
were implemented, which may be partially due to their observed divestment of pollution control equipment.
4The Action Plans and HPI initiatives comprise two of India’s largest efforts to curb emissions in the
country’s regulatory history. To our knowledge, this paper is also the first to use nationally representative
micro-data to estimate the cost-side of CAC regulations in a large emerging market setting.
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Another contribution of our paper is to highlight the enormous differences in coal prices
paid by firms–sometimes with the lowest coal prices paid by the most highly polluting
firms or sectors.5 The responsiveness of firm behavior to coal prices in particular suggests
that the coal tax introduced by India in 2010 could play an important role in reducing coal
use.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 begins with a literature review and describes
the different environmental policies in India that are the focus of our study. Section 3.1
describes the data, while Section 2.4 discusses identification issues. Section 2.5 presents the
main results while Section 2.6 explores the consequences for TFP, entry, exit, and emissions
outcomes. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2. Related Literature and Policy Background
Related Literature
There is a large public finance literature contrasting price instruments with
command-and-control regulation. Most of these studies find evidence that using
emissions fees, permits, or input taxes to equate the marginal costs of abatement with
the marginal social cost of pollution damage are the most effective and least costly
ways to abate pollution. An excellent overview is provided by Bohm and Russell (1985)
and Harrington and Morgenstern (2007) provides a discussion contrasting US and EU
experiences.
Cap-and-trade schemes have been shown to be especially effective market instruments
toward this end. Ellerman (2003) evaluates the SO2 cap-and-trade system created by the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (i.e. the Acid Rain Program), and shows that realized
costs under cap-and-trade were one quarter of the estimated cost of CAC standards.
Fowlie et al. (2012) further show that average emissions at NOx Reclaim facilities fell
5The geographic variation is driven by establishment distances from coal deposits within India, state
level differences in supply policies for coal, and long-standing policies that provide for firm-specific price
differences in access to coal.
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20 percent relative to similar facilities subject to CAC regulations, and Jaffe and Stavens
(1995) show that CAC regulations can fail to provide incentives for R&D in new abatement
technologies, unlike market-based instruments.
A related strand of literature examines environmental regulations in developing countries.
Laffont (2005) and Estache and Wren-Lewis (2009) argue that optimal regulation is
likely to look different in developing countries as a result of limited regulatory capacity,
limited accountability, limited commitment, and limited fiscal efficiency. Blackman
and Harrington (2000) describe the difficulty enforcing environmental regulation in a
developing country context, adding factors such as high monitoring costs due to the large
number of very small firms, limited data collection, and low demand for strict policies or
voluntary measures on the part of voters or consumers. India is not exempt: Duflo et al.
(2013) reveal high levels of corruption in India’s system of environmental audits.
One solution to high monitoring costs may be to concentrate efforts on policies that directly
affect factor prices. For example, taxing pesticide production can be more effective than
monitoring pesticide use by individual farmers, especially if the human cost of pesticide
application does not vary widely across the region in question. Khanna and Zilberman
(2001) show that eliminating domestic and trade policy distortions has the potential to
reduce carbon emissions by inducing the adoption of energy efficient technologies by
changing relative fuel prices. Specifically, they show that removing trade restrictions
reduced the price of cleaner coal in India, leading manufacturing firms to switch fuels.
A number of developing country policy makers have expressed concerns that
environmental mandates imposed by industrial countries could prove particularly costly
in terms of foregone growth and competitiveness if applied in developing countries.
In contrast, supporters of environmental legislation point to a “double dividend” from
abatement investment, suggesting that legislation to improve environmental outcomes
can also foster innovation and productivity growth. A related literature on price-induced
technological change, first proposed by Hicks in 1932, suggests that high energy prices
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can lead to both adoption of cleaner technologies and positive R&D spillovers. This
induced innovation has been shown to decrease energy demand of new entrants (Linn
(2008)), affect the mix of durables offered by the firm (Newell et al. (1999)), and to increase
energy-related patents (Popp (2015)).
The Porter Hypothesis is an extension of this idea, arguing in its strictest interpretation
that environmental regulation can benefit firms. Porter posits that regulations can increase
productivity due, say, to positive spillovers from R&D or first-mover advantages relative
to unregulated firms. There is limited empirical support for a strong Porter Hypothesis.6
Instead, evidence suggests that regulated firms experience foregone earnings (Walker
(2012)), TFP decreases (Greenstone et al. (2012)), and less entry / higher exit in response
to regulations (Becker and Henderson (2000) and List et al. (2003)). In a developing
country however, there may be evidence of a strong Porter Hypothesis. Tanaka et al.
(2014) find evidence that SO2 and acid rain regulation increased industrial productivity in
China due to both selection effects (entry of more efficient and exit of less efficient firms)
and within-firm adoption of cleaner technologies. Liu and Martin (2014) evaluate a large
industrial energy efficiency program in China and show that the difference in productivity
growth rates between participating and counterfactual non-participating firms is very
small (less than 1 percent), despite evidence of positive air quality impacts.
Policy Background
We focus on two sets of CAC policies: policies introduced in 1991 designating High
Polluting Industries (HPI), and Supreme Court Action Plans (SCAP), introduced in 1996.7
The SCAP also interacted with the earlier HPI designations by explicitly focusing on HPI
sectors in many cases.
6There is ample evidence, on the other hand, of the weak Porter Hypothesis, namely, that environmental
regulation stimulates environmental innovations. See the above studies and Jaffe and Palmer (1997).
7We have omitted a discussion of some policies either because they are not easily quantified or because
their enactment falls outside the scope of our time period. Appendix A includes a discussion of some other
policies.
83
In 1991 the MoEF identified 17 HPI which were further monitored at both the central
government and state government levels. In certain cases, new standards were imposed on
specific industries from the HPI list (for example, stricter PM standards for small cast iron
foundries in Lucknow); in several instances, cities adopted the “Corporate Responsibility
for Environmental Protection” (CREP) charter for HPI. This charter was established by
MoEF and CPCB in 2003, and set specific new standards for the 17 HPI.
The Supreme Court of India, partly in response to perceptions of inadequate action
by government ministries, ordered Action Plans to be developed, submitted, and
implemented in seventeen cities, starting in 1996 with Delhi, the national capital.
Subsequently, several Action Plans also specifically targeted the 17 HPI industries as
designated in 1991.
The Supreme Court Action Plans typically targeted vehicular pollution and also imposed a
variety of restrictions on manufacturing firms, including requirements to use cleaner fuels,
to close or relocate polluting factories, and to install pollution control equipment. Earlier
work suggests that the Action Plans may have reduced NO2 pollution slightly, but had no
impact on PM or SO2; in contrast, a policy requiring catalytic converters was linked with
reductions in PM and SO2 (Greenstone and Hanna, 2014).
India’s coal industry is highly regulated and a major player in meeting the country’s
energy needs. Coal accounts for more than half of India’s commercial energy needs, with
larger domestic reserves than any of the country’s other major fuel sources. While the
share fluctuates, around eighty percent of the country’s coal needs are satisfied through
local mining efforts.
India’s coal mines were nationalized in 1972 and 1973. Coal India Limited (CIL),
created in 1975, is one of the largest State Owned Enterprises in India and manages the
mining, distribution, and sales of domestic coal in conjunction with the Ministry of Coal.
Expectations for CIL are that its role is likely to become even more important in an effort
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to meet India’s growing energy needs. Coal production by CIL is expected to double
from around 500 million tons annually to one billion tons by 2020. However, individual
companies within the manufacturing sector also engage in coal mining. Following
nationalization, all individual leases allowing companies to mine coal were terminated
except for the iron and steel industry.
Beginning in 1992, India initiated a policy to expand so-called “captive mining” beyond
the iron and steel industry. The motivation behind this policy was to increase coal
mining capacity through coal users in the private sector. This policy was first extended
to power companies (in 1993), then cement producers (in 1996), and finally to other Indian
companies in 1997. In practice, captive mining has been problematic as many coal blocks
allocated to individual companies were not effectively utilized and pricing has not been
systematically designed. Combined with significant differences in railway capacity, taxes,
and state level environmental policies, the consequences have been enormous variation in
coal prices, extraction, and costs. Prices vary across companies, districts, and states.
2.3. Data
2.3.1. Establishment-Level Data
We use 10 years of establishment-level panel data (2000 through 2009) from the Annual
Survey of Industries (ASI), comprising approximately 89,000 unique factories after sample
restrictions. The ASI data are, for the most part, at the level of the establishment or factory;
owners of multiple factories in the same state and industry can furnish a joint return, but
fewer than 5 percent of observations in our sample report multiple factories. Thus, all our
analyses should be interpreted as being at the establishment rather than the firm level.
The ASI panel includes 9 years of data on pollution control investment, pollution control
capital stock, and expenditures on repair and maintenance of pollution control stock
(2001 through 2009). Note that, as defined, pollution control represents undifferentiated
investments to address air pollution, water pollution and/or hazardous waste. We use
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reported pollution control investment to calculate pollution control stock according to a
perpetual inventory method.8
For each establishment we also observe annual expenditures on fuels, including
expenditures on coal, petrol / diesel, and electricity, as well as quantities of coal consumed,
and quantities of electricity consumed, generated and sold. We use these data to construct
several outcome measures that we expect to be closely linked to the environmental policies
we study: the stock of pollution control assets, fraction of pollution control assets in total
capital stock, coal use in tons, and intensity of coal use (tons of coal use per rupee of
output). We also draw on the establishment-level data to calculate total factor productivity
(TFP) via the following methods: Solow Residual, Index Method (following Aw, Chen,
and Roberts (2001)), and Olley and Pakes (1996).9 Output values are deflated using the
appropriate industry-specific wholesale price index (WPI). We have detailed product-level
price and quantity data for primary outputs and inputs, which allows us to calculate
material input deflators by weighting commodity-specific WPI by commodity-specific
input shares.10 Investments in machinery, transport equipment and computer systems
are deflated separately by commodity-specific WPI, while fuel inputs are deflated by the
fuel-specific WPI. Wages (used in estimating TFP) are deflated using the consumer price
index (CPI).
Establishment location is identified at the district-area level, with more than 600 unique
districts and two areas within each district (urban and rural). The ASI panel does not
contain district-level identifiers, but the cross-sectional data do. We are the first researchers
to have purchased and merged both cross-section and panel datasets to integrate district
8We take the first year an opening pollution stock value is observed, and add within-year pollution
investments plus the year-to-year change in pollution stock taken from comparing the jump between closing
and opening pollution stock values across years to attain a new value for investment. We then add this
(deflated) investment to the previous year’s opening stock, and depreciate the new closing value by 10 percent,
repeating for subsequent years.
9For a more detailed discussion of the methodology used to calculate TFP, see Harrison, Martin, and
Nataraj (2013).
10We use input shares from 2001 to avoid potentially endogenous changes in input mix due to the policies
we study.
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identifiers into the ASI panel.11 We also know the primary industry in which an
establishment operates at the 5-digit level, representing 476 unique 5-digit industries.
We use this industry information to construct a dummy variable indicating whether an
establishment has ever operated in an HPI industry.12
2.3.2. Policy Data
Action Plans
The Supreme Court Action Plans were implemented at the city level, which we match
to districts from our establishment-level dataset (Table 2.1). Several Action Plans were
implemented in cities spanning multiple districts; in these cases we assume the Action
Plans affected all of the districts. We observe establishments before and after the
implementation of 16 of the 17 Action Plans. Delhi was mandated to develop an Action
Plan in 1998, prior to the sample period. Therefore, we exclude Delhi from our analysis.
Figure 1.C.2 shows the geographic distribution of Action Plans overlaid on top of
districts, which are coded according to the total number of pollution monitors (suspended
particulate matter (SPM), NO2, SO2) ever active in each district. The map shows significant
coverage of Action Plan districts by pollution monitors. Furthermore, Figure 1.C.2 reveals
that the 11 Action Plans implemented in 2003 were concentrated in the northern region
of the country, while the 5 Action Plans mandated in 2004 were concentrated in southern
India.13
Our identification strategy exploits the geographic and temporal variation in the Action
11District level identifiers were not available for 2009, and were instead imputed from previous panel data.
Our results however, are robust to re-running the entire analysis omitting 2009.
12A number of establishments do appear to move into and out of operation in HPI industries. However,
this largely appears to be a function of small changes in product mix. For example, if an establishment reports
a primary industry of “casting of iron and steel” in a particular year and “casting of non-ferrous metals” in the
following year, it would be classified as an HPI in the first year but not the in second, even though the change
in category likely reflects a change in product mix rather than a substantial shift in industry or applicable
regulations.
13As noted in Appendix A, Problem Area Action Plans (PAAPs) were also targeted geographically.
However, since PAAPs were mandated in 1989, we do not identify policy variation within our sample period
and have thus omitted them from the map.
87
Plans. Documents from the Supreme Court suggest that the Court’s mandates were largely
based on CPCB air quality reports. In a case regarding CNG buses in Delhi, in April 2002
the Court wrote, “We may here note that there are, as per CPCB data, at least nine other
polluted cities in India where the air quality is critical. These cities are Agra, Lucknow,
Jharia, Kanpur, Varanasi, Faridabad, Patna, Jodhpur and Pune. But there appears to be
no effective action plan to address the problem of these cities....If no immediate action is
taken, then it may become necessary for some orders being passed so as to bring relief to
the residents of those cities.”14 The Court required that Action Plans be drafted for those
cities, adding Ahmedabad and Kolkata to the list in May 2002.15
In August 2003, the Court further noted, “CPCB’s report shows that the Respirable
Particulate Matter (in short “RSPM”) levels in Ahmedabad, Kanpur, Sholapur, Lucknow,
Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad, Mumbai and Kolkata are alarming.”16 The five southern
cities - Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad, Mumbai, and Solapur - were subsequently
required to create Action Plans as well.17
Examining hard-copy CPCB reports, as well as a report on air quality trends and action
plans in 17 cities by the MoEF and CPCB, suggests that the Action Plans likely targeted a
variety of industries through different means. Examples of action items include closure
of clandestine units (Faridabad), moving various industries and commercial activities
outside of city limits (Jodhpur, Kanpur), installation of electrostatic precipitators in
all boilers in power generation stations (Lucknow), surprise inspections (Patna), and
promotion of alternative fuels in generators (Hyderabad).
Highly Polluting Industries
14M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, WP 13029/1985 (2002.04.05).
15“Action Plan Preparation and Implementation for Control of Air Pollution in Nonattainment Cities and
Towns.” CPCB presentation from Meetu Puri.
16CPCB, Air Quality Trends and Action Plan for Control of Air Pollution from Seventeen Cities, September
2006.
17“Action Plan Preparation and Implementation for Control of Air Pollution in Nonattainment Cities and
Towns.” CPCB presentation from Meetu Puri.
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A number of Action Plans also specifically applied to the 17 industries identified by the
CPCB as “Highly Polluting” (HPI). These industries are: aluminum smelting; basic drugs
and pharmaceuticals; caustic soda; cement; copper smelting; dyes and intermediates;
fermentation (distillery); fertilizers; integrated iron and steel; leather processing; oil
refining; pesticides; pulp and paper; petrochemicals; sugar; thermal power plants; and
zinc smelting. We manually match all of these HPI, with the exception of “thermal
power plants”,18 to 97 5-digit NIC industries. As discussed above, we then identify HPI
establishments as those that ever reported a primary industry code that was matched to
an HPI.
2.3.3. Coal Prices
The Action Plans can be seen as examples of CAC regulation. Establishments may also
respond to changing coal prices through measures that increase efficiency and reduce coal
use. Coal prices faced by manufacturing establishments in our dataset varied enormously
across states and districts. Figure 1.C.3 indicates that coal prices were generally lower in
the eastern part of India, where many coal mines are located. Prices were higher in the
western parts and the densely-populated regions. Variations in coal prices were very high
with prices in some regions five times higher on a per ton basis than in others. Many of
the factors causing this variation stem from locational advantages (closer to coal mines),
state differences in pricing policies and taxes, differences in transport costs, and differences
in captive mining arrangements and individualized establishment contracts for accessing
coal from CIL (see Appendix Table A.1).
Despite all of these exogenous factors, establishment-level coal prices could be
endogenous to establishment-specific characteristics; for example, larger establishments
may command more market power and thus face lower prices. We have two strategies
18As power plants are outside the scope of the ASI’s coverage of manufacturing sectors, we could not
analyze thermal plants in our main specifications. We were however, able to locate thermal power plant
coal use data from India’s Central Electric Authority’s Thermal Performance Reviews – an important control
variable for our air quality specifications. However, this dataset does not contain the dependent variables that
would permit their inclusion in the main analysis.
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for circumventing price endogeneity concerns. First, in base specifications we measure the
coal price faced by an establishment as the mean coal price in the establishment’s district,
excluding the establishment’s own price.19 This price measure is flexible in that it does not
constrain estimation to the subset of establishments with non-missing coal prices. Second,
we use an instrumental variable (IV) as a plausibly exogenous cost-shifter of a firm’s
coal input price when estimating coal price elasticities. As is common in the industrial
organization literature, we use the mean input prices faced by similar firms in other
markets that do not directly affect own-firm demand. Following extensive exploration
of the determinants of coal price variation in our data (see Appendix Table A.1), we define
our IV as the log mean price faced by establishments within the same 2-digit industry and
state.20
2.3.4. Air Pollution Data
In this paper, we focus on estimates of SO2, NO2, and SPM to compare the impact of
Action Plans with the effects of coal prices on environmental outcomes. SPM captures
general pollution levels. The CPCB website indicates that “[Respirable] SPM levels exceed
prescribed NAAQS in residential areas of many cities... The reason for high particulate
matter levels may be vehicles, engine gensets, small scale industries, biomass incineration,
resuspension of traffic dust, commercial and domestic use of fuels, etc.”21
SO2 levels are primarily attributable to burning of fossil fuels. In recent years, the CPCB
indicates that India’s SO2 levels have been declining in major cities, in part because of
efforts to introduce cleaner fuels and new norms for vehicles and fuel quality. There have
also been efforts to shift domestic fuel use away from coal. In our paper, the comparison
of Action Plan measures with coal price effects is most likely to be relevant for SO2 levels,
as they are most closely linked to fossil fuel use. NO2 levels are generally attributable
19If fewer than 10 establishments report coal use (and thus coal prices) in a particular district and year, we
assign coal users the mean state-level coal price (excluding own price).
20Defining the IV within industry-state-year cells also has the added advantage that coal quality differences
across industries are controlled for.
21Website accessed on June 1, 2015 at http://cpcb.nic.in/Findings.php.
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to vehicular exhaust and as such a reduction should be associated with efforts to reduce
pollution associated with vehicle exhaust. The CPCB’s website indicates that “NO2 levels
are within the prescribed National Ambient Air Quality Standards in residential areas of
most of the cities. The reasons for low levels of NO2 may be various measures taken such
as banning of old vehicles, better traffic management etc.”
Our air pollution data are based on city-level data provided by Greenstone and Hanna
(2014) for 1998-2007. We supplement their data with additional observations from
The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) in its TERI Energy Data Directory Yearbook
(TEDDY) for 2008.22 Figure 1.C.2 shows the locations of air quality monitors. Air quality
data are only available for a subset of cities; we mapped each city for which the data are
available to the corresponding district(s) in our dataset.
2.3.5. Summary Statistics and Trends
In Table 2.2, we present summary statistics for our main variables, after implementing our
preferred sample restrictions.23 Variable means and standard deviations are broken out by
six key analysis groups: whether or not an establishment was ever regulated by an Action
Plan (SCAP, Not SCAP), whether or not an establishment ever listed an HPI as its primary
industry, and establishment size (Large versus Not Large, which indicates whether the
establishment had above or below 100 workers—the threshold most commonly used
by Indian regulators targeting large establishments—in the initial year in which it was
observed).
Establishments in all groups face similar coal prices, entry and exit rates, and productivity
levels. However, there is very large variation in coal prices as indicated by the high
standard deviations in establishment coal prices in Table 2.2 and displayed visually in
22Results are robust to using the pollutant data from TERI / TEDDY for all years.
23As discussed in the next section, while the event years of the analysis run from -4 to +6, we restrict our
study to the window from -3 to +5 such that no single policy exerts leverage over the stacked results. This is
analogous to imposing a balanced panel requirement for Action Plan-treated districts in event time. We also
drop the Delhi Action Plan as our panel currently does not accommodate any data prior to 1998, the year in
which Delhi was mandated to adopt an Action Plan by the Indian Supreme Court.
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Figure 1.C.3. We also report average coal prices by sector type and ownership type in
Appendix Table A.2. The means for the year 2000 indicate that the lowest coal prices were
paid by one of the dirtiest sectors: cement.
Figure 1.C.4 shows trends in the fraction of establishments reporting positive pollution
control stock and positive coal use. Note that the fractions of establishments shown in
Figure 1.C.4 are not directly comparable to those shown in Table 2.2, as Figure 1.C.4 has
sampling weights applied, while Table 2.2 does not.
The top two panels of Figure 1.C.4 show the fraction of establishments reporting
any pollution control stock, and any coal use, respectively, for HPI versus non-HPI
establishments. In line with the long history of regulation of HPI sectors, establishments
in HPI industries are more likely to have pollution control assets than establishments in
non-HPI industries. HPI establishments have a 14 percentage point higher probability
of ever using pollution control equipment, over a base of 7.5 percent for non-HPI
establishments (Table 2.2).
The top left panel of Figure 1.C.4 also offers a preview of some of our results: prior
to the implementation of the Action Plans, about 15 percent of HPI establishments had
non-zero pollution control stocks, against 5 percent of non-HPI establishments. Following
the enactment of the Action Plans, the fraction of non-HPI establishments with non-zero
pollution control stock continues a steady climb, while the fraction of HPI establishments
with pollution-control stock rises more quickly than before.
HPI establishments also have a higher probability of coal use: Table 2.2 reports that 16.2
percent of HPI establishments report ever using coal, compared to 10.2 percent for others.
The top right panel of Figure 1.C.4 shows that over time, the fraction of establishments
using coal has generally fallen, in both HPI and non-HPI industries, with an uptick in the
probability of coal usage during the late 2000s, especially among HPI establishments.
In both cases there was more substantial movement for establishments in HPI sectors than
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for the rest of the economy. In the empirical section of this paper, we test for an interaction
between Action Plan passage and designation as an HPI sector.
The bottom two panels of Figure 1.C.4 compare trends for districts that implemented
Action Plans and those that did not. Establishments in districts that are ultimately treated
by Action Plans have lower observed values of pollution control stock and coal use
variables, on both the intensive and extensive margins. For example, establishments
in Action Plan districts have a 3.5 percentage point lower coal use probability than
establishments in non-SCAP districts, and have substantially lower average coal use in
terms of tons and coal intensity rate as measured by the coal tons used per unit of output
(Table 2.2). Establishments in Action Plan districts also have a lower overall probability
of using pollution control equipment. 11.5 percent of non-SCAP establishments report
ever having used pollution control equipment, compared to 9.2 percent for SCAP-exposed
establishments.
The bottom left panel of Figure 1.C.4 shows a slight upward trend in the fraction of
establishments in non-Action Plan districts investing in pollution control stock starting
in 2003, while the Action Plan districts show an upward trend beginning in 2004. The
lower right panel shows that Action Plan districts had a lower fraction of establishments
reporting coal use, and that the fractions have fallen in all districts over time.
Taken together, there is no clear visual evidence across all four panels that Action Plans
had a strong impact on establishment performance, either by encouraging more pollution
abatement investments or by reducing coal use. But there is some evidence that Action
Plans combined with HPI status may have changed establishment behavior.24
24Table 2.2 also displays preliminary evidence that establishment size plays a role. Columns (5) and (6)
show that large establishments are much more likely to report investment in pollution abatement equipment,
with 21.8 percent of large establishments reporting having some pollution abatement equipment but only 5.7
percent of small establishments doing so. While these two groups face similar coal prices, large establishments
are more likely to report coal use. In addition, large establishments exhibit less churn – they have somewhat
lower entry rates and exit rates.
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2.4. Identification Strategy
Our identification strategy exploits the differential incidence and timing of the Action
Plans. As discussed in Sections 2 and 3.2, the Supreme Court mandated that a number
of cities develop Action Plans, typically based on evidence of high RSPM levels. These
Action Plans were, with the exception of the plan for Delhi, implemented in 2003 and
2004. We compare districts that implemented an Action Plan against those that did not,
and we separately examine effects on establishments in HPI versus non-HPI industries.
We use a “stacked” difference-in-differences (DID) method following Greenstone and
Hanna (2014) where we estimate the following for establishment i in district d in year
t:25
yidt = β1SCAPdτ + λCoalPriceidt + αi + ηt + εidt (2.1)
The variable SCAP is equal to 1 in a district that receives an Action Plan, in any year after
the Action Plan is in place, 0 otherwise; τ denotes event time. The coal price is equal to
the mean district price, excluding own price, and hence varies at the establishment level.
Except when noted, our specifications include establishment fixed effects αi as well as
accounting year fixed effects ηt.
We begin by examining the impacts of the Action Plans and coal prices on the probability
that an establishment reports any pollution control stock, or that it uses coal. In these cases,
we implement linear probability models, where the outcome of interest yidt is a dummy
equal to one if the establishment reports a positive value of pollution control stock (coal
use), zero otherwise.
We then consider whether the policies and prices had any impact on within-establishment
25While event years run from -4 to +6, we restrict our analysis to the window from -3 to +5 such that
no single policy exerts leverage over the stacked results. This is analogous to imposing a balanced panel
requirement for Action Plan-treated districts in event time.
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changes in coal use or pollution control stock. The specific outcomes we examine are:
pollution control stock (estimated using a perpetual inventory method as described
above), fraction of total capital stock invested in pollution control, coal use in tons, and
coal intensity of output (tons of coal per unit of real output).
Our outcomes of interest also include three non-environmental aspects of establishment
behavior: TFP, entry and exit. The entry variable takes on a value of 1 in the first year
an establishment appears in the data within three years of the observed initial production
date.26 The exit variable takes on a value of 1 in the year an establishment is officially
declared “closed” in the ASI, so long as it remains closed thereafter. When examining entry
and exit, we use a similar specification as above, but exclude establishment fixed effects in
order to identify the effect based on all establishments, not just entrants and exiters.
The DID strategy accounts for any time-invariant differences across Action Plan and
non-Action Plan cities. However, as noted by Greenstone and Hanna (2014), we might
be concerned about a correlation between the Supreme Court’s mandate for an Action
Plan, and pre-existing trends in the outcomes of interest. We thus present specifications
that also control for a linear time trend (τ) in event time. The time trend (τ) is normalized
to zero for any district which is never mandated to adopt an Action Plan over the sample
period. In addition, we interact the time trend with the Action Plan dummy to examine
whether the effect of the policy changes over time:
yidt = β1SCAPdτ + β2τ + β3SCAPdτ × τ + λCoalPriceidt + αi + ηt + εidt (2.2)
As noted above, many of the Action Plans specifically targeted HPI. We might also expect
effects to differ for HPI and non-HPI industries simply because the HPI industries have
historically been major polluters, and have been regulated more heavily. In addition,
26We do not ascribe an entry value of 1 if the factory was left-censored, and chose the threshold value 3
based on the mean difference between the reported date of initial production and the establishment’s first
appearance in the survey data.
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like many other countries, India tends to focus its environmental regulations on larger
establishments. Thus, we examine whether the Action Plans had differential impacts for
establishments in HPI versus non-HPI industries, and for large and small establishments:
yidt = β2τ + β3SCAPdτ × τ + δ1SCAPdτ × HPIi × Largei
+ δ2SCAPdτ × HPIi × NotLargei + δ3SCAPdτ × NotHPIi × Largei+
δ4SCAPdτ × NotHPIi × NotLargei + λCoalPriceidt + αi + ηt + εidt (2.3)
HPI is a dummy equal to 1 if the establishment ever reported its primary industry as one
that is flagged as highly polluting, 0 otherwise. To avoid the potential endogenous reaction
of establishment size to the Action Plans, we define an establishment as “large” if it has
more than 100 workers in the first year in which we observed it. The establishment fixed
effects absorb the direct effects of the HPI and establishment size variables. We also do a
similar break-down for coal prices.
Finally, we conduct similar regressions at the district level to examine the effects on
district-level pollution measures:
ydt = β1SCAPdτ + β2τ + β3SCAPdτ × τ + λCoalPricedt + αd + ηt + εdt (2.4)
In this set of specifications, we also control for coal use by thermal coal power plants,
which account for approximately three-quarters of India’s coal use.27
For establishment-level results, we apply sampling multipliers in our analyses. For
district-level results, we first aggregate the establishment-level data to the district level
27The ASI establishment-level data however, unfortunately do not cover electricity units. Consequently, we
cannot include them in our main specifications as we do not observe any of the main variables of the analysis
for thermal coal plants.
96
using sampling multipliers; we then present results in which each district is weighted
by the initial number of establishments in the district. In all cases, standard errors are
clustered at the district level.
2.5. Main Results
We begin by exploring the overall impact of Action Plans and coal prices on the probability
that an establishment reports a positive value for pollution control stock or coal use. This
is what we refer to as the “extensive margin”. Columns (1) and (3) of Table 2.3 report the
results from estimating Equation 2.1 for pollution control stock and coal use, respectively.
They show that overall, the Action Plans had no substantial impact on the probability that
an establishment had pollution control equipment or used coal.28
Columns (2) and (4) introduce a control for a linear time trend and an interaction between
the time trend and the Action Plans as in Equation 2.2. The coefficient on the time trend
confirms the visual evidence in Figure 1.C.4 that coal use has been declining over time.
Columns (3) and (4) also show little relationship between coal prices and the probability of
any coal use. Overall, we see no clear relationship between Action Plan legislation or coal
price, and two primary measures of environmental responses at the establishment level:
investment in pollution abatement and reduction in the use of dirty fuels.
One possibility is that heterogeneity in responses for establishments of different sizes and
sectors could obscure significant impacts of the Action Plans on establishments. As we
saw, establishments in HPI sectors were targeted through the Action Plans and are likely
to have received special treatment and additional scrutiny. In Figure 1.C.5, we show
that the likelihood of investments in pollution abatement did in fact vary across different
categories of firms. The figure shows that large establishments classified as HPI (highly
polluting industries) responded significantly to the Action Plans. Over time, the increased
28One may be concerned that Action Plans mechanically increase coal prices if new pollution control
equipment requires higher-quality and thus more expensive grades of coal (which is unobserved) to be
operated. We directly test this simultaneity concern by omitting coal prices from our main specifications
for both the extensive and intensive margins, and find that the coefficient on SCAP remains nearly identical.
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probability of investment in abatement rose from five percent prior to the plans to as high
as fifteen percent five years after legislation. In contrast, other establishments were not
positively affected at all.29
In Table 2.4 we formally test for the differences reported in Figure 1.C.5. We estimate
whether Action Plans affected the probability of coal use or pollution abatement
investment for establishments of different sizes and HPI designations. While the Action
Plans were not associated with an overall change in whether or not establishments
invested in pollution control (the extensive margin of establishment behavior), column
(1) shows that Action Plans are associated with a significant increase in the probability
that large establishments in HPI industries - those most likely to be targeted by the Action
Plans - report some pollution control stock. Results are similar when we control for a
linear time trend in column (2). The coefficient on the interaction term (SCAP X HPI X
Large), 0.0922 in column (2), suggests that treatment increased the probability of non-zero
abatement investment by about 9.5 percentage points.30 In addition, the results in column
(2) suggest that large, non-HPI establishments were also more likely to invest in pollution
control stock, although the effect is much smaller than for large, HPI establishments. In
contrast, the Action Plans are associated with a reduction in the probability that small,
non-HPI establishments – those least likely to be targeted by the Action Plans – reported
any pollution control investment.
In terms of coal use, we continue to find no relationship between the Action Plans and
the extensive margin of coal use in columns (3) and (4). There is no evidence that Action
Plans moved establishments to give up the use of coal or begin to use coal even when we
29We see in Appendix Table B.1 that this growth is relative to an initial condition in which SCAP districts
had not only fewer large HPI establishments reporting pollution control stock but also a smaller fraction of
large HPI establishments that reported pollution control stock, relative to non-SCAP districts.
30We also run all specifications including HPI-by-year fixed effects. Doing so reduces the coefficient
estimate on SCAP X HPI X Large from 9.5 percentage points to roughly 7.1 percentage points. This is
expected however, as our identification strategy leverages differential targeting between HPI and non-HPI
establishments over time. Our preferred specification thus omits these fixed effects. In Appendix C, we also
show the results of a placebo test in the spirit of Chetty et al. (2009). The test indicates that the estimate on
the interaction term SCAP X HPI X Large in Column (2), 0.0922, is substantially larger than the majority of
placebo estimates.
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distinguish across establishment size and HPI status.
One potential explanation for the contrasting findings on investment in pollution
abatement is that regulators may have focused their attention even more strongly
on large, HPI establishments following the advent of the Action Plans, in order to
maximize potential returns by targeting the largest polluters, thus allowing non-targeted
establishments to reduce their pollution control efforts.
It is interesting to use the data reported in Appendix B to try to estimate the net impact
from the opposing effects exhibited in Table 2.4. Since Appendix Table B.2 shows that
roughly 60 percent of the sample consists of smaller non-HPI establishments, while only
about 6 percent of the sample falls into the category of large HPI establishments, overall the
drop in the number of smaller non-HPI establishments investing in pollution abatement
in column (2) is nearly equivalent to the number of large HPI enterprises moving from
non-zero investment into positive investment. Yet because the large HPI establishments
accounted for 44 percent of all industrial output in India in 2008, while the small non-HPI
establishments accounted for only 13 percent of total output, the share of output associated
with new investment in pollution abatement for large HPI establishments far outweighed
the reductions for small establishments. As we see in Appendix Table B.3, the average
investment in pollution abatement by a large HPI establishment that previously had
no such investments was 50 times higher than the typical initial investment by a small
non-HPI establishment. These results indicate that the establishments that changed their
behavior to invest in pollution abatement were large enterprises in dirty sectors and made
very large investments.
We now turn to the intensive margin results, measuring the determinants of changes in
intensity of coal use or pollution abatement for establishments with non-zero observations.
Table 2.5 reports the impact of the Action Plans and mean district coal prices on changes
in within-establishment pollution abatement investment and coal use. The instrument for
establishment-level coal prices is strong (F-stat close to 80). The results show that the net
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impact of Action Plans on the intensive margin of pollution abatement was negligible.
Turning to the determinants of coal use, the coefficient on the time trend in Table 2.5
implies that over time, manufacturing establishments have reduced their consumption
of coal. However, the coefficient on the interaction between the time trend and the Action
Plans suggests that this trend was nullified for the average establishment in an Action Plan
district.
The last two rows of Table 2.5 report the impact of log mean district coal prices (excluding
the establishment’s own price) on coal consumption. The results in columns (3) to (6)
indicate that a 10 percent increase in coal price is associated with a 5-10 percent reduction
in establishment level coal use, and a similar reduction in coal intensity of output. These
results suggest that while the Action Plans had some impact on the extensive margin of
pollution abatement, coal price changes were the major driver of coal use.
Table 2.6 decomposes the intensive margin results by establishment size and HPI status.
These results suggest that the Action Plans were not associated with an improvement in
within-establishment outcomes. For coal use, the results in Table 2.6 confirm previous
findings that the Action Plans appear, if anything, to have offset the secular reduction in
coal use. As before, coal prices appear to be the main driver of within-establishment coal
use. Higher coal prices are associated with lower coal use across all types of establishments
(HPI and non-HPI, small and large).
Taken together, the extensive and intensive margin results indicate that the Action
Plans encouraged large establishments in the HPI sector to shift from zero to positive
investments in pollution abatement. While a number of smaller establishments were likely
to divest themselves of pollution control equipment, given the relative sizes of observed
investment, we estimate that the net effect of these two offsetting consequences associated
with the Action Plans was likely to be positive.
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2.6. Impact on Productivity, Entry, Exit, and Ambient Air Quality
2.6.1. Productivity, Entry, and Exit
So far, we have considered the effects of the Action Plans and coal prices on investment in
pollution control equipment and coal use. We saw that higher coal prices are associated
with lower coal consumption and coal intensity of output. We also saw that the
Action Plans increased the extensive margin of pollution abatement among large, HPI
establishments, with some offsetting disinvestment in pollution abatement among small,
non-HPI establishments.
We now consider how these two policies have affected TFP (Table 2.7). Looking at overall
trend changes in TFP over time, the coefficient on the time trend reveals that TFP has
been steadily increasing over event time, with TFP growing on average between 0.6 and
1 percentage point per year in terms of gross output. The coefficient on the Action
Plans interacted with the time trend is consistently negative and significant, suggesting
that establishments affected by Action Plans exhibited lower productivity growth. The
magnitude of the interaction term is equal and opposite in sign to trend TFP growth,
suggesting that the Action Plans completely offset the overall trend growth rates.
The coefficients on the Action Plans, interacted with the HPI and size dummies, also
suggest that Action Plans were associated with even larger TFP declines for large, HPI
establishments. The point estimates indicate a reduction in output of between 2 and
4 percent. Since TFP indicates net output changes after accounting for changes in
inputs, this is a large negative effect. In magnitudes, it exceeds the estimates derived
by Greenstone, Syverson, and List (2012) for U.S. manufacturing enterprises targeted by
the U.S. EPA through a non-attainment designation. However, TFP increased in small,
non-HPI establishments located in Action Plan districts. This result is consistent with
our earlier finding that the Action Plans are associated with a disinvestment in pollution
control equipment among small, HPI establishments, potentially due to a re-focusing of
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regulatory attention on larger, HPI establishments.
Table 2.7 also shows that the coal price is typically (although not always significantly)
associated with lower productivity, which is consistent with the revenue productivity
definition that we use here. The magnitudes range from insignificant and close to zero
to significant and close to -0.02. The elasticity of log TFP to log coal price of 0.017-0.018
indicates that if the large, HPI establishments that were affected by the SCAP policies had
instead been subjected to a higher coal price, the price would have to increase by nearly
200 percent to be equal to result in the same TFP decline caused by the Action Plans.
The productivity costs of the SCAP policies have been large. To explore the mechanism
through which SCAPs led to TFP declines, we reclassified the Action Plans into three
types of regulations. We coded separately the Action Plans that we could identify
as having mandated new equipment, placed restrictions on energy inputs, or required
relocation.31 We then redid the productivity regressions to identify which types of
mandates contributed to productivity declines. The results are summarized in Figure
1.C.6. A major source of productivity declines for hardest hit, large HPI establishments was
regulations mandating changes in energy inputs. These requirements led to TFP declines
of 3 to 5 percent. We do not find similar evidence that equipment mandates either resulted
in a major decline in productivity. However, these results should be cautiously interpreted,
as they are based on the specific requirements that we could identify from the available
records for each Action Plan. It is likely that the records we had access to do not contain
a full accounting of all Action Plan mandates, and thus that our measures of requirements
for equipment use, input restrictions, and relocation are not complete.
The effects discussed so far are, by construction, only defined for surviving establishments.
However, a key issue in the debate about environmental regulations revolves around the
31Examples of specific mandates include: in 2005 the Action Plan for Lucknow required scrubbers for
certain types of plants (equipment requirement); in 2003 the Action Plan for Agra forbade the use of coal and
coke in new industries (energy input restriction); in 2004 the Action Plan for Delhi required that all stone
crushers be relocated (relocation).
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potential effects on entry and exit. Tables 2.8 and 2.9 thus return to the extensive margin,
and examine whether the Action Plans and coal prices affect probability of establishment
exit or entry. As noted above, in these specifications we do not include establishment fixed
effects, in order to estimate the relationship using all establishments, not just those that
entered or exited during our sample period. Thus, we can also include a dummy variable
indicating whether an establishment was HPI.
In Table 2.8, the negative and significant coefficient on the time trend suggests that exit
probabilities had been declining over event time. The coefficients on the Action Plans
are generally insignificant and close to zero in magnitude for all types of establishments,
indicating no relationship between CAC mechanisms and exit probabilities. The coefficient
on district coal prices is positive, indicating that higher coal prices are associated with
higher exit probabilities; however, the effects are only significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 2.9 explores the relationship between entry, environmental regulations, and coal
prices. While Action Plans do not appear correlated with exit, they are correlated with a
lower probability of entry. In contrast to the results from Table 2.8, the time trend here
suggests a secular increase in entry probabilities over time. However, the interaction
between SCAP and the time trend indicates that this increasing trend is being offset in
Action Plan districts. Column (5) shows that the entry deterrence effect is particularly
strong in HPI industries. Designation as an HPI industry alone, however, does not
predict entry or exit. In addition, there is evidence in support of a statistically significant
relationship between higher coal prices and lower entry.
To summarize the impact of Action Plans on establishment outcomes so far, we see that
they have affected behavior at the extensive margin but not at the intensive margin.
In particular, Action Plan passage is associated with the initiation of investments in
pollution abatement for large HPI establishments, but the opposite for smaller, non-HPI
establishments. We also find reduced TFP in large HPI establishments with Action Plans
but higher TFP in smaller establishments that were likely not targeted by the regulations.
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Decomposing the source of those productivity declines, we find that mandated changes on
energy inputs were a likely driver of lower productivity among large HPI establishments.
In addition, Action Plan passage did not significantly affect exit but did discourage entry,
particularly among HPI establishments.
Coal prices also affected establishment outcomes, but in different ways. Unlike the effects
of Action Plans, which were concentrated among large, HPI establishments, higher coal
prices are associated with lower coal use among all types of establishments. Higher prices
also reduced TFP, and are associated with increased exit and reduced entry.
2.6.2. Air Quality
So far, we have shown that both the Action Plans and coal prices affected establishment
outcomes, albeit in different ways. Now we ask whether these policies had any impact on
air quality.
Supreme Court Action Plans could have influenced emissions through a variety of
measures mandated by the plans. The different plans had components targeted at vehicles,
which could lead to a direct relationship between Action Plan passage and different
measures of air pollution if measures were implemented effectively. However, other
components of these plans focused on HPI sectors and as we saw, encouraged investment
in pollution abatement among large establishments. For these plan components, we would
expect Action Plan passage to affect emissions through changes in pollution abatement, if
such abatement effectively reduced emissions.
Table 2.10 shows the results from a district-level regression in which the outcome variables
are SPM, SO2 and NO2 concentrations. It is important to note that air quality monitoring
data are only available from a subset of cities and years (see Figure 1.C.2). Thus, the
results may not be nationally representative, but based on Figure 1.C.2, monitors cover
most Action Plan areas.
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Consistent with Greenstone and Hanna (2014), we find that the Action Plans had little
impact on overall SPM or SO2 concentrations but did reduce NO2.32 For NO2, our
evidence suggests that while NO2 concentrations demonstrated a secular rise over time,
the Action Plans appear to have reversed this trend.
In contrast, coal prices appear to be more effective in reducing SO2 pollution.33 Since SO2
levels are primarily associated with the burning of fossil fuels, the significant and negative
impact of rising coal prices on SO2 emissions is plausible. The negative coefficient, which
varies between -0.112 and -0.166, indicates that a 10 percent rise in coal prices at the district
level was associated with a reduction in SO2 emissions of between 1 and 2 percent.
Table 2.11 reports the impact of SCAP measures and coal prices on emissions for urban and
rural districts separately. Comparing the results in the last two columns with the first two
columns makes it evident that the Action Plans reduced SO2 emissions in rural districts.
The results suggest very large effects of both prices and CAC actions in these areas.
2.7. Conclusion
While India’s rapid growth and spectacular rate of poverty reduction has brought many
benefits, it has also contributed to a rapid increase in air pollution. India now holds the
dubious distinction of being home to 13 of the 20 cities in the world with the worst air
quality.
India’s Ministry of the Environment and Forests, Central Pollution Control Board,
Supreme Court, State Pollution Control Boards, and myriad other bodies have
enacted many reforms to address this highly visible problem. Historically, India
has relied primarily on command-and-control mechanisms to encourage its industrial
establishments to tackle environmental problems. In 1991 the MoEF identified 17 highly
32In Appendix Table B.3, we also replicate the exact analogs to the pollution regressions in Greenstone and
Hanna (2014) and find similar results.
33In air pollutant specifications we use the log mean district price of coal. While the Hausman IV discussed
is well suited for estimating demand elasticities, without industry and firm-level variation the IV becomes
weak.
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polluting industries which were further monitored and regulated at both the central
government and state government levels. India’s Supreme Court also required that a
number of cities mandate catalytic converters for new cars and enact Action Plans, which
targeted a number of pollution sources, including establishments in highly polluting
industries.
Beyond the usual arguments that economic incentives are more likely than
command-and-control regulations to promote efficiency and innovation, in a complex
and large country such as India, it is possible that economic incentives may also help to
overcome institutional barriers to implementation. In recognition of this fact, the Indian
government in 2010 introduced a tax of Rs. 50 per metric ton of coal. The revenues
from this Clean Energy Cess, as it is known, are intended to be used for environmental
purposes. In 2014, the tax was doubled. The Indian government further demonstrated
its commitment to consider price mechanisms in 2013 by spearheading a large-scale
emissions trading scheme pilot for particulate matter (CPCB, 2013).
In this paper we compare the effects of a command-and-control approach with price
incentives on investment in pollution abatement and coal use across establishments.
Command-and-control policies refer to the extensive use of Supreme Court Action Plans
to address India’s environmental challenges. Price incentives are captured in our analysis
through district-level variations in coal prices. To our knowledge, this is the first study to
use the comprehensive establishment-level Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) to assess
the effectiveness of India’s environmental regulations. We also measure the impact of
these different mechanisms on other establishment-level outcomes, namely productivity
growth, entry and exit. Examining these non-environmental outcomes is important
because we are interested in whether it is possible to formulate an environmental policy
that minimizes foregone growth, or as some authors have argued, even enhances such
outcomes.
The main impact of the Action Plans appears to have been an increase in the external
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margin of pollution abatement among large establishments in highly polluting industries,
which were already substantially more likely than other establishments to invest in
pollution abatement. At the same time, the Action Plans are associated with a decrease
in pollution abatement among small, non-HPI establishments, suggesting that regulators
may have increased their focus on establishments where they would get the most “bang
for the buck.”
Our results on coal prices provide broad support for the Indian government’s recent efforts
to address pollution problems through fuel taxes. Higher coal prices significantly reduced
coal consumption at the establishment level, with price elasticities consistently estimated
between approximately -0.5 and -1.0, in line with estimates reported in industrial country
studies. The significant responses to higher prices, coupled with our documentation of
enormous price variation in coal throughout India, suggests much could be done to reduce
consumption. For example, raising coal prices for establishments paying a fraction of
the nation-wide mean coal price could result in lower emissions and higher government
revenue. Our results indicate that some highly polluting sectors, like the cement industry,
face coal prices that are far below the national average.
However, both the Action Plans and the higher prices come at a cost. The Supreme
Court Action Plans were accompanied by significant costs to productivity growth, and
with lower entry, particularly among highly-polluting industries. The only evidence of a
potential “double dividend” comes from small, non-HPI establishments, which showed
an increase in productivity; however, this may be driven by disinvestment in pollution
abatement equipment following the Action Plans, or by a related decline in employment
from other policy changes, in particular the dismantling of the reservation policy for Small
Scale Industries (Martin et al., 2017). Higher coal prices are also associated with lower
productivity, as well as an increase in exit and a deterrence to entry.
We find that the Action Plans reversed the previously increasing trend in NO2
concentrations, and significantly improved air quality in rural but not in urban districts.
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The results also suggest that higher coal prices were associated with lower SO2
concentrations in both urban and rural districts. Empirical work to date has most
commonly evaluated the effects of either market-based incentives or CAC regulations in
isolation. The results in this paper suggest that a combination of the two may be required to
effect change. Higher coal prices reduced the intensive margin of establishment coal use,
but they did not affect the fraction of establishments using coal. In contrast, the Action
Plans affected the fraction of establishments with pollution control equipment but did not
increase the average investment in pollution control equipment among establishments that
already had some equipment, nor did they affect coal use. Whereas coal prices had similar
effects on coal use for establishments of different sizes and in different industries, the CAC
regulations clearly affected large, HPI establishments the most.
These findings suggest that CAC regulations may be more effective at targeting the largest
polluters, whereas price-based policies could be a more robust tool for broadening the
scope of regulation to include smaller establishments in industries that have not been
traditionally targeted, without imposing an additional burden on regulators.
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Figure 1.C.2: Locations of Action Plans and Air Pollution Monitors
Note: This figure shows the number of pollution monitors in each district, along with
the location and timing of each Action Plan. Action Plans in large cities in the South of
India such as Bangalore, Hyderabad, and Chennai in fact overlap with a high density of
monitors, which is not easily seen on the map given the small geographic size of these
cities’ surrounding districts.
109
Figure 1.C.3: District Coal Price Variation, Coal Deposits, and State Lines
Note: This figure maps mean district coal prices across our sample period (2000 to
2009), and demonstrates how prices are related to both distance from coal deposits
and state-driven factors (where state boundaries are outlined in green). For conversion
purposes, 1 USD = approximately 50 INR over the sample period.
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Figure 1.C.4: Fraction of Establishments Reporting Positive Use
Panel A: By HPI
Panel B: By SCAP
Note: Panel A shows the fraction of establishments with any level of pollution control
stock and coal use, by HPI status. Panel B shows the fraction of establishments with
any level of pollution control stock and coal use, by whether the district in which the
establishment was located was eventually subject to SCAP regulations. Sampling weights
applied.
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Figure 1.C.5: Effect of Action Plans on Extensive Margin of Pollution Control, by HPI and
Size
Note: This figure shows the coefficients from regressions of the probability of having
pollution control stock on SCAP, interacted with HPI status and initial establishment size.
112
Figure 1.C.6: Effect of Action Plans on TFP, by Type of SCAP Mandate
Note: This figure shows the coefficients on SCAP from the TFP regressions from Table 2.7, restricted to
establishments in districts that implemented different types of SCAP policies: equipment-based, input-based,
or relocation of high-polluting establishments. TFP is calculated using an Index Method following Aw, Chen,
and Roberts (2001)) (AW) and (AW3), the Solow Residual (OLS), and Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP).
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Table 2.1: Supreme Court Action Plan (SCAP) Implementation by Year in which Each
Supreme Court Action Plan (SCAP) was Mandated
Year City
1998 Delhi
2003 Agra, Ahmedabad, Kolkata, Dhanbad, Faridabad, Jodhpur,
Kanpur, Lucknow, Patna, Pune, Varanasi
2004 Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad, Mumbai, Solapur
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics by SCAP, HPI, and Large Sub-Groups
SCAP Not SCAP HPI Not HPI Large Not large Overall
Pollution Control Stock (INR 1000s) 258 969 2,970 145 2,405 70 845
(3,935) (25,048) (45,405) (3,404) (39,517) (1,518) (22,827)
Pollution Control Stock / Capital 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.003
(0.026) (0.027) (0.037) (0.022) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026)
PollUser (Ever Use Pollution Control) 0.092 0.115 0.221 0.075 0.218 0.057 0.111
(0.289) (0.319) (0.415) (0.263) (0.413) (0.233) (0.314)
Coal Tons 246 2,174 6,737 224 5,325 94 1,847
(3,959) (55,849) (101,613) (4,060) (87,861) (2,590) (50,921)
Coal Tons / 1000 INR 0.041 0.236 0.262 0.184 0.053 0.334 0.211
(0.073) (17.024) (22.217) (11.230) (1.311) (21.196) (15.899)
CoalUser (Ever Use Coal) 0.088 0.123 0.162 0.102 0.152 0.100 0.117
(0.284) (0.329) (0.369) (0.303) (0.359) (0.299) (0.322)
Employment 217 181 218 177 470 44 187
(851) (746) (830) (742) (1,261) (107) (765)
Output (INR Millions) 279 304 598 201 791 51 300
(2,348) (3,064) (5,349) (1,448) (5,049) (338) (2,955)
Establishment Coal Price 2,405 2,279 2,429 2,224 2,190 2,377 2,295
(1,587) (1,376) (1,686) (1,227) (1,311) (1,472) (1,405)
Mean District Coal Price (excl. own) 2,712 2,593 2,558 2,632 2,615 2,611 2,613
(797) (862) (875) (844) (824) (867) (853)
TFP (OLS) -0.090 -0.040 -0.086 -0.036 -0.199 0.028 -0.049
(0.428) (0.434) (0.422) (0.436) (0.480) (0.384) (0.433)
TFP (Olley-Pakes) 2.250 2.220 2.177 2.241 2.263 2.206 2.225
(0.428) (0.457) (0.404) (0.467) (0.508) (0.419) (0.453)
TFP (ACR Revenue Share) -0.021 -0.055 -0.036 -0.054 -0.053 -0.047 -0.049
(0.424) (0.399) (0.399) (0.405) (0.426) (0.391) (0.404)
TFP (ACR Cost Share) -0.015 -0.035 -0.007 -0.040 -0.019 -0.038 -0.031
(0.412) (0.396) (0.420) (0.391) (0.445) (0.371) (0.399)
Entry 0.112 0.137 0.143 0.130 0.103 0.147 0.133
(0.315) (0.344) (0.350) (0.336) (0.304) (0.354) (0.340)
Exit 0.073 0.055 0.052 0.059 0.044 0.064 0.058
(0.260) (0.227) (0.222) (0.236) (0.205) (0.246) (0.233)
N 51,966 254,086 76,216 229,836 102,227 202,189 306,052
Note: Summary statistics for the sample of establishments, averaged over the sample period. Mean values
are shown by whether or not the district in which establishments are located was ever subject to a Supreme
Court Action Plan, by whether the establishment was ever in an industry designated as highly-polluting
(HPI), and by whether the establishment had above 100 employees in the initial year in which it was
observed. 1 USD = Approximately 50 INR over sample period. Values for capital stock and output are
expressed in 1998 INR.
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Table 2.3: Effect of Action Plans on Extensive Margin of Pollution Control and Coal Use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P(Poll. P(Poll. P(Coal P(Coal
Control Use) Control Use) Use) Use)
VARIABLES
SCAP -0.00385 0.00219 -0.00702 -0.00270
(0.00360) (0.00234) (0.00672) (0.00396)
Stacked Time Trend -0.00401** -0.00502*
(0.00166) (0.00293)
SCAP X Trend 0.00278 0.00504
(0.00175) (0.00309)
Log mean district coal price (excluding own) 0.00178 0.00203 -0.00531 -0.00482
(0.00276) (0.00280) (0.00489) (0.00493)
Observations 282,469 282,469 305,111 305,111
R2 0.029 0.029 0.003 0.004
Number of Estab 88,272 88,272 89,906 89,906
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is equal to one if an establishment reports any pollution control stock in columns
(1) and (2) or any coal use in columns (3) and (4). SCAP is equal to 1 in a district that receives an Action Plan,
in any year after the Action Plan is in place, 0 otherwise. Stacked Time Trend is a linear trend in event time,
and is normalized to zero for any district that is never mandated to adopt an SCAP over the sample period.
Log mean district coal price is the mean coal price in the establishment’s district, excluding the
establishment’s own price. Standard errors clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.4: Effect of Action Plans on Extensive Margin of Pollution Control and Coal Use,
by HPI and Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P(Poll. P(Poll. P(Coal P(Coal
Control Use) Control Use) Use) Use)
VARIABLES
SCAP X HPI X Large 0.0858*** 0.0922*** -0.0208 -0.0166
(0.0253) (0.0239) (0.0185) (0.0162)
SCAP X HPI X Not Large -0.00613 6.73e-05 -0.0165 -0.0125
(0.00661) (0.00658) (0.0184) (0.0139)
SCAP X Not HPI X Large 0.0129* 0.0195*** 9.93e-05 0.00425
(0.00693) (0.00708) (0.00752) (0.00545)
SCAP X Not HPI X Not Large -0.0151*** -0.00877*** -0.00493 -0.000705
(0.00315) (0.00298) (0.00471) (0.00550)
Stacked Time Trend -0.00387** -0.00497*
(0.00164) (0.00297)
SCAP X Trend 0.00251 0.00501
(0.00171) (0.00313)
Log mean district coal price (excluding own) 0.00167 0.00190 -0.00533 -0.00485
(0.00274) (0.00279) (0.00487) (0.00491)
Observations 280,930 280,930 303,484 303,484
R2 0.031 0.031 0.004 0.004
Number of Estab 87,765 87,765 89,387 89,387
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is equal to one if an establishment reports any pollution control stock in columns
(1) and (2) or any coal use in columns (3) and (4). SCAP is equal to 1 in a district that receives an Action Plan,
in any year after the Action Plan is in place, 0 otherwise. Stacked Time Trend is a linear trend in event time,
and is normalized to zero for any district that is never mandated to adopt an SCAP over the sample period.
HPI is equal to 1 if an establishment has ever operated in an HPI industry; Not HPI is equal to 1 otherwise.
Large is equal to 1 if the establishment had more than 100 employees the first time it was observed; Not
Large is equal to 1 otherwise. Log mean district coal price is the mean coal price in the establishment’s
district, excluding the establishment’s own price. Standard errors clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.5: Effect of Action Plans on Intensive Margin of Pollution Control and Coal Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Log Log Log Log Log
Pollution Pollution Coal Coal Coal Coal
Control Control Tons Tons Tons Tons
VARIABLES / Capital / Output / Output
SCAP -0.00933 -0.0687 0.0698 0.0595 0.0313 0.0214
(0.0430) (0.0729) (0.0829) (0.0897) (0.0784) (0.0869)
Stacked Time Trend 0.000416 0.0196 -0.102** -0.0903* -0.0382 -0.0238
(0.0469) (0.0509) (0.0483) (0.0501) (0.0506) (0.0455)
SCAP X Trend -0.0238 -0.0391 0.0896** 0.0833** 0.0236 0.0131
(0.0482) (0.0478) (0.0399) (0.0341) (0.0465) (0.0399)
Log mean district coal price (excluding own) -0.0541 -0.0681 -0.581*** -0.552***
(0.0458) (0.0502) (0.103) (0.0917)
Log coal price (own) - Hausman IV 2nd Stage -0.989*** -0.927***
(0.233) (0.191)
Observations 31,886 31,786 35,876 31,283 35,859 31,266
R2 0.062 0.085 0.019 0.148 0.015 0.161
Number of Estab 8,163 8,163 12,497 8,374 12,494 8,371
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First Stage F-Stat 79.63 79.53
Notes: Dependent variable names are given in title headings. SCAP is equal to 1 in a district that receives an
Action Plan, in any year after the Action Plan is in place, 0 otherwise. Stacked Time Trend is a linear trend in
event time, and is normalized to zero for any district that is never mandated to adopt an SCAP over the
sample period. Log mean district coal price is the mean coal price in the establishment’s district, excluding
the establishment’s own price. Log coal price (own) - Hausman IV 2nd Stage indicates that we instrumented
for the establishment’s own coal price using the log mean price faced by establishments within the same
2-digit industry and state. Standard errors clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.6: Effect of Action Plans on Intensive Margin of Pollution Control and Coal Use, by
HPI and Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Log Log Log Log Log
Pollution Pollution Coal Coal Coal Coal
Control Control Tons Tons Tons Tons
VARIABLES / Capital / Output / Output
SCAP X HPI X Large -0.0753 -0.183** 0.0582 0.0738 0.0979 0.0627
(0.0614) (0.0778) (0.134) (0.173) (0.131) (0.134)
SCAP X HPI X Not Large 0.0727 0.0997 0.135 0.124 0.0512 0.0695
(0.150) (0.148) (0.171) (0.200) (0.137) (0.155)
SCAP X Not HPI X Large 0.0427 0.0303 -0.197 -0.256 -0.213 -0.270**
(0.0580) (0.123) (0.243) (0.194) (0.173) (0.129)
SCAP X Not HPI X Not Large -0.0853 -0.229* 0.0988 0.0959 0.0754 0.0600
(0.0604) (0.117) (0.110) (0.102) (0.108) (0.106)
Stacked Time Trend -0.00159 0.0155 -0.100** -0.0878* -0.0367 -0.0213
(0.0472) (0.0541) (0.0469) (0.0480) (0.0502) (0.0445)
SCAP X Trend -0.0231 -0.0373 0.0929** 0.0832** 0.0250 0.0126
(0.0491) (0.0516) (0.0401) (0.0341) (0.0471) (0.0404)
Log coal price (district) -0.0546 -0.0687
(0.0462) (0.0496)
Log coal price (own) - Hausman IV 2nd Stage -1.001*** -0.938***
(0.233) (0.190)
Log coal price (district) X HPI X Large -0.451*** -0.605***
(0.162) (0.156)
Log coal price (district) X HPI X Not Large -0.821*** -0.684***
(0.190) (0.192)
Log coal price (district) X Not HPI X Large -0.353*** -0.330***
(0.122) (0.112)
Log coal price (district) X Not HPI X Not Large -0.582*** -0.565***
(0.147) (0.136)
Observations 31,721 31,623 35,701 31,141 35,684 31,124
R2 0.063 0.086 0.020 0.148 0.016 0.161
Number of Estab 8,111 8,111 12,441 8,347 12,438 8,344
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First Stage F-Stat 78.96 78.88
Notes: Dependent variable names are given in column headings. SCAP is equal to 1 in a district that receives
an Action Plan, in any year after the Action Plan is in place, 0 otherwise. Stacked Time Trend is a linear
trend in event time, and is normalized to zero for any district that is never mandated to adopt an SCAP over
the sample period. HPI is equal to 1 if an establishment has ever operated in an HPI industry; Not HPI is
equal to 1 otherwise. Large is equal to 1 if the establishment had more than 100 employees the first time it
was observed; Not Large is equal to 1 otherwise. Log mean district coal price is the mean coal price in the
establishment’s district, excluding the establishment’s own price. Log coal price (own) - Hausman IV 2nd
Stage indicates that we instrumented for the establishment’s own coal price using the log mean price faced by
establishments within the same 2-digit industry and state. Standard errors clustered at the district level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7: Effect of Action Plans on TFP, by HPI and Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ACR ACR
VARIABLES OLS (RevShare) (CostShare) OP
SCAP X HPI X Large -0.0326*** -0.0306*** -0.0285*** -0.0192*
(0.00834) (0.0108) (0.0105) (0.00980)
SCAP X HPI X Not Large -0.0127 -0.00791 -0.00714 -0.0107
(0.0101) (0.00835) (0.00862) (0.00963)
SCAP X Not HPI X Large 0.00701 -0.000194 0.000764 0.0128
(0.0123) (0.0109) (0.00954) (0.0156)
SCAP X Not HPI X Not Large 0.0186*** 0.0130* 0.0167*** 0.0166***
(0.00620) (0.00678) (0.00544) (0.00524)
Stacked Time Trend 0.00755** 0.00663 0.00951** 0.0104***
(0.00293) (0.00412) (0.00369) (0.00391)
SCAP X Trend -0.00832** -0.00661 -0.0101** -0.0112**
(0.00371) (0.00484) (0.00418) (0.00440)
Log coal price (district) -0.0183** -0.00257 -0.00798 -0.0170**
(0.00733) (0.00603) (0.00622) (0.00714)
Observations 291,397 296,119 296,119 296,012
R2 0.007 0.011 0.015 0.003
Number of Estab 86,542 88,196 88,196 88,135
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is total factor productivity (TFP), calculated using the Solow Residual in column
(1), an Index Method following Aw, Chen, and Roberts (2001)) in columns (2) and (3), and Olley and Pakes
(1996) in column (4). SCAP is equal to 1 in a district that receives an Action Plan, in any year after the Action
Plan is in place, 0 otherwise. Stacked Time Trend is a linear trend in event time, and is normalized to zero for
any district that is never mandated to adopt an SCAP over the sample period. HPI is equal to 1 if an
establishment has ever operated in an HPI industry; Not HPI is equal to 1 otherwise. Large is equal to 1 if the
establishment had more than 100 employees the first time it was observed; Not Large is equal to 1 otherwise.
Log mean district coal price is the mean coal price in the establishment’s district, excluding the
establishment’s own price. Standard errors clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.8: Effect of Action Plans on Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Pr(Exit) Pr(Exit) Pr(Exit) Pr(Exit) Pr(Exit)
SCAP 0.00534 0.0130 0.0111 0.0111
(0.00738) (0.0135) (0.0129) (0.0128)
SCAP X HPI -0.000631
(0.0121)
SCAP X Not HPI 0.0144
(0.0130)
Stacked Time Trend -0.00770** -0.00833** -0.00828** -0.00832**
(0.00339) (0.00374) (0.00375) (0.00374)
SCAP X Trend 0.00505 0.00584 0.00580 0.00589
(0.00526) (0.00552) (0.00555) (0.00555)
HPI -0.00397* -0.00223
(0.00227) (0.00249)
Log coal price (district) 0.0180* 0.0182* 0.0179* 0.0179*
(0.00960) (0.00961) (0.00947) (0.00950)
Constant -0.0778 0.0553*** -0.0879 -0.0847 -0.0848
(0.0745) (0.00664) (0.0747) (0.0733) (0.0735)
Observations 305,111 305,971 305,111 305,111 305,111
R2 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016
Establishment FE No No No No No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable equals 1 if an establishment is officially declared “closed” in the ASI, so long as it
remains closed thereafter. SCAP is equal to 1 in a district that receives an Action Plan, in any year after the
Action Plan is in place, 0 otherwise. Stacked Time Trend is a linear trend in event time, and is normalized to
zero for any district that is never mandated to adopt an SCAP over the sample period. HPI is equal to 1 if an
establishment has ever operated in an HPI industry, 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the district
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.9: Effect of Action Plans on Entry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Pr(Entry) Pr(Entry) Pr(Entry) Pr(Entry) Pr(Entry)
SCAP -0.0283*** -0.0273** -0.0246** -0.0246**
(0.00825) (0.0110) (0.0114) (0.0114)
SCAP X HPI -0.0451***
(0.0102)
SCAP X Not HPI -0.0188
(0.0118)
Stacked Time Trend 0.0183*** 0.0190*** 0.0189*** 0.0189***
(0.00583) (0.00550) (0.00553) (0.00553)
SCAP X Trend -0.0196*** -0.0206*** -0.0205*** -0.0204***
(0.00498) (0.00470) (0.00472) (0.00468)
HPI 0.00510 0.00814*
(0.00411) (0.00452)
Log coal price (district) -0.0218*** -0.0224*** -0.0221*** -0.0222***
(0.00797) (0.00785) (0.00781) (0.00780)
Constant 0.276*** 0.130*** 0.306*** 0.302*** 0.302***
(0.0636) (0.0110) (0.0628) (0.0624) (0.0624)
Observations 305,111 305,971 305,111 305,111 305,111
R2 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006
Establishment FE No No No No No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable equals 1 in the first year an establishment appears in the data within three years
of the observed initial production date. SCAP is equal to 1 in a district that receives an Action Plan, in any
year after the Action Plan is in place, 0 otherwise. Stacked Time Trend is a linear trend in event time, and is
normalized to zero for any district that is never mandated to adopt an SCAP over the sample period. HPI is
equal to 1 if an establishment has ever operated in an HPI industry, 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at
the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.10: Effect of Action Plans on District-Level Pollution
Panel A: Each district equally weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES log(SPM) log(SPM) log(SO2) log(SO2) log(NO2) log(NO2)
Stacked SCAP -0.182* -0.116 -0.0468 0.0149 0.182* 0.00369
(0.0939) (0.141) (0.109) (0.0928) (0.106) (0.0954)
Stacked Time Trend 0.00762 -0.0721 0.187***
(0.0839) (0.0628) (0.0687)
SCAP X Trend -0.0301 0.0737 -0.186**
(0.0882) (0.0742) (0.0829)
Log mean district price coal 0.0102 0.00684 -0.115** -0.112** -0.0211 -0.0273
(0.0487) (0.0489) (0.0526) (0.0528) (0.0356) (0.0346)
Coal Use, Power Plants 0.0510 0.0496 0.0370 0.0370 0.0584** 0.0590**
(0.0343) (0.0346) (0.0439) (0.0449) (0.0247) (0.0259)
Observations 666 666 642 642 680 680
R2 0.383 0.384 0.108 0.110 0.029 0.045
Number of District 109 109 103 103 108 108
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Weighted by initial number of establishments in each district
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES log(SPM) log(SPM) log(SO2) log(SO2) log(NO2) log(NO2)
SCAP -0.154 -0.0505 -0.0650 -0.0849 0.0506 -0.0735
(0.126) (0.103) (0.120) (0.108) (0.117) (0.111)
Stacked Time Trend -0.0125 -0.0764 0.143*
(0.0752) (0.0713) (0.0824)
SCAP X Trend -0.0184 0.105 -0.142
(0.0907) (0.0967) (0.109)
Log mean district price coal 0.0383 0.0312 -0.166** -0.145* -0.0574 -0.0800
(0.0659) (0.0651) (0.0715) (0.0752) (0.0728) (0.0645)
Coal Use, Power Plants -0.0298 -0.0315 0.00347 0.0101 0.0512 0.0431
(0.0746) (0.0751) (0.0500) (0.0526) (0.0446) (0.0447)
Observations 663 663 639 639 677 677
R2 0.398 0.401 0.094 0.102 0.017 0.035
Number of District 107 107 101 101 106 106
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variables are shown in column headings. Standard errors clustered at the district level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.11: Effect of Action Plans on District-Level SO2 by Urban/Rural
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(SO2) log(SO2) log(SO2) log(SO2)
VARIABLES Urban Urban Rural Rural
SCAP 0.0395 -0.0923 -0.471*** -0.281**
(0.134) (0.166) (0.143) (0.106)
Stacked time trend 0.00498 -0.122
(0.0642) (0.0843)
SCAP X Trend 0.0396 0.100
(0.103) (0.0892)
Log Price coal industry -0.256** -0.263** -0.184*** -0.171**
(0.117) (0.116) (0.0604) (0.0657)
Coal use power plants (M tons) 0.0305 0.0365 -0.105 -0.108
(0.0404) (0.0423) (0.104) (0.0997)
Observations 331 331 308 308
R2 0.202 0.213 0.192 0.199
Number of District 50 50 51 51
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variables are shown in column headings. All regressions weighted by the number of
establishments in each district. A district is defined as “rural” if more than half of manufacturing output is
from firms whose location is described as “rural” in the ASI. Standard errors clustered at the district level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix A - Indian Pollution Control Policies, Coal Prices, and Replicating
Greenstone and Hanna (2014)
Indian Pollution Control Policies
This short section cannot do justice to the extensive set of policies enacted at different
central, state, and municipal levels to address growing pollution problems in India. There
are, however, two key policies of note. One early attempt to address pollution in India
led to the Problem Area Action Plans (PAAPs). These were comprehensive plans targeting
industrial pollution in 26 different cities, implemented by the CPCB and the state-level
branches. However, these PAAPs were first identified in 1990, when 16 areas were
designated as problem areas, then again in 1995 (an additional six) and in 1996 (4 more).
While likely important, there is no evidence to date that these PAAPs were enforced
by the Supreme Court or funded by the CPCB or the development banks. Since these
designations were made before our sample begins, we have chosen to subsume their
probable outcomes into fixed effects in our baseline specifications. However, we have also
explored specifications in which we interact PAAP designation with SCAP designation,
and we find broadly similar effects of the SCAP in areas that were previously designated
as PAAP and those that were not.
Another key policy outside of the scope of our time frame and analysis was the
introduction in 1994 of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). These
standards, formulated by the CPCB, introduced benchmarks for seven pollutants. The
policy also provided guidelines for calculating exceedence factors regarding ambient
air quality, which are regularly published. The NAAQS appear to primarily play the
role of identifying, monitoring, and reporting on pollution levels. There are no rules
for monitoring compliance or imposing penalties. Exceedence Factors continue to be
published annually by the CPCB, and in 2009, a new Comprehensive Environmental
Pollution Index (CEPI) was used for the first time to red-flag 43 non-attainment areas as
Critically Polluted Industrial Clusters for subsequent intervention. However, we do not
have ample post-data to analyze effects of the CEPI.
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Table 2.A.2: Average Coal Price (Rs./ton) by Industry and Ownership, 2000
Average Coal Price
Iron and Steel 3,145
Cement 1,811
Other 2,238
Central Government 1,975
State or Local Government 2,362
Central and Local Government 1,860
Joint Public 2,520
Joint Private 2,719
Private 2,372
Table 2.A.3: Effect of Action Plans on District-Level Pollution, Replicating Greenstone and
Hanna (2014)
Panel A: Each district equally weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES log(SPM) log(SPM) log(SO2) log(SO2) log(NO2) log(NO2)
SCAP -0.197** -0.129 -0.0761 -0.00461 0.168 0.00430
(0.0949) (0.140) (0.108) (0.0977) (0.104) (0.0959)
Stacked Time Trend 0.00747 -0.0825 0.173***
(0.0814) (0.0582) (0.0619)
SCAP X Trend -0.0303 0.0847 -0.173**
(0.0860) (0.0699) (0.0784)
Observations 701 701 666 666 712 712
R2 0.383 0.384 0.097 0.099 0.024 0.038
Number of District 110 110 104 104 109 109
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Weighted by initial number of establishments in each district
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES log(SPM) log(SPM) log(SO2) log(SO2) log(NO2) log(NO2)
SCAP -0.156 -0.0599 -0.103 -0.108 0.0505 -0.0709
(0.127) (0.105) (0.117) (0.120) (0.111) (0.103)
Stacked Time Trend -0.00539 -0.102 0.127
(0.0730) (0.0633) (0.0767)
SCAP X Trend -0.0249 0.135 -0.124
(0.0876) (0.0900) (0.106)
Observations 694 694 659 659 705 705
R2 0.400 0.403 0.077 0.090 0.009 0.024
Number of District 108 108 102 102 107 107
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variables are shown in column headings. Standard errors clustered at the district level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix B - Pollution Investment by HPI and Size
Table 2.B. 1: Pollution Control Stock by HPI and Size
Establishments Establishments with Value Pollution
in 2001 Pollution Control Control in 2001
in 2001 (M Rs)
Non-SCAP districts
HPI x Large 4,823 1,370 28% 30,100
Not HPI x Large 12,633 1,414 11% 3,180
HPI x Not large 14,899 1,352 9% 3,490
Not HPI x Not large 51,360 1,665 3% 756
83,715 5,801 37,526
SCAP districts
HPI x Large 921 223 24% 1,020
Not HPI x Large 3,348 290 9% 835
HPI x Not large 4,293 522 12% 332
Not HPI x Not large 13,443 346 3% 94
22,005 1,381 2,281
Notes: This table shows the number of establishments (factories), establishments with pollution control stock,
and the total value of pollution control stock in each of the eight groups in 2001. The percentages represent the
fraction of establishments in each group that has pollution control stock, relative to the total over all groups.
An establishment is considered to be HPI if it has ever operated in an HPI industry. An establishment is
considered to be large if it had more than 100 employees the first time it was observed.
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Table 2.B. 2: Shares of Factories, Output and Pollution Control Stock by HPI and Size
HPI, Large HPI, Not large Not HPI, Large Not HPI, Not large
% Share of Factories, 2001 5.41 18.09 15.06 61.09
% Share of Factories, 2008 5.84 17.45 18.08 58.20
% Share of Output, 2001 38.32 7.42 37.93 15.93
% Share of Output, 2008 44.02 6.63 35.76 13.03
% Share of Pollution Control Stock, 2001 78.13 9.60 10.08 2.13
% Share of Pollution Control Stock, 2008 79.56 5.10 12.27 2.96
Notes: This table shows the share of establishments (factories), output, and pollution control stock in each of
the 4 groups listed in the column headings, in 2001 and 2008. Each row sums to 100%. An establishment is
considered to be HPI if it has ever operated in an HPI industry. An establishment is considered to be large if
it had more than 100 employees the first time it was observed.
Table 2.B. 3: Average Change in Pollution Control Stock
Overall HPI, Large HPI, Small Non-HPI, Large Non-HPI, Small
Initial Investment 3,983,169 23,005,248 1,019,043 3,621,041 461,759
Subsequent Change in Investment 828 75,996 -4,834 -18,200 126
Notes: This table shows the mean initial investment in pollution control stock, and the mean subsequent
changes, for establishments in each of the 4 groups listed in the column headings, in 2001 and 2008. An
establishment is considered to be HPI if it has ever operated in an HPI industry. An establishment is
considered to be large if it had more than 100 employees the first time it was observed.
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Appendix C - Falsification Test
Chetty et al. (2009) propose a non-parametric permutation test that has been applied
in a number of subsequent public finance papers with common trends identification
assumptions.34 We implement that test here. The idea in our context, is to run a
permutation test that generates placebo estimates from re-assigning treated districts to be
treated in every possible year-district combination in our sample, and graphically inspect
where the true estimate falls with respect to the placebo estimate distribution. While the
combinatorial space for all such permutations would be enormous (8 years including 2001
to 2008 raised to 16 possible districts ≈2.8e+14), in practice, we take 1000 i.i.d. random
draws to assign treatment-years to each of the 16 SCAP districts.
If we find that the estimate from our preferred specification is far larger than the majority
of placebo estimates, this would indicate a low p-value on our estimate—i.e. that we are
not finding spurious effects due to pre-existing differential trends in years and subsets
of districts in which we would not expect to find strong effects. Below, we thus present
the empirical CDF of placebo estimates from estimating equation 2.3 without time trends,
plotting the simulated coefficients on SCAP-HPI-Large.
Figure 2.C.1: Placebo Test CDF Plot
We indicate with a red vertical line the true treatment estimate of the effect of
SCAP-HPI-Large on the probability of pollution control use reported in Table 2.4. The
figure confirms that the effect level we find, a value of .0922, far exceeds the large majority
of all other possible placebo estimate permutations.
34See for example Chodorow Reich et al. (2013) for a prominent and influential example of this.
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CHAPTER 3 : Imported Inputs and Productivity Spillovers from Foreign Direct
Investment
In the economic growth and trade literature, foreign direct investment (FDI)—foreign
equity invested in domestic firms and multinational corporation (MNC) entry—is thought
to be a key channel through which technology and innovation diffuse to developing
country firms. To asses this claim, most empirical analyses measure three key trade-offs
induced by FDI entry: (1) A within-industry Horizontal effect which either results in
technology leakage and improved productivity from foreign competition, or market share
crowd-out; (2) A between-industry Forward Linkage effect in which technology is shared
through MNC sales of intermediate inputs to local firms; and (3) A Backward Linkage effect
that arises when MNCs contract with local upstream suppliers in industries with whom
there is no incentive to shield tacit knowledge about production processes, resulting in
inter-industry learning.1
While the vast majority of papers find zero to negative Horizontal and Forward Linkage
effects, these are almost always dwarfed by large and economically important Backward
Linkage gains.2 The rationale for this is relatively straightforward—although MNCs
may adversely affect domestic firm productivity through downstream competition or
by introducing costly advanced inputs, foreign firms transfer frontier technology and
know-how to upstream suppliers at a rate that more than offsets these negative effects.3
Supported by over a decade of findings such as these, academics and policymakers alike
have identified capital market liberalization as a deep policy determinant of long run
growth.4
This paper extends the conventional view by showing that input market liberalization
1Many studies also consider a within-firm foreign equity effect, however this has received less attention
than the other spillover channels—especially Backward Linkages—and is beyond the scope of this paper.
2See Harrison and Rodrı́guez-Clare (2009) for a comprehensive survey of these empirical studies.
3Javorcik (2004) attributes negative Forward Linkage effects to input adjustment costs. In this paper, I thus
also consider the lagged effects of Forward Linkages on future productivity to test this hypothesis.
4As early as 1997, 103 countries offered concessions, tax breaks, or subsidies to MNCs (?).
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(usually associated with increased FDI inflows) can have important feedback effects on
the extent to which MNCs contract with local suppliers. Motivated by an emerging
trade literature on the role of imported inputs in firm productivity growth,5 I show
that “standard” Backward Linkage productivity spillover specifications implicitly assume
domestic and foreign firms share the same input structure and propensity to import
inputs.6 Yet this assumption contradicts a striking feature of trade data—MNCs
import significantly more inputs than domestic firms. For example, in 2010 alone, US
multinationals abroad accounted for roughly half of all US exports (BEA, 2012). In this
paper, I explore the implications of relaxing the assumption that MNCs and domestic firms
share the same import propensity, and ultimately show that the assumption generates
potentially large omitted variable bias from imported inputs in its key TFP spillover
specification.
Using a novel Colombian firm panel that allows me to isolate imported from domestic
inputs, I propose a micro-data adjustment to the input-output coefficients that are central to
TFP spillover measures, making them more reflective of MNCs’ observably higher import
propensity.7 I find that this adjustment reduces mean Backward Linkage productivity
spillovers roughly in half—an economically meaningful difference that is robust across
four out of five measures of firm revenue and TFP.8 By empirically allowing MNCs to
substitute foreign for domestic intermediate inputs, the intensity of contracting with local
firms decreases, as do any productivity spillovers that may arise from sharing technology
with those upstream partners. Some industries however, such as construction and mining,
actually exhibit an increase in Backward Linkage TFP spillovers. This highlights the
5See Amiti & Konings (2007), Kugler and Verhoogen (2008), Golberg et al. (2010), and Halpern et al. (2011)
for recent evidence showing imported inputs and input tariffs play key roles in productivity growth.
6This insight was also made by Barrios et al. (2011) in simultaneously developed work, however the
authors come to the opposite conclusion and implication of that made here. That is, with European data
Barrios et al. (2011) show that revising the Backward Linkage measure results in a larger productivity spillover
rather than smaller spillovers as is suggested here.
7As is shown in Table 1, the import intensity of output of MNCs is roughly 10 times higher than that of
domestic firms in Colombia, the country studied in this paper.
8These results are also robust to the inclusion of export controls, and alternative specifications that restrict
spillovers to occur within narrow industries and geographies.
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importance of precise measurement of TFP spillovers, and further suggests that the bias
does not unambiguously overstate productivity gains.
This is also reassuring as it suggests that the main results are not driven by additional
measurement error introduced by the proposed adjustment, as this could mechanically
bias estimates toward zero. To address this attenuation bias concern more formally, I
also simulate the amount of random measurement error that would need to be added
to the Backward Linkage measure to attenuate estimates of spillovers to the observed
level, and find that this would require the adjustment to produce approximately 25%
random measurement error. Compared to the observed difference in firm distributions
of the original and adjusted spillover measures—roughly 1% and 2% on average—we can
confidently rule out attenuation bias as driving the strong decrease in Backward Linkage
spillovers.
Because the equal import propensity assumption overstates MNC inputs sourced in
the host country in a precise way, one can also derive an analytical expression for the
omitted variable bias it produces. I show that the sign and magnitude of this bias are
proportional to the elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic inputs under
mild assumptions. If imported and domestic inputs are relative substitutes (complements),
Backward Linkage spillovers are (under) overestimated. To test this prediction empirically,
I specify a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function, and estimate
substitution elasticity parameters within 3-digit industries following Feenstra (1994). As
predicted, the CES parameter is positively correlated with the bias magnitude of the
original Backward Linkage measure across all CES specifications.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.1 discusses the administrative
data used in this project, and relevant summary statistics. Section 3.2 presents the
estimation strategy under the baseline assumption of equal import intensities, its
associated shortcomings, and the omitted variable bias it produces. Section 3.3 outlines the
micro-data adjustment made to the flawed Backward Linkage estimator, while Section 3.4
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compares the results from baseline and adjusted estimators. Finally, Section 3.5 presents
the CES estimation procedure and results on predicted correlations between bias and
substitution terms, and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.1. Data and Summary Statistics
3.1.1. Colombian Firm-Level Administrative Data
To analyze import tendencies of both foreign and domestic firms requires rich data that can
discern these features. I combine two sources of public micro-data from Colombia toward
this end—a firm-level panel of financial statements from the country’s main business
registry Superintendencia de Sociedades, spanning all 59 3-digit industries of the Colombian
economy from 1995 to 2011; and firm-level import and export data from the Colombian
customs agency Dirreción de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales (DIAN), spanning 2007 to 2011.
The two datasets can be merged due to a shared firm identifier in both data sets.
The data contain annual production function variables including total profit, operating
revenue (sales), total reported costs, property, plants, and equipment (PP&E), investment,
raw materials and non-material inputs, inventory, and short- and long-run labor
obligations (wage payments). Importantly, the business registry also provides an indicator
for firms with over 50% foreign equity, however the foreign equity share itself is not made
public. Consequently, this paper defines MNCs as any firm with greater than 50% foreign
equity, and identifies spillovers from such firms. Lastly, the data also contain 5-digit
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) industry codes and registration city,
permitting further tests within industries and geographies. After sample restrictions
to eliminate non-operating firms (any firm with zero revenue, labor, capital, or input
values), the final sample comprises 138,411 observations of 28,449 domestic firms, and
4,739 observations from 936 MNCs.9
9While the summary statistics in Table 3.1 suggest a fairly balanced panel, I also re-run the analysis to
restrict firms to those that survive the entire sample frame, allowing me to bound the main effects.
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In Table 3.1, I present summary statistics on the main firm-level variables of the analysis.
Means and standard deviations are broken out by three key analysis groups—domestic
firms, multinational firms (firms that ever had greater than 50% foreign equity), and
overall firms. All monetary variables are deflated to real 1999 Colombian Pesos (COP).10
Consistent with the motivation at the onset of the paper, multinational firms in Colombia
import more inputs than domestic firms—ln(MF) in Table 3.1—and also exhibit higher
dispersion in imports as indicated by the larger standard deviation. The higher import
propensity of MNCs is particularly salient using a unitless measure such as import
intensity of output—or MF/Y in Table 3.1—which suggests that import intensities are on
average 10 times larger for MNCs than for domestic firms.
Figure 3.1 further plots kernel histograms of logged firm imports and import intensities,
and shows that these features are not just unique to the first two moments of the data.
Instead, the entire distribution of firm imports is right-shifted for MNCs. Together, these
stylized facts help confirm that import heterogeneity may be an important feature to
consider when studying the total effects of MNC entry on domestic firm productivity.11
3.1.2. Constructing Input-Output Tables from National Accounts Data
Critical for the measurement of Backward and Forward Linkages, the national accounts
division of the Colombian national statistics agency Departamento Administrativo Nacional
de Estadı́stica (DANE), maintains annual Supply and Use tables detailing which industries
produce and consume which commodities across 59 3-digit ISIC industries—information
taken from survey and census data detailing transactions between firms of diverse
10Revenue is deflated by the annual Producer Price Index (PPI) provided by the Colombian Statistical
Agency DANE for each producing industry, of which 31 deflators are matched to 59 3-digit industries in
the panel. Year-by-industry PPI capital deflators are used to deflate capital and investment variables, while
inputs, imports, and exports, are all deflated by year-by-industry PPI price indices for each of those categories.
Lastly, the annual Consumer Price Index is used to deflate wages as well as service sector industry output. All
industry codes are converted to ISIC version 3.1 for consistency
11MNCs on average, also have higher profits and revenue, and lower costs, suggesting higher productivity
than domestic firms (as would be expected), further validating the Business Registry’s indicator for what
comprises a multinational firm in Colombia.
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industries.12 Following the most highly cited procedure for converting such tables into
symmetric industry-by-industry matrices (Guilhoto and Filho, 2005), I generate annual
input-output tables of total sales between industries in Colombia.13 The components of
these j-by-k matrices form the basis for input-output coefficients αjk, input shares of output
which play a key role in TFP spillover measures. These measures are precisely defined in
the next section, and their virtues and limitations are discussed in detail in Section 3.2.1.
3.2. Estimation with Equal Import Intensities
This section describes the baseline strategy used to identify the effects of MNC presence
on domestic firm TFP in the literature, assuming MNCs and domestic firms share the same
import propensities.
First specify a simple Cobb-Douglas production function for domestic firm i in 3-digit
industry j and year t, where revenue Y is a function of capital expenditures K, labor
expenditures L, intermediate input expenditures M, and revenue-TFP A.
Yijt = AijtK
β1
ijt L
β2
ijt M
β3
ijt (3.1)
Taking logs, we can isolate firm TFP as the dependent variable. While below, TFP is
expressed as a predicted Solow residual, in practice I also semi-parametrically control
for the potential endogeneity of inputs following Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003), and Ackerberg et al. (2006), resulting in a robust set of TFP measures.14
TFPijt ≡ ε̂ ijt = ln(Y)ijt − β̂1ln(K)ijt − β̂2ln(L)ijt − β̂3ln(M)ijt (3.2)
12Supply and Use tables are at the commodity-by-industry level. Another commonly used input-output
table is the “Make” table, which is simply a transposed Supply table at the industry-by-commodity level.
13This procedure weights commodity production shares by industry, by commodities used by each
industry, such that each cell reflects one industry’s use of products from another given industry. The Matlab
code, assumptions, and adaptations of the Guilhoto and Filho (2005) procedure for the case of Colombia are
available at http://assets.wharton.upenn.edu/~bhyman/ColombiaFDI/GBPCOL2000.m.
14Investment and raw materials are used as the required proxies for Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) methods respectively. To estimate TFP using Ackerberg et al. (2006), I follow Jagadeesh
Sivadasan’s estimation routine (http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/jagadees/other/acf_code.html).
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With firm TFP estimated, we next define several FDI spillover channels. The main
insight from Javorcik (2004) is that we can specify between-industry productivity
spillover channels from MNCs as a linear combination of between-industry input-output
transaction data and within-industry foreign market shares (Horizontal), as follows:
Horizontaljt =
∑i∈MNC Yijt
∑i∈AllFirms Yijt
(3.3)
Backwardjt = ∑
k 6=j
αjktHorizontalkt (3.4)
Forwardkt = ∑
j 6=k
αjktHorizontaljt (3.5)
Horizontaljt is simply the foreign share of output in industry j in year t. Turning to
Backwardjt, we first define αjk which reflects the input share of industry k revenue paid
to industry j, as calculated from the 3-digit j-by-k input-output tables discussed in Section
3.1. Backwardjt is thus the row-sum of sales from domestic upstream industry j to all
downstream industries k weighted by the downstream foreign presence in each purchasing
industry k—a measure of domestic input sales to MNCs. Forwardkt is the column-sum of
industry k purchases from all industries j weighted by the upstream foreign presence in
each selling industry j—or MNC input sales to domestic firms.15 To illustrate the intuitive
appeal of such measures, Javorcik (2004) explains: “Suppose that the sugar industry sells
half of its output to jam producers and half to chocolate producers. If no multinationals
are producing jam but half of all chocolate production comes from foreign affiliates, the
Backward variable will be calculated as follows: 0.5 * 0 + 0.5 * 0.5 = 0.25.”
15In practice, when Forward is the measure of interest the foreign share of production Horizontal is purged
of export sales, which is made possible given the richness of the firm-level data. The main results are also
robust to using either revenue (output) as the denominator in αjk, or the sum of inputs in the denominator.
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This paper is concerned with mechanical (non-classical) measurement error in the
Backward effect due to overstated linkages in αjk. To make this clear notationally, rewrite
Backward with superscript D to denote its dependence on input-output coefficients αDjkt that
assign large weight to domestic firm input demand, and thus domestic inputs. The main
estimating equation is a TFP spillover specification with controls (such as exports) and
fixed effects to help control for MNC selection of time- or industry-invariant characteristics
such as industry profitability and business cycle peaks and troughs:
TFPijt = θ1Horizontaljt + θ2BackwardDjt + θ3Forwardjt + X ijtβ + ιi + λt + ε ijt (3.6)
Identifying Assumption: Identification of θ2 requires any measurement error in Backward to
be classical (random), such that E[εijt ∗ BackwardDjt |Horizontaljt, Forwardjt, X ijt, ιi, λt] = 0.
I show below however, that Backward mechanically over-weights domestic inputs, forcing
MNCs to source according to the domestic firm input structure. Stated differently, foreign
and domestic firms are assumed to have the same import propensity, overstating domestic
input sales to import-intensive MNCs. In the rest of the paper I explore the implications of
relaxing this strong assumption, and find that doing so can fundamentally alter the effects
of FDI on host country firm productivity.
3.2.1. Measurement Error from Import Propensity Assumption
While pioneering in its approach, the Javorcik (2004) estimator relies on national
input-output table aggregates which I argue contain important mechanical measurement
error. To see this, first consider a standard simplified input-output coefficient matrix α,
recalling that superscript D and F indicate dependence on largely domestic and foreign
inputs respectively:
Standard Input-Output Table with Implied Weight on Domestic Firm Linkages
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Agriculture Manufacturing Services
Agriculture 0.46 .33 = 10
D
30D+F 0.35
Manufacturing 0.24 0.14 .05
Services 0.20 0.20 0.48
Imported Inputs .10 .33 = 10
F
30D+F .12
Horizontalk (MNC Share) .30 .20 .40
TotalOutputk 15 30 20
Each αjk cell in the top 3x3 matrix is calculated by summing the total sales from supplier
sector j to downstream industry k, and then dividing by the total country output (revenue)
in sector k which is noted in the last row of the table. This yields the direct input
requirements from sector j per unit of output in sector k. Considering α12, domestic
suppliers (denoted with superscript D) sell 10 million pesos of agricultural inputs to
produce 30 million pesos of total manufacturing output.
To isolate the total sales from domestic input suppliers j to foreign MNCs alone (the object
of interest), the Javorcik (2004) innovation is to weight the row-sum of any input sector
j by the foreign share of output in each buying sector k (Horizontalk in the table above),
capturing the local upstream effects of foreign presence in downstream sectors. Consider
for example, total backward linkages to agriculture in the above table:
BackwardD1t = 0.46 ∗ 0.3 + 0.33 ∗ 0.2 + 0.35 ∗ 0.4 = 0.344 (3.7)
While this insight generated a wave of new work on FDI, the method masks important
heterogeneity in import intensity between domestic and MNC firms. To see this, now
consider the ideal, but unobservable, input-output table:
Ideal (Unobservable) Input-Output Table: Isolated MNC Linkages
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Agriculture Manufacturing Services
Agriculture .46 .067 = 10
D−8F
30D+F .35
Manufacturing .24 .14 .05
Services .20 .20 .48
Imported Inputs .10 .60 = 10
D+8F
30D+F .12
Horizontalk (MNC Share) .30 .20 .40
TotalOutputk 15 30 20
Here, the precise measurement error is highlighted in indicated by the additional term
8F. If MNCs in manufacturing are more likely to import agricultural inputs, as reflected
by subtracting 8 million pesos of domestic inputs and re-assigning them to imports, the
Backward measure in (3.7) sums to 0.2914, a roughly 14% measurement error which always
overstates the true linkages so long as foreign manufacturing firms have a larger import
propensity than domestic manufacturing firms. That is, purchases from MNCs of local
goods need to be scaled down to reflect imported inputs.
3.2.2. Measurement Error Generates Omitted Variable Bias from Imported Inputs
This section explores the implications of relaxing the identifying assumption stated in
Section 3.1. Suppose the true econometric model is as follows:
TFPijt = θ1Horizontaljt + θ∗2 Backward
∗
jt + θ3Forwardjt + X ijtβ + ιi + λt + ε ijt (3.8)
but the true effect Backward∗jt is proxied with error by Backward
D
jt :
Backward∗jt = δ0 + δ1Backward
D
jt + vjt (3.9)
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Plugging (3.9) into (3.8) yields:
TFPijt = θ∗2 δ0 + θ1Horizontaljt + θ
∗
2 δ1Backward
D
jt + θ3Forwardjt
+ X ijtβ + ιi + λt + θ∗2 vjt + ε ijt (3.10)
To evaluate how the proxy may generate bias, consider the following cases implied by
(3.10):16
• Case #1 - Consistent Estimates, Inflated Standard Errors: If E[vjt ∗ BackwardDjt |...] = 0 in
(3.9), we simply have an additional error term θ∗2 vjt that inflates standard errors, and
can identify θ∗2 δ1 in (3.10) as the coefficient of interest θ2 in (3.6).
• Case #2 - Classical Measurement Error (Attenuation Bias): If E[vjt ∗ Backward∗jt|...] 6= 0
in (3.9), then we have attenuation bias which drives estimates toward zero at a rate
proportional to the relative variance of the true measure and the measurement error.
• Case #3 - Omitted Variable Bias from Imported Inputs: If E[vjt ∗ BackwardDjt |...] 6= 0, then
the bias is ambiguous. However, because the mis-measurement here is argued to be
mechanical, we can derive an analytical expression for the bias. If BackwardDjt reflects
the impact of largely domestic input linkages on TFP, and this covaries with the impact
of omitted (un-separated) and largely imported input linkages on domestic supplier
TFP (≡ BackwardFjt), this produces the following omitted variable bias formula:
θ2 = θ
∗
2 + θ4
Cov[BackwardFjt, Backward
D
jt |...]
Var[BackwardDjt |...]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ρt
. (3.11)
Here, the biased estimate θ2 from (3.6) is a function of the true estimate θ∗2 and a bias
term. θ4 is the coefficient from regressing TFP on the omitted variable BackwardFjt were it
16These cases need not be mutually exclusive, however it is argued in Section 3.4 that Case #3 is of greatest
concern, as Cases #1 and #2 can be ruled out as driving the main results.
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included in the original estimation equation (3.6). To sign the bias in 3.11, we can sign θ4
and ρt independently.
Sign(θ4): In words, θ4 is the impact of MNCs importing inputs on the TFP of domestic
suppliers of those same inputs. We know from recent research that own-industry TFP and
imported inputs are positively correlated (Amiti & Konings (2007), Kugler and Verhoogen
(2008), Golberg et al. (2010), and Halpern et al. (2011)). It thus follows that if foreign firms
have a stronger propensity to import, increases in foreign firm TFP likely occur at the
expense of domestic input sourcing, such that θ4 < 0 (by assumption).
Sign(ρt): Using the definitions of ρt in 3.11 and Backward from 3.4, we can write:
ρt ≡
Cov[∑k αDjktHorizontalkt, ∑k α
F
jktHorizontalkt]
Var[BackwardDjt |...]
(3.12)
Define input-output matrices AD, AF ∈ RjXk with column vectors αDk , αFk ∈ Rj, and h ∈ Rk
a vector of Horizontal share components each denoted by Hk. Using the linearity properties
of covariance,17 we can re-write (3.12) (within each period t) as follows:
ρ = Var[BackwardDj |...]−1Cov[ADh, AFh]
= Var[BackwardDj |...]−1 ∑
1≤d, f≤k
Cov[HdαDd , H f α
F
f ]
= Var[BackwardDj |...]−1 ∑
1≤d, f≤k
HdH f Cov[αDd , α
F
f ]
= Var[BackwardDj |...]−1h
′︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∑
1≤d, f≤k
Cov[αDd , α
F
f ] h︸︷︷︸
>0
(3.13)
Because the components h are non-negative by definition, this expression makes clear that
what ultimately drives the omitted variable bias term is whether domestic and foreign
17Or skip directly to the result by using an analog of the following covariance property: if X is a random
vector with covariance matrix ∑(X) and A is a matrix that can act on X, then ∑(AX) = A∑(X)A
′
.
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input varieties are net complements or substitutes.18 If domestic and imported inputs are
net substitutes (complements), then the covariance term is negative (positive), resulting
in upward (downward) bias. Intuitively, the elasticity of substitution between imported
and domestic inputs drives the bias because the main estimating equation is in some sense
omitting the impact of import-intensive MNCs on domestic supplier TFP through the equal
import propensity assumption.
This also provides the foundation for a strong robustness test on whether an adjustment
to the Backward proxy actually purges it of its measurement error. For any proposed
improvement, the result above predicts that the magnitude of the bias between the original
and adjusted measures should be proportionate to the degree of substitutability between
domestic and imported inputs σ, such that that Corr(θ∗2,j − θ2,j, σj) > 0. In the next section
I propose such an improvement, and in Section 3.5, test for this correlation directly.
3.3. Estimation with Adjusted Backward Linkages
In this section I propose an “adjustment” to the Backard Linkage spillover measure that
relaxes the strong assumption that MNCs and domestic firms have the same import
propensity. Using firm micro-data on domestic and imported inputs by both domestic
firms and MNCs, we can re-scale each input-output coefficient to approximate the ideal,
unobserved input-output matrix. The ideal adjustment would be as follows:
BackwardFirstBestjt = ∑
k
αjkt(1− αDjkt)Horizontalkt (3.14)
where αDjkt sums firm inputs from sector j to domestic-only firms in sector k and divides by
the sum of all-firm output in sector k (implementing the operations in red in Section 3.2.1),
leaving only sales to multinational firms. However, as is the case in Javorcik (2004), despite
the increasing availability of detailed administrative data, separate input-output linkages
18For an alternative and perhaps more intuitive proof of this result, see Appendix 3.A.
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for domestic and MNC firms are rarely available.19 Instead I use micro-data to generate
new input-output coefficients by domestic and MNC firms. The adjustment is as follows:
BackwardAdjustedjt = ∑
k
αjktα̃ktHorizontalkt (3.15)
where
α̃kt ≡
ᾱkt
MNC
ᾱkt
AllFirms =
(∑i∈MNC
mDikt
Yikt
)/NMNC
(∑i∈AllFirms
mDikt
Yikt
)/NAllFirms
is an adjustment factor calculated from firm data that can isolate domestic inputs mD
from total inputs, and represents the average fraction of the overall domestic input-output
coefficient in downstream industry k attributable to MNC purchases.20 This adjustment is
always less than unity if MNCs have a lower domestic input (or higher import) propensity
than domestic firms, and thus scales down potentially overstated input-output coefficients
to better approximate the first-best coefficients in equation (3.14). The main exercise of this
paper will thus be to compare the original base specification to the following, where we
now substitute the new adjusted Backward measure for the original measure:
TFPijt = θ1Horizontaljt + θ2Backward
Adjusted
jt + θ3Forwardjt + X ijtβ + ιi + λt + ε ijt (3.16)
In Table 3.2 I present summary statistics for the FDI spillover measures tested in this
paper, including the adjusted Backward Linkage measure just defined. The average
Horizontal foreign market share is 4.4% in a given 3-digit industry, however with a standard
deviation of about 10% there is ample variation in MNC entry both within and across
19Javorcik (2004) is careful to recognize this data limitation as well, however does not have the rich
micro-data to explore its consequences more deeply.
20In practice, domestic input flows mDikt are not directly observed but are instead proxied by a time-varying
panel variable that sums domestic inventory and raw material stock and subtracts out imports. This
distinction however should be of little concern, as the adjustment measure reflects a unitless ratio of domestic
and foreign values whose variation of interest is the cross-sectional difference between original and adjusted
measures. Furthermore, when compared to a secondary firm measure of domestic input flows (mD2ikt ) which
scales input-output coefficients by the panel output variable, both domestic input measures share similar
summary statistics (see MD and MD2 in Table 1.)
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industries.21 Secondly, the average firm Backward Linkage measure is indeed reduced
when the adjustment is applied. The way in which this reduction occurs is discussed
at length in Section 3.4.
3.4. Main Results
We begin by estimating total factor productivity (TFP). Table 3 shows production function
estimation results using standard methods from the industrial organization literature.22
Across all specifications, output elasticities for capital are roughly twice as large as for
labor in Colombia, broadly consistent with other country studies of firm productivity in
Colombia.23 The output elasticities also suggest that the aggregate production function in
Colombia is roughly constant returns to scale. Figure 3.2 further displays predicted TFP
values at the firm-level. All four TFP distributions are relatively smooth and symmetric.
OLS, Olley-Pakes, and Ackerberg-Caves-Frazier standard deviations range between .3 and
.5, while Levinsohn-Petrin features a larger standard deviation of roughly 3.3. Differences
in these measures however are of little concern, as the main variation of interest in this
paper is the cross-sectional difference between variants of the Backward TFP spillover
measure.
Turning to the main results, Table 3.4 compares coefficients from the base specification
in equation (3.6), with the adjusted specification from equation (3.16). Panel A presents
results in logs and levels, while Panel B presents results in standardized variables for
comparability with other papers—that is, dividing both dependent and independent
variables by their sample standard deviations. Odd-numbered columns reflect base
specification models with the original Backward measure, while even-numbered columns
are specifications with the adjusted Backward measure. When Log(Output) is the dependent
21See Appendix B for annual time-series variation in Horizontal by 1-digit industry.
22For exposition, I present aggregate production function estimates in Table 3, however in subsequent
tables (as well as in Figure 2), TFP is estimated within broad 1-digit categories when estimated by OLS.
23See for example Eslava et al. (2004) for a comparison. One important difference is that this paper’s
measure for total inputs is taken by multiplying input-output coefficients by firm-level output as no input flow
value was available. This is not to be confused with the measure of domestic inputs used in the adjustment
factor, which is a panel stock value less imports.
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variable of interest (technically log revenue), factors of production are included as controls
in the regression.
The coefficients on Backward and Backward - Adjusted in Panel A show that across 4
out of 5 TFP and revenue outcome measures, the overall effect of downstream foreign
investment on upstream domestic firm productivity is positive and highly statistically
significant, but estimates reduce roughly in half when comparing original and adjusted
measures (odd and even columns pairwise). Magnitudes in Panel A are large because the
average exchange rate over the sample frame was roughly 1 US dollar to 2000 Colombian
pesos (COP). Interpretations of Backward and Backward - Adjusted coefficients in Panel A
thus reflect how much more (less) revenue in real 1999 Colombian pesos, domestic firms
incurred due to foreign presence in downstream sectors for the same level of inputs.
To contextualize these magnitudes and compare them to estimates from other papers,
Panel B implements the same regressions in standardized variables. In Panel B, estimates
reduce by well over a half when using the adjusted Backward measure. Interpreting
coefficients from the Olley-Pakes regressions—columns (5) and (6) of Panel B—a one
standard deviation increase in Backward Linkages results in a .62 standard deviation
increase when using the original Backward measure, but only a .21 standard deviation
increase when using the Backward - Adjusted measure. With an average Olley-Pakes TFP
value of 2.42 and a standard deviation of .43, these correspond to an 11.5% and 4.1%
TFP increase respectively when evaluated at the mean. The effect size of 11.5% on the
original Backward measure is also remarkably similar to the 15% output response to the
one-standard deviation Backward increase found in Javorcik (2004).
Across specifications in both panels, the coefficient on Horizontal is negative but not always
statistically distinguishable from zero. Furthermore, an increase in Forward linkages is
also negatively associated with domestic firm productivity in the same industry. These
effects are consistent with Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Javorcik (2004) respectively. To
explore how this implicates the total effect of FDI on local firms, in the last two rows of
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each panel I add together the coefficients on Backward (Backward - Adjusted) and Forward to
generate a net FDI impact value, and display the F-statistic on a joint hypothesis test that
the sum of these measures are statistically different than zero. Moving from odd to even
columns in Panel B, the net effect of FDI changes from positive to negative in all output and
TFP measures, suggesting that the adjusted Backward effect is large enough to reverse the
overall sign of the impact of FDI on local firm productivity. Importantly however, F-tests
on these effects do not always reject the null hypothesis that the net effect of FDI is zero.
Interpreting these results conservatively, we can at the very least confidently reject the
claim that FDI generates large net productivity benefits to domestic firms in Colombia.24
All specifications contain firm and year fixed effects to help control for MNC selection
of time- or industry-invariant characteristics such as industry profitability and business
cycle peaks and troughs, so results should be interpreted as average within-firm responses
to increased FDI. While the preferred specifications in Table 3.4 do not contain export
controls,25 the main results are robust to their inclusion. I instead focus on the more
conservative estimates in Table 3.4 as the paper’s preferred estimates as lower bound on
the bias. Lastly, it bears noting that the lower reported observation counts here reflect
the limited sample period over which there is sufficient import data to implement the
adjustment to the Backward variable. While the estimates in Table 3.4 are generated by
restricting the sample to those years (2007-2011), the results are also robust to including all
years and allowing firm fixed effects to be estimated from the full sample.
In Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 I further disaggregate these effects by broad 1-digit ISIC
industries and focus on OLS productivity estimates. Table 3.5 reports OLS production
function output elasticities by 1-digit industry, and Table 6 reports analogous estimates
of the main results by industry. The disaggregated results first suggest that overall effect
24I exclude Horizontal from the net effect to focus on the more prominent trade-off in the literature between
positive Backward and negative Forward spillovers, as most studies find no statistically significant evidence of
Horizontal effects. Including Horizontal would in fact make baseline effects even more negative.
25The main results are actually even stronger when including export controls as shown in Table 3.9 in the
Appendix. Note that Table 3.9 does not include imported input controls as they are already accounted for in
the first stage TFP estimation.
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reflects a weighted average of both positive and negative net FDI effects across industry
groupings, whose effect sizes vary between -1.3 and 1.7 standard deviations according
to Panel B. Furthermore, some industries exhibit a positive Horizontal effect, such as
Manufacturing, Construction, and (private) Services sectors, while more extractive sectors
such as Mining exhibit strongly negative competition effects. Unlike in Table 4, the net
effect is also statistically detectable across most industries, as indicated by high F-statistics.
When looking for which industries drive the overall decrease in Backward linakge TFP
spillovers, it appears that (private) Service, Public service, and Manufacturing industries are
responsible, although coefficients on manufacturing are not statistically different from zero
(though their net effect is statistically significant when combined with Forward linkages).
These three 1-digit industries are also among the top five of ten in imported inputs and
import intensity of output, providing further support for the hypothesis that the bias is
related to the equal import intensity assumption. Overall, in conjunction with the main
effects, these results suggest that there may in fact be several industries in which FDI is a
burden rather than a boon to domestic firm productivity.
3.4.1. Measurement Error Simulation
One concern raised early in the paper is that the adjusted Backward measure may be
introducing its own new measurement error which attenuates coefficient estimates toward
zero (see Case #1 in Section 3.2.1). As Table 3.6 demonstrates however, some industries
such as Construction and Mining actually exhibit an increase in Backward Linkages, which
would normally be precluded by an attenuation bias story. To test this more formally, I
perform a measurement error simulation that loops through the base specification adding
artificial error from a random uniform distribution with a larger and larger support to
the original Backward linkage measure, re-estimating the coefficient on Backward in each
iteration.
Figure 3 shows the results from that simulation, where the top horizontal red line indicates
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the coefficient estimate on Backward from column (3) of Panel A in Table 3.4 (5.401), while
the lower red line indicates the coefficient estimate on Backward - Adjusted from column (4)
of Panel A in Table 3.4 (2.423). The simulation suggests that the adjustment itself would
need to generate roughly 25% unintended measurement error in Backward for coefficients to
reach their observed values. To assess whether this is feasible, I also plot the distribution
of both the original and adjusted Backward measures in Figure 3.4, which shows that the
average difference between original and adjusted measures is on average only between 1%
and 2% (interpreting log differences as percentages).
These two observations combined suggest that the change in Backward Linkage TFP
spillovers is in fact due to an improvement rather than added measurement error.
3.5. Elasticity of Substitution Predictions and Results
Section 3.2.1 showed that the omitted variable bias found in each industry j is predicted to
be proportionate to the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported inputs.
Here we test that prediction. Toward this end, we first add flexibility to the production
function such that Yijt takes constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) arguments in foreign
and domestic inputs.
Yijt = AijtK
β1
ijt L
β2
ijtM
β3
ijt (3.17)
Mijt = (bDijt(m
D
ijt)
σj−1
σj + bFijt(m
F
ijt)
σj−1
σj )
σj
σj−1 (3.18)
Here, total inputs M are a composite of domestic mD and foreign mF (imported) inputs.
Each b term represents the relative importance of each input variety to the firm. This
functional form permits the estimation of the substitution parameter σj. To estimate σj, I
make small adaptations to a widely used method developed in Feenstra (1994), tailored to
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the context of Colombian input and import micro-data.
Feenstra Method and Adaptations. Feenstra (1994) estimates substitution elasticities between
imported and domestic varieties within goods across countries to calculate price index
responses to trade liberalization that account for utility from the increased variety of goods
available to consumers. In the context of this paper, there is no analagous utility function,
however the same set-up can be used to estimate a demand equation that isolates logged
market shares for imported and domestic input varieties on the left-hand side, as a function
of observables in the Colombian data on the right-hand side. To do this, denote Pjvt
the price index of each industry-j specific input variety v (now subscripting D and F as
domestic and foreign varieties) in year t. First order conditions with respect to each input
variety mivjt yield firm input demand and expenditure share formulas.26
mivjt = P
−σj
vjt bivjt
(
∑
v
bivjtP
1−σj
vjt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
φijt
1
1−σj
(3.19)
sivjt =
(
Pvjt
φijt
)1−σj
bivjt︸︷︷︸
assumed random
(3.20)
While Feenstra (1994) observes good-specific price indices but is limited to aggregate
expenditure (import) share data across countries, in this paper however, price data is
limited to aggregate annual input and import indices (not good- or industry-specific as
one cannot separate the industry-level producer price index into input and import price
indices), but highly detailed firm-level and thus industry-level expenditure share data
are observed. To account for this difference, assume that the price index above can be
decomposed such that we can write Pvjt = PvtPjt.27 Summing (3.20) over i and taking
26This also generates the familiar constant elasticity relative demand formula miFjtmiDjt =
(
PDjt
PFjt
)−σj
.
27Because expenditure shares vary by industry, one can still combine variation in expenditure shares and
aggregate input and import variety industries to estimate meaningful substitution elasticities.
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logs, demand can be re-written as a function of observables and year, industry, and
industry-year fixed effects to control for fixed characteristics (assuming that bijvt and thus
∑i bijvt are mean zero random tastes).28
log(svjt) = (1− σj)log(Pvt) + (1− σj)log(Pjt)− (1− σj)log(φjt)− log(bivjt)
= (1− σj)log(Pvt) + f j + f jt + ft + εvjt (3.21)
The supply side follows Feenstra (1994) and assumes Dixit-Stiglitz style mark-ups that
yield a supply curve that is multiplicative in terms that vary at the jt level and others
that are a function of stochastic inverse supply elasticity and technology terms ωj and ηjvt,
which are absorbed by the same fixed effects used in the demand equation yielding supply
in logs:
log(Pvt) = log(Pvt) + log(Pjt)
= log
(
∑
v
exp
(−ηvjt
ωj
)
P
1+ωj
ωj
vt
)
+ log
(
ηvjt
1 + ωj
)
+ log
(
s
ωj
1+ωj
vjt
)
=⇒ log(Pvt) =
ωj
1 + ωj
log(svjt) + f j + f jt + ft + δvjt (3.22)
Finally, Feenstra (1994) shows that we can combine supply and demand by multiplying
error terms to attain a compact structural estimation equation (assuming demand and
supply shifters ε and δ are orthogonal) that yields a closed-form solution for σj if σj > 1 :29
log(Pvjt)2 = γ1jlog(svjt)2 + γ2jlog(svjt)log(Pvjt) + f j + f jt + ft +
εvjtδvjt
1− σj
(3.23)
28Feenstra (1994) uses first differences instead of fixed effects, but these are functionally equivalent here.
29For a discussion of the limitations of the identifying assumption here, see Soderbery (2015).
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σj = 1 +
(
2ρ̂j − 1
1− ρ̂j
)
1
γ̂2j
(3.24)
ρ̂j =
1
2
−
(
1
4
− 1
4 + (γ̂22j/γ̂1j)
)1/2
In practice, I estimate σj within 3-digit ISIC categories such that only year fixed effects
are needed as additional controls in the regression. Table 3.7 shows the results from this
estimation. Of the 59 3-digit industries in the Colombian economy, 44 had sufficient price
index and import micro-data overlap to be included in the analysis. The final table displays
41 of these industries. Coffee Beans, Gas, and Waste Product industries were eliminated due
to insufficient observations in the sample period for which import expenditure shares are
available (2007-11). 39 out of these 41 industries have estimated substitution elasticities
over 1, the majority of which fall in the 2 to 4 range. Reassuringly, sectors such as Financial
Intermediation have very high substitution elasticities, whereas non-durables such as Meat
and Fish Products feature lower elasticities.
Only two industries had σ estimates less than 1, which are non-admissible in the Feenstra
routine: Other Transport Services and Social and Health Services. Rather than implementing
a grid search for these two industries as in Broda and Weinstein (2004) and Soderbery
(2015), because so few industries were not admissible, I display correlations both including
and omitting their estimates from the correlation coefficients. Figure 3.5 shows the results
from correlating these substitution elasticities with the bias calculated from subtracting the
original Backward coefficient from the adjusted coefficient in each 3-digit industry j.
Across all four TFP measures, the amount of bias is increasing in the elasticity of
substitution. The red line plots the unrestricted linear fit, the green line restricts the fit
to values of σ that are greater than 1, and the orange line restricts σ within 1 and 4 to test
its sensitivity to outliers. While there is a clear positive trend across all specifications and
restrictions, only three of the twelve fitted lines are statistically significant at the 10%-level,
however it bears noting that the correlation coefficients reflect a bi-variate regression with
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no controls to improve efficiency.
To check whether this correlation is consistent with the analytical sign in Section 3.3, note
that several 3-digit industries are biased downward rather than upward. As discussed,
this can only happen if the elasticity of substitution is low (σ < 1), or there are positive
effects of import-intensive MNCs on upstream suppliers (θ4 > 0). Figure 3.5 shows
that downward-biased industries have low substitution elasticities. While suggestive that
imported and domestic inputs are more complementary in those industries, Table 3.6
showed that some industries exhibit positive Horizontal spillovers (technology leakage or
competition effects), which may cause the downward bias here. Regardless of the ultimate
driver, the correlation pattern is consistent with the analytical sign and provides further
suggestive evidence that the Backward linkage bias is driven by imported inputs.
3.6. Robustness
While imported inputs appear to play an important role in estimating TFP spillovers from
MNCs, they enter the omitted variable bias in a complicated way such that one cannot
simply include them as controls in the regression.30 One may however, be concerned
that further omitted variables or selection concerns may differentially affect Backward and
Backward - Adjusted estimates in the cross-section. In Appendix 3.C, I show that the main
results are robust to the inclusion of export controls. I also show that results are robust to
limiting the sample to surviving (right-censored) firms, which helps circumvent selection
concerns regarding the entry and exit of import-intensive MNCs. Lastly, I also show that
the results are not being driven by allowing input-output coefficients to vary by time.
When fixing input-output coefficients at the values calculated in the first year of the panel,
the main results remain in tact.
One final inquiry relates to why Forward linkages are so persistently negative, as found
both here, in Javorcik (2004), and in other papers. I first implement a fix similar to the
30One additional reason for this is they are already accounted for in the first stage TFP estimation.
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Backward linkage adjustment, which scales each row of the input-output table by the share
of MNC sales relative to domestic firm sales in each selling sector (purging the measure of
exports). Unlike with Backward linkages however, MNCs sales of intermediates in the host
country should not result in understated linkages. Appendix 3.E shows that domestic
firms actually have higher export intensities than foreign firms. If anything, negative
effects found from unadjusted forward linkages should in fact become more negative
when adjusted to reflect the fact that MNCs have a larger share of their sales within the
country. Lastly, I examine whether strongly negative Forward linkage effects persist when
considering lagged specifications, as Javorcik (2004) implied that strong negative effects
emanate from MNCs imposing large adjustment costs on domestic firms when introducing
higher-quality inputs. If this is indeed the case, one should see the reversal of negative
Forward linkage effects over time [results pending].
3.7. Discussion
Global FDI inflows reached USD $1.46 trillion in 2013 (UNCTAD, 2014), capping a
remarkable trend in the growth of capital flows and relocation of multinational firms over
the preceding two decades. For developing countries that have received an increasing
share of these flows and continue to offer deferential FDI incentives, the question of
whether and how FDI generates net benefits or costs to local firms remains important.
Whereas the economic rationale for trade liberalization relates to the gains from trade,
the long-run gains from FDI are predicated on strong positive technology externalities or
productivity spillovers from MNCs to local firms. A long and influential empirical literature
(starting with Aitken and Harrison (1999)) has thus focused on identifying whether large
externalities from FDI exist, and through which channels they diffuse (Javorcik, 2004).31
Since the pioneering work of Javorcik (2004), a broad consensus has emerged that
most of the productivity gains from FDI percolate through Backward Linkages to
31Not discussed in this paper, is an equally large literature concerning the gains from FDI in the financial
intermediation sector, where externalties emanate from imperfect capital markets.
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MNCs—knowledge acquired by local suppliers when contracting with foreign firms at
the Pareto technology frontier. Yet a newer literature on the role of imported inputs in
firm productivity growth suggests that the most productive firms become that way in part
through importing inputs, motivating a fresh look at how Backward Linkage productivity
spillovers occur if MNCs are largely importers rather than domestic-sourcers of inputs.
In this paper, I show that “standard” Backward Linkage productivity spillover
specifications implicitly assume domestic and foreign firms share the same input structure
and propensity to import inputs. Using a novel Colombian firm panel that allows
me to isolate imported from domestic inputs, I propose a micro-data adjustment to the
input-output coefficients that are central to TFP spillover measures, making them more
reflective of MNCs’ observably higher import propensity. I find that this adjustment
reduces mean Backward Linkage productivity spillovers roughly in half—an economically
meaningful difference that is robust across four out of five measures of firm revenue and
TFP. By empirically allowing MNCs to substitute foreign for domestic intermediate inputs,
the intensity of contracting with local firms decreases, as do any productivity spillovers
that may arise from sharing technology with those upstream partners. Some industries
however, such as construction and mining, exhibit an increase in Backward Linkage TFP
spillovers. This highlights the importance of precise measurement of TFP spillovers, and
further suggests that the bias does not unambiguously overstate productivity gains. I
show that the magnitude and sign of the bias are analytically proportional to the elasticity
of substitution between domestic and imported inputs. In addition to robustness tests
confirming that measurement error in the adjusted measure cannot be driving the overall
results, I estimate substitution elasticities between domestic and imported inputs, and find
correlation coefficients that are broadly consistent with this prediction.
Overall, these results suggest that productivity spillovers may vary largely by industry.
They also highlight how input market liberalization can have adverse feedback effects
by strengthening MNCs competing for foreign market share. While recent work has
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begun to explore interactions between foreign affiliate and input quality choices (see
for example Antras and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Fieler et al. (2014)), more theoretical
precision is needed to understand what assumptions may generate diverse interactions
between FDI and imported inputs at the industry level.32 Overall, this paper highlights the
importance of properly accounting for heterogeneity in imported inputs when estimating
TFP spillovers from FDI. More empirical work is needed to understand whether this
reduction is specific to Colombia, or instead a widespread problem in the literature.
32Particularly interesting is what appears to be a Forward Linkage puzzle—if imported inputs are so
complementary to firm productivity then why do so many studies on FDI consistently find negative Forward
Linkage TFP effects from MNC sales of productive inputs to domestic firms?
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Figure 3.1: Domestic and MNC Import Propensities (2007-11), Kernal-Smoothed
Histograms
Notes. Firms with import intensity above 1 (0 in logs) are largely import-export MNCs.
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Figure 3.2: Firm TFP Distributions by OLS (Solow residual), Olley-Pakes,
Levinsohn-Petrin, and Ackerberg-Caves-Frazier Methods
Notes. TFP distributions reflect estimates from full sample (1995-2011).
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Figure 3.3: Attenuation Bias Check - Measurement Error Simulation of Backward Variable
Figure 3.4: Standard vs. Adjusted Backward Measure (’07-11), Kernal-Smoothed
Histograms
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Figure 3.5: Correlation Between Elasticity of Substitution and Backward Coefficient Bias
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics - Colombian Firm Panel Variables (1995 - 2011)
Domestic Firms Multinational Firms All Firms
ln π - Log Profit (post-tax) 11.570 12.733 11.595
(1.903) (3.012) (1.942)
ln Y - Log Total Revenue (sales) 14.665 14.831 14.670
(1.771) (2.525) (1.794)
ln C - Log Reported Total Costs (Admin., Delivery, Operating) 15.005 14.609 14.993
(1.651) (2.978) (1.709)
ln K - Log Property, Plants, and Equipment (PPE) 14.150 13.812 14.139
(1.617) (2.710) (1.665)
ln L - Log Wage Payments (Short and Long-Run Obligations) 10.100 10.623 10.112
(1.785) (2.141) (1.796)
ln M - Log Total Inputs (Domestic + Imported) 12.466 13.159 12.478
(2.096) (2.603) (2.108)
ln MD - Log Dometic Inputs (from Input-Output Table) 13.836 13.907 13.838
(1.896) (2.609) (1.918)
ln MD2 - Log Domestic Inventory (Materials + Inventory) 12.288 12.776 12.295
(2.056) (2.539) (2.063)
ln MF - Log Imported Inputs 11.829 12.955 11.876
(2.197) (2.966) (2.246)
MD/Y - Domestic Input Itensity of Output (nominal) 0.368 0.297 0.366
(0.247) (0.177) (0.246)
MF/Y - Imported Input Intensity of Output (nominal) 0.030 0.319 0.037
(0.150) (2.521) (0.425)
ln Exports 12.609 12.174 12.597
(2.593) (3.918) (2.637)
ln Investment in PPE 11.426 11.240 11.424
(3.047) (2.757) (3.045)
Years Firm in Panel 10.685 10.739 10.687
(5.168) (5.067) (5.165)
No. of Observations 138,411 4,739 143,150
No. of Firms 28,449 936 29,369
Notes. Varibles in real 1999 COP unless indicated. Panel data from Colombian corporate business registry Superintendencia
de Sociedades, and span 1995 to 2011. Import and export data from Colombian customs agency DIAN, and span 2007-11.
Input-Output tables are annual from Colombian statistics agency DANE, assembled using alterations of Matlab procedure
from Guilhoto and Filho (2005). Full sample contains 28,449 unique domestic firms and 936 foreign firms. The smaller
DIAN sample contains 16,245 unique domestic firms. Summary statistics above reflect full sample, and are restricted
to firms with non-zero operating revenue, labor, capital, and materials.
Table 3.2: Variation in FDI Spillover Measures
Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Horizontal (Foreign Market Share of Revenue) 0.044 0.102 0.000 1.000
Backward Linkage Sales (to MNCs) 0.028 0.043 0.000 0.355
Backward Linkage Sales (to MNCs) - Adjusted 0.009 0.033 0.000 0.547
Forward Linkage Sales (from MNCs) 0.004 0.014 0.000 0.430
No. of Observations 143,150
No. of Firms 29,639
Notes. Horizontal revenue shares calculated within 59 3-digit industries. Backward and Forward values are firm-specific.
See Appendix B for futher time-series variation in foreign revenue shares by 1-digit industry in Colombia.
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Table 3.3: Production Function Estimation Results
OLS Olley Levinsohn Ackerberg-
-Pakes -Petrin Caves-Frazier
Log(Capital) 0.271∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.00214) (0.00173) (0.00346) (0.00231)
Log(Labor Payments) 0.106∗∗∗ 0.0570∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.00137) (0.00226) (0.000812) (0.00136)
Log(Total Inputs) 0.703∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗
(0.00243) (0.00283) (0.00168) (0.00231)
Sum of Coefficients 1.081 0.959 0.985 0.985
No. of Observations 138,826 138,826 138,826 138,826
No. of Firms 29,369 29,369 29,369 29,369
Notes. Standard errors heteroskedastik-robust for OLS, O-P, L-P, bootsrapped for A-C-F
according to Jagadeesh Sivadasan block routine. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4: Main Effects of Foreign Direct Investment on Domestic Firm TFP
Panel A. In Logs and Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log Log TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP
VARIABLES Output Output (OLS) (OLS) (OP) (OP) (LP) (LP) (ACF) (ACF)
Horizontal -2.165** -2.356** -2.259** -2.574** -2.597** -2.897** -5.833 -6.388 0.0275 0.0811
(0.943) (1.120) (1.037) (1.271) (1.147) (1.407) (3.763) (4.529) (0.0530) (0.0689)
Backward 5.215*** 5.401*** 6.253*** 14.28** -0.0483
(1.511) (1.444) (1.665) (6.146) (0.0479)
Backward - Adjusted 2.224*** 2.423*** 2.737*** 6.115** -0.0759**
(0.577) (0.594) (0.678) (2.426) (0.0386)
Forward -8.852*** -8.680** -8.972*** -8.895*** -10.36*** -10.28*** -32.82*** -32.67*** -0.0492 -0.0587
(3.214) (3.351) (3.035) (3.202) (3.460) (3.659) (10.74) (11.21) (0.0512) (0.0500)
Observations 38,036 38,036 38,036 38,036 38,036 38,036 38,036 38,036 38,221 38,221
R2 0.700 0.692 0.307 0.292 0.351 0.329 0.026 0.025 0.035 0.035
Number of Firms 16,504 16,504 16,504 16,504 16,504 16,504 16,504 16,504 16,582 16,582
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Export Controls No No No No No No No No No No
Net Effect (Backward + Forward) -3.637 -6.456 -3.571 -6.472 -4.103 -7.542 -18.54 -26.55 -0.0974 -0.135
F-statistic (Net Effect=0) 8.636 0.0352 10.90 0.0359 11.11 0.0342 4.366 0.0111 0.275 0.0110
Panel B. In Standardized Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log Log TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP
VARIABLES Output Output (OLS) (OLS) (OP) (OP) (LP) (LP) (ACF) (ACF)
Horizontal -0.124** -0.135** -0.415** -0.473** -0.615** -0.686** -0.181 -0.198 0.00994 0.0293
(0.0539) (0.0640) (0.191) (0.234) (0.272) (0.333) (0.117) (0.140) (0.0191) (0.0249)
Backward 0.125*** 0.418*** 0.623*** 0.186** -0.00734
(0.0364) (0.112) (0.166) (0.0802) (0.00728)
Backward - Adjusted 0.0406*** 0.142*** 0.207*** 0.0606** -0.00876**
(0.0106) (0.0349) (0.0514) (0.0240) (0.00445)
Forward -0.0702*** -0.0689** -0.229*** -0.227*** -0.341*** -0.338*** -0.141*** -0.141*** -0.00246 -0.00294
(0.0255) (0.0266) (0.0774) (0.0817) (0.114) (0.120) (0.0462) (0.0482) (0.00257) (0.00251)
Observations 38,036 38,036 38,036 38,036 38,036 38,036 38,036 38,036 38,221 38,221
R2 0.700 0.692 0.307 0.292 0.351 0.329 0.026 0.025 0.035 0.035
Number of Firms 16,504 16,504 16,504 16,504 16,504 16,504 16,504 16,504 16,582 16,582
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Export Controls No No No No No No No No No No
Net Effect (Backward + Forward) 0.0552 -0.0282 0.189 -0.0846 0.283 -0.131 0.0450 -0.0800 -0.00980 -0.0117
F-statistic (Net Effect=0) 0.00220 2.883 0.000445 2.644 0.00208 2.753 0.00537 1.326 0.0300 0.874
Standard errors clustered at the 5-digit industry level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. When Log(Output) is the dependent variable, production
factors are included as controls.
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Table 3.5: Production Function Estimation Results by 1-Digit Industry (OLS)
Agriculture Mining Petroleum Manufacturing Construction Utilities Services Transportation Financial Public
Log(Capital) 0.197∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗
(0.00500) (0.0373) (0.0266) (0.00705) (0.00375) (0.0324) (0.00305) (0.0119) (0.00765) (0.00414)
Log(Labor Payments) 0.164∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.0832∗∗∗ 0.0460∗∗∗ 0.0658∗∗∗ 0.0282∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.0935∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.00405) (0.0165) (0.0184) (0.00222) (0.00348) (0.0173) (0.00172) (0.00865) (0.00865) (0.00407)
Log(Total Inputs) 0.759∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗∗ 0.774∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.860∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.819∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗
(0.00604) (0.0408) (0.0290) (0.00734) (0.00433) (0.0314) (0.00319) (0.0134) (0.00890) (0.00528)
Sum of Coefficients 1.120 1.117 1.080 1.058 1.057 1.062 1.065 1.088 1.100 1.111
No. of Observations 12,991 1,095 1,282 39,046 13,556 267 45,701 5,935 2,999 15,954
No. of Firms 2,091 279 330 6,383 3,240 76 10,342 1,392 684 4,552
Standard errors heteroskedastik-robust. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6: Effects of Foreign Direct Investment on Domestic Firm TFP, OLS by 1-Digit Industry
Panel A. In Logs and Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
VARIABLES Agricult. Agricult. Mining Mining Manufact. Manufact. Construct. Construct. Services Services Transport. Transport. Public Public
Horizontal -4.658 -4.367 -5.104** -5.884** 2.513*** 2.449*** 19.84*** 1.941*** 4.481* 10.18*** -0.107 0.114 -13.65*** -1.254
(4.235) (4.463) (2.008) (1.996) (0.743) (0.699) (0.641) (0.229) (2.676) (3.253) (0.197) (0.106) (3.444) (4.741)
Backward -2.778** -25.69 1.528 -89.63*** 15.02*** -2.310** 25.39***
(1.040) (41.01) (1.940) (3.772) (1.499) (1.068) (5.774)
Backward - Adjusted -2.519** 6.418** 0.673 13.17*** 6.663*** -2.002** 1.852
(1.032) (2.589) (0.892) (0.554) (0.300) (0.756) (2.065)
Forward -26.36** -28.07*** 26.13 74.67 -0.724 -0.550 -103.1*** -32.95*** -7.660*** -8.492*** -10.91** -13.17*** -10.80 -29.05
(9.571) (9.572) (37.00) (50.21) (1.084) (1.109) (3.725) (2.063) (0.894) (0.754) (5.104) (4.533) (10.81) (33.56)
Observations 4,269 4,269 361 361 10,772 10,772 5,028 5,028 12,666 12,666 753 753 3,400 3,400
R2 0.630 0.629 0.617 0.621 0.759 0.759 0.385 0.385 0.790 0.785 0.375 0.400 0.664 0.577
Number of Firms 1,452 1,452 183 183 3,813 3,813 2,073 2,073 6,391 6,391 426 426 1,827 1,827
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Export Controls No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Net Effect (Backward + Forward) -29.14 -30.59 -0.379 -0.369 0.804 0.123 -192.7 -19.79 7.359 -1.829 -13.22 -15.18 14.59 -27.20
F-statistic (Net Effect=0) 2.011 1.586 0.547 0.0262 3.639 7.253 486.7 1108 25.13 27.58 5.229 7.382 22.13 0.0479
Panel B. In Standardized Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
VARIABLES Agricult. Agricult. Mining Mining Manufact. Manufact. Construct. Construct. Services Services Transport. Transport. Public Public
Horizontal -0.856 -0.802 -0.938** -1.081** 0.462*** 0.450*** 3.645*** 0.357*** 0.823* 1.870*** -0.0197 0.0209 -2.508*** -0.230
(0.778) (0.820) (0.369) (0.367) (0.137) (0.128) (0.118) (0.0421) (0.492) (0.598) (0.0362) (0.0195) (0.633) (0.871)
Backward -0.215** -1.987 0.118 -6.932*** 1.162*** -0.179** 1.964***
(0.0805) (3.172) (0.150) (0.292) (0.116) (0.0826) (0.447)
Backward - Adjusted -0.148** 0.377** 0.0395 0.774*** 0.391*** -0.118** 0.109
(0.0607) (0.152) (0.0524) (0.0326) (0.0176) (0.0444) (0.121)
Forward -0.672** -0.716*** 0.667 1.905 -0.0185 -0.0140 -2.631*** -0.841*** -0.195*** -0.217*** -0.278** -0.336*** -0.275 -0.741
(0.244) (0.244) (0.944) (1.281) (0.0277) (0.0283) (0.0950) (0.0526) (0.0228) (0.0192) (0.130) (0.116) (0.276) (0.856)
Observations 4,269 4,269 361 361 10,772 10,772 5,028 5,028 12,666 12,666 753 753 3,400 3,400
R2 0.630 0.629 0.617 0.621 0.759 0.759 0.385 0.385 0.790 0.785 0.375 0.400 0.664 0.577
Number of Firms 1,452 1,452 183 183 3,813 3,813 2,073 2,073 6,391 6,391 426 426 1,827 1,827
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Export Controls No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Net Effect (Backward + Forward) -0.887 -0.864 -1.240 -1.210 0.0997 0.0255 -9.563 -0.0672 0.966 0.175 -0.457 -0.454 1.688 -0.632
F-statistic (Net Effect=0) 1.565 1.169 0.785 3.103 7.714 12.06 326.2 1087 11.71 14.47 5.431 7.303 6.444 0.0262
Standard errors clustered at the 5-digit industry level. Three sectors were omitted due to insufficient observations - Utilities, Financial Services, and Petroleum firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.7: Elasticity of Substitution Estimates, Imported and Domestic Inputs
Downstream Industry Log(Share) X
3-Digit ISIC Log(Share2) (s.e.) Log(Price) (s.e.) γ1j γ2j ρj σj
Other Agricultural Goods 0.0933*** (0.00600) -0.412* (0.0901) 0.093 -0.412 0.086 3.200
Forestry and Wood 0.167* (0.0412) -0.472 (0.266) 0.167 -0.472 0.146 2.758
Fishing Goods 0.169*** (0.00594) -0.526** (0.0635) 0.169 -0.526 0.147 2.574
Petroleum, Natural Gas, Uranium 0.122** (0.00163) -0.422** (0.000804) 0.122 -0.422 0.110 3.078
Metallic Minerals 0.213*** (0.00573) -0.718*** (0.0179) 0.213 -0.718 0.180 2.086
Non-Metallic Minerals 0.159*** (0.00183) -0.440*** (0.0220) 0.159 -0.440 0.140 2.903
Meat and Fish Products 0.106** (0.0128) -0.826** (0.0910) 0.106 -0.826 0.097 2.080
Oils, Animal and Vegetable Grease 0.155*** (0.00819) -0.592** (0.0793) 0.155 -0.592 0.136 2.423
Lactose Products 0.117*** (0.00794) -0.538*** (0.0140) 0.117 -0.538 0.106 2.637
Milled Products and Starches 0.125** (0.0111) -0.416 (0.170) 0.125 -0.416 0.113 3.098
Coffee Products 0.218*** (0.0128) -1.061* (0.232) 0.218 -1.061 0.184 1.729
Sugar and Cane Products 0.198*** (0.00888) -0.816** (0.0703) 0.198 -0.816 0.169 1.975
Cacao, Chocolate, and Jam Products 0.212*** (0.0138) -0.683*** (0.0356) 0.212 -0.683 0.179 2.144
Food Products 0.132** (0.0134) -0.413*** (0.0287) 0.132 -0.413 0.118 3.098
Beverages 0.184** (0.0181) -0.495*** (0.0183) 0.184 -0.495 0.159 2.638
Tobacco Products 0.383*** (0.0276) -1.422* (0.252) 0.383 -1.422 0.296 1.408
Fabrics and Fiber Textiles 0.171** (0.0159) -0.389** (0.0359) 0.171 -0.389 0.149 3.123
Textile Articles 0.151*** (0.0112) -0.533*** (0.0309) 0.151 -0.533 0.133 2.588
Clothing Textiles 0.0915* (0.0171) -0.409** (0.0574) 0.092 -0.409 0.084 3.221
Leather Products 0.124*** (0.00766) -0.478*** (0.00676) 0.124 -0.478 0.111 2.830
Wood Products 0.159*** (0.0118) -0.413* (0.108) 0.159 -0.413 0.140 3.029
Paper and Cardboard Products 0.204** (0.0160) -0.467*** (0.00788) 0.204 -0.467 0.174 2.690
Printing and Editing Machines 0.143* (0.0277) -0.296* (0.0484) 0.143 -0.296 0.127 3.887
Petroleum, Refining, Nuclear Combustion 0.199** (0.0266) -0.836* (0.227) 0.199 -0.836 0.170 1.951
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 0.122*** (0.00367) -0.406*** (0.00442) 0.122 -0.406 0.110 3.161
Other Machinery, Electronic Appliances 0.141*** (0.00446) -0.486*** (0.00542) 0.141 -0.486 0.126 2.764
Transportation Equipment 0.106* (0.0229) -0.476*** (0.0323) 0.106 -0.476 0.097 2.874
Furniture 0.132* (0.0136) -0.456* (0.0495) 0.132 -0.456 0.118 2.900
Electric Energy 0.336 (0.0277) -2.103 (0.207) 0.336 -2.103 0.265 1.304
Water 0.406** (0.0330) -1.183* (0.159) 0.406 -1.183 0.310 1.465
Private Construction 0.0519* (0.00677) -0.379** (0.0206) 0.052 -0.379 0.049 3.501
Public Construction 0.101*** (0.00303) -0.341 (0.129) 0.101 -0.341 0.092 3.639
Repair Services 0.154 (0.0476) -0.400* (0.0704) 0.154 -0.400 0.136 3.107
Tourism, Hotels, Restaurants 0.109*** (0.00304) -0.620* (0.0773) 0.109 -0.620 0.099 2.435
Land Transport Services 0.145* (0.0150) -0.670 (0.156) 0.145 -0.670 0.128 2.274
Air Transport Services 0.282* (0.0399) -1.047* (0.217) 0.282 -1.047 0.230 1.670
Other Transport Services -0.124* (0.0237) 1.969** (0.223) -0.124 1.969 -0.145 0.428
Financial Intermediary Services 0.0887** (0.0115) -0.143 (0.0751) 0.089 -0.143 0.082 7.363
Rental Services 0.0707* (0.00895) -0.176 (0.0716) 0.071 -0.176 0.066 6.292
Social and Health Services 0.0227 (0.114) 0.497 (0.864) 0.023 0.497 0.022 -0.966
Sewage Services 0.258*** (0.0144) -1.280** (0.121) 0.258 -1.280 0.213 1.570
Notes. This table displays the results from regression variants of equations (3.23) and (3.24) following Feenstra (1994), with
log domestic and import prices as the dependent variable in the first two columns. Coffee Bean, Gas, and Waste Product
industries were eliminated due to insufficient observations. Only two industries above feature σ estimates less than 1, Other
Transport Services and Social and Health Services. Rather than implementing a grid search for these two industries as in Broda
and Weinstein (2004), I omit these industries in subsequent correlation results. All estimates contain year fixed effects and
heteroskedatic-robust errors.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Alternative Proof of Omitted Variable Bias Correlation with Elasticity of Substitution
Without loss of generality, assume k ∈ {1, 2}. Directly expanding the numerator in 3.12:
Cov[
2
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αDjk Hk,
2
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D
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D
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By the additive law of covariance:
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By the linearity properties of expectations and since H1 and H2 are scalars:
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Since H1 and H2 are positive scalars by definition, the sign of 3.12 is thus driven entirely
by the covariance among foreign and domestic inputs.
Appendix B. Time-Series Variation in Foreign Market Shares
Table 3.B.1: Foreign Revenue Shares (Horizontal) by 1-Digit Industry in Colombia
Industry 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Agriculture, Fishing, and Forestry 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.013 0.005 0.004 0.003
Mining 0.365 0.456 0.470 0.520 0.735 0.745 0.003 0.006 0.000
Petroleum 0.854 0.812 0.838 0.868 0.901 0.897 0.878 0.945 0.945
Manufacturing 0.019 0.022 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.022 0.008 0.012 0.004
Construction 0.070 0.188 0.171 0.134 0.034 0.019 0.027 0.119 0.011
Electricity, Gas, and Water 0.000 0.019 0.178 0.535 0.168 0.068 0.044 0.349 0.005
Commerce, Tourism, and Services 0.044 0.049 0.065 0.074 0.069 0.053 0.051 0.090 0.004
Transportation-Communications 0.069 0.069 0.068 0.046 0.019 0.015 0.059 0.192 0.008
Financial Intermediation 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.066 0.001
Public Services 0.016 0.059 0.064 0.051 0.047 0.037 0.040 0.168 0.008
170
Appendix C. Main Results with Export Controls
Table 3.C.1: Effects of Foreign Direct Investment on Domestic Firm TFP - with Export
Controls
Panel A. In Logs and Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log Log TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP
VARIABLES Output Output (OLS) (OLS) (OP) (OP) (LP) (LP) (ACF) (ACF)
Horizontal -1.852*** -1.582*** -2.326** -1.879* -2.513* -1.981 -1.193 0.727 -0.00136 0.00371
(0.588) (0.520) (1.162) (1.108) (1.301) (1.230) (6.738) (6.238) (0.0916) (0.104)
Backward 6.798*** 10.67*** 11.78*** 20.35 -0.216
(1.388) (1.792) (1.969) (16.29) (0.133)
Backward - Adjusted 1.590*** 2.475*** 2.662*** 2.760 -0.0760
(0.390) (0.579) (0.653) (4.383) (0.0682)
Forward -5.485** -4.973* -8.668** -8.204* -9.962** -9.446* -35.50** -34.50* -0.0418 -0.0498
(2.374) (2.658) (3.752) (4.322) (4.255) (4.890) (16.21) (17.72) (0.0553) (0.0638)
Observations 6,916 6,916 6,916 6,916 6,916 6,916 6,916 6,916 6,923 6,923
R2 0.556 0.538 0.373 0.326 0.349 0.295 0.007 0.007 0.044 0.044
Number of Firms 3,040 3,040 3,040 3,040 3,040 3,040 3,040 3,040 3,043 3,043
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Export Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Net Effect (Backward + Forward) 1.313 -3.383 2.001 -5.730 1.820 -6.783 -15.15 -31.74 -0.258 -0.126
F-statistic (Net Effect=0) 15.83 0.000338 20.08 0.386 20.02 0.406 3.104 1.248 2.877 0.697
Panel B. In Standardized Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log Log TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP
VARIABLES Output Output (OLS) (OLS) (OP) (OP) (LP) (LP) (ACF) (ACF)
Horizontal -0.106*** -0.0904*** -0.427** -0.345* -0.595* -0.469 -0.0370 0.0225 -0.000490 0.00134
(0.0336) (0.0297) (0.213) (0.204) (0.308) (0.291) (0.209) (0.193) (0.0331) (0.0376)
Backward 0.164*** 0.825*** 1.175*** 0.265 -0.0329
(0.0334) (0.139) (0.196) (0.212) (0.0203)
Backward - Adjusted 0.0291*** 0.145*** 0.202*** 0.0273 -0.00878
(0.00713) (0.0340) (0.0495) (0.0434) (0.00788)
Forward -0.0435** -0.0395* -0.221** -0.209* -0.328** -0.311* -0.153** -0.148* -0.00210 -0.00250
(0.0188) (0.0211) (0.0957) (0.110) (0.140) (0.161) (0.0698) (0.0762) (0.00277) (0.00320)
Observations 6,916 6,916 6,916 6,916 6,916 6,916 6,916 6,916 6,923 6,923
R2 0.556 0.538 0.373 0.326 0.349 0.295 0.007 0.007 0.044 0.044
Number of Firms 3,040 3,040 3,040 3,040 3,040 3,040 3,040 3,040 3,043 3,043
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Export Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Net Effect (Backward + Forward) 0.120 -0.0104 0.604 -0.0639 0.847 -0.109 0.113 -0.121 -0.0350 -0.0113
F-statistic (Net Effect=0) 2.672 5.416 3.218 1.119 3.250 0.980 4.785 0.102 1.146 0.0485
Standard errors clustered at the 5-digit industry level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. When Log(Output) is the dependent variable, production
factors are included as controls.
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Appendix D. Geographic Variation in FDI and TFP
1995 Mean Solow TFP (OLS) versus MNC Revenue
Legend: Total MNC Revenue (Red); Mean Domestic Firm TFP (Blue)
0.000000
0.000001 - 49000000.000000
49000000.000001 - 145000000.000000
145000000.000001 - 203000000.000000
203000000.000001 - 1080000000.000000
1080000000.000001 - 8320000000.000000
-1.521672 - -1.200000
-1.199999 - -1.000000
-0.999999 - -0.600000
-0.599999 - -0.400000
-0.399999 - -0.200000
-0.199999 - 0.200000
0.200001 - 0.400000
0.400001 - 0.600000
¯0 100 200 300 40050 Miles
2000 Mean Solow TFP (OLS) Versus MNC Revenue
¯0 100 200 300 40050 Miles
Legend: Total MNC Revenue (Red); Mean Domestic Firm TFP (Blue)
0.000000
0.000001 - 49000000.000000
49000000.000001 - 145000000.000000
145000000.000001 - 203000000.000000
203000000.000001 - 1080000000.000000
1080000000.000001 - 8320000000.000000
-1.521672 - -1.200000
-1.199999 - -1.000000
-0.999999 - -0.600000
-0.599999 - -0.400000
-0.399999 - -0.200000
-0.199999 - 0.200000
0.200001 - 0.400000
0.400001 - 0.600000
2005 Mean Solow TFP (OLS) Versus MNC Revenue
¯0 100 200 300 40050 Miles
Legend: Total MNC Revenue (Red); Mean Domestic Firm TFP (Blue)
0.000000
0.000001 - 49000000.000000
49000000.000001 - 145000000.000000
145000000.000001 - 203000000.000000
203000000.000001 - 1080000000.000000
1080000000.000001 - 8320000000.000000
-1.521672 - -1.200000
-1.199999 - -1.000000
-0.999999 - -0.600000
-0.599999 - -0.400000
-0.399999 - -0.200000
-0.199999 - 0.200000
0.200001 - 0.400000
0.400001 - 0.600000
2010 Mean Solow TFP (OLS) Versus MNC Revenue
¯0 100 200 300 40050 Miles
Legend: Total MNC Revenue (Red); Mean Domestic Firm TFP (Blue)
0.000000
0.000001 - 67000000.000000
67000000.000001 - 153000000.000000
153000000.000001 - 223000000.000000
223000000.000001 - 616000000.000000
616000000.000001 - 11100000000.000000
-1.521672 - -1.200000
-1.199999 - -1.000000
-0.999999 - -0.600000
-0.599999 - -0.400000
-0.399999 - -0.200000
-0.199999 - 0.200000
0.200001 - 0.400000
0.400001 - 0.600000
172
Appendix E. Domestic and MNC Export Propensities (2007-11)
Figure 3.D.1: Domestic and MNC Export Propensities
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